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ABSTRACT
The last decade has seen an explosive growth of both: (1) enterprise service-oriented software
systems, for managing enterprise resources and automating business processes, and (2) user-
centric, cloud-based web applications, which provide richer experiences and more intelligent
services to end-users than traditional, monolithic applications. The adoption of systems
that are based on Internet-accessible software components, a class of distributed software
systems to which we simply refer as Internet software, is expected to grow tremendously
in the future. Nevertheless, designing and developing dependable Internet software poses
a unique set of challenges, making the already difficult issue of whether a deployed system
meets its specification requirements even harder to address than for traditional software
systems.
In this dissertation, we develop formal specification, simulation, prototyping, and formal
analysis techniques and tools for distributed software services, based on rewriting logic, the
Maude system, and the theory of Orc, with the overall goal of improving the reliability of
Internet software. The dissertation focuses on the formal specification and analysis of two
fundamentally important aspects of Internet software systems: (1) the correctness of service
compositions, and (2) the availability of services.
For service composition specification and analysis, we systematically use and extend meth-
ods from the rewriting logic semantics project and apply them to service orchestrations in
Orc, providing a simple, elegant and efficient formal model for timed orchestration design
and analysis. The rewriting specifications of the semantics of Orc is presented in three main
semantics-preserving refinements in order to achieve maximum efficiency and expressive-
ness: (1) an SOS-based rewriting semantics, (2) a reduction rewriting semantics, and (3)
an object-based rewriting semantics. A specification of the the latter in Real-Time Maude
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is used as a back-end for a high-level, web-based tool, MOrc, enabling exhaustive formal
verification, including model checking, of service orchestrations in Orc. Moreover, the disser-
tation develops a natural transformation path from formal models of Orc programs to actual,
provably-correct, distributed implementations with physical timing, which enable observing
actual possible behaviors of service orchestrations in realistic environments.
For the service availability problem, the dissertation extends current methods based on
rewriting logic for the specification and analysis of availability properties to improve their
efficiency and scalability. In particular, the dissertation first presents parallel versions of the
statistical model checking algorithm of Sen, Viswanathan and Agha [1] and the statistical
quantitative analysis algorithm of Agha, Meseguer and Sen [2]. The parallel algorithms
we propose, which are implemented in a parallel, client/server extension of VeStA, called
PVeStA, exploit an inherent parallelization opportunity within these statistical analysis
algorithms, where multiple, independent Monte-Carlo simulations are performed. Perfor-
mance gains as a result of parallelization can in practice be remarkable, as demonstrated
using several experiments. Furthermore, using Maude and PVeStA, we apply the rewriting
logic approach to availability analysis to the Adaptive Selective Verification (ASV) protocol
and verify, in the presence of denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, several of its availability prop-
erties, which were previously shown either analytically or statistically by low-level network
simulations.
In addition, the dissertation proposes an expressive and modular method for the formal
specification and analysis of service availability against DoS in service compositions using
generic ASV object wrappers. This is achieved essentially by combining techniques developed
for Orc service orchestrations and service availability analysis. The method is illustrated by
specifying and analyzing an ASV-endowed service orchestration pattern in Orc.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The last decade has seen an explosive growth of service-oriented software systems across
various application domains, such as health care, e-commerce, finance and government.
Such enterprise software systems proved very effective in managing internal resources and
automating business processes of the enterprise in the open, and distributed environment
of the Internet. Furthermore, a new breed of user-centric, personalized web applications
that are based on aggregations of cloud services provided over the Internet has recently
emerged to provide richer experiences and more intelligent services to end-users on various
stationary and mobile platforms. The adoption of systems that are based on Internet-
accessible software components, a class of distributed software systems to which we simply
refer as Internet software, is expected to grow tremendously in the future.
Nevertheless, designing and developing dependable Internet software poses a unique set of
challenges. Internet software systems are geographically distributed, highly concurrent sys-
tems, in which service requests and responses are handled asynchronously over an unreliable
communication medium. Furthermore, communication and processing overhead may affect
the time it takes the system to complete a given task, and hence its overall performance
and usability. In addition, increased distribution and accessibility expose Internet software
to malicious uses and attacks. Consequently, such software systems admit fairly complex
interaction behaviors that are hard to predict or analyze. For these reasons, the already dif-
ficult issue of whether a deployed system meets its specification requirements is even harder
to address for Internet software.
In general, applying formal techniques and tools to the software development process has
gained noticeably increased interest within both the research community and industry over
the past few years. The mathematical rigor of formal methods, especially at the early stages
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of specification and design, facilitate developing higher quality software systems. Moreover,
these methods are (at least partially) mechanizable in the form of supporting tools, which
can substantially improve their scalability and accessibility and reduce their adoption costs.
Research in formal methods has culminated in a wide variety of formalisms for specifying
systems and their behaviors, including automata-theoretic approaches [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9],
logics and process calculi [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15], and (often semi-formal) visual modeling
languages [16, 17, 18, 19]. These formalisms target different classes of systems and may
differ widely in their underlying abstractions, expressive power, decidability properties, and
tool support. One such formalism that strikes a good balance between expressiveness and
verifiability is rewriting logic [10]. Rewriting logic provides a general and executable specifi-
cation and verification framework through the use of an expressive equational logic for data
representations and (conditional) rewrite rules for dynamic system transitions. This frame-
work, on which this thesis builds, can naturally model deterministic and non-deterministic
systems, sequential and concurrent languages, and probabilistic and real-time processes. A
feature-rich implementation of rewriting logic is available in the Maude system [20], along
with an ever expanding set of associated formal analysis tools.
In contrast to system specifications, which, as in the rewriting logic case, are often exe-
cutable, properties of systems are normally specified in typically non-executable formalisms,
such as modal logics [21], including most prominently temporal logic on computation trees
[22], and axiomatic assertions in some form of predicate logic, such as Hoare logic [23]
and JML [24]. Depending on the formalisms used, different formal techniques for property
verification may be used, including deductive reasoning with a theorem prover, reachability
analysis and model-checking. A significant amount of research in the area focuses on improv-
ing the efficiency and scalability of such verification techniques, and increasing automation
in supporting tools.
Industrial adoption of formal methods in software development has primarily focused
on embedded software systems mainly because of their safety critical concerns. A recent
survey by Woodcock et. al. [25] covered a wide range of fairly large industrial formal
methods projects that have been carried out over the last twenty years, including Rockwell
Collins’ AAMP7 microcode design verification against security policies using ACL2 [26] and
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Airbus’s flight control design using the SCADE toolkit [27], based on the real-time language
Esterel [28]. The survey reports that the vast majority (over 90%) of these projects had
seen improvements in product quality, and over one-third had reduced project durations
and costs. Although most respondents to the survey were pleased with the final products,
some (about 15%) believed that the formal analysis and verification tools were lacking more
features and could be improved. The survey also shows an especially growing interest in
applying formal methods to real-time and distributed applications with emphasis on the
specification and design phases of development.
Despite these successes in the realm of embedded software systems, applications of formal
methods to Internet software in industry have not been as successful or as widely accepted,
sparking an increasingly growing research interest in this problem (see, for example, the
papers on automated formal specification and verification of web services and systems in
WWV’09 [29], WS-FM’10 [30], FACS’2010 [31], and earlier editions and references there).
The unique challenges associated with developing Internet software require extending current
formal methods and developing new techniques and tools to effectively and efficiently capture
their essential characteristics.
1.1 Problem Description
The thesis focuses on the formal specification and analysis of two fundamentally important
aspects of Internet software systems: (1) the correctness of service compositions, and (2) the
availability of services.
Service Composition. Service composition is a disciplined process of combining indi-
vidual service invocations into a larger, more useful service. Composability of services is one
of the most critical design principles of the service-oriented computing (SOC) paradigm and
its various instantiations, such as Software-as-a-Service architectures and business process
and workflow management. This is because composability promotes abstractions, modular-
ity, reusability, and interoperability of services, which are some of the fundamental goals of
SOC for developing and managing large, and distributed Internet software. Within the SOC
paradigm, services are normally implemented as web services, and their compositions are
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specified using a web services orchestration language, such as the Business Process Execution
Language (BPEL), which is now an OASIS standard known as WS-BPEL [32], and is part
of an expansive set of industry standards for web services [33].
The correctness problem of timed service compositions asks whether a given composition
performs its intended task (functional correctness) while satisfying its timing requirements
(non-functional correctness). In practice, designing compositions of services is a heavily
error-prone activity. Given the inherent dependence of Internet-accessible software compo-
nents and business processes on composing services, the importance of specifying correct
service compositions is quite clear and cannot be overemphasized.
One of the most prominent research proposals to address this problem, which is centrally
relevant to this thesis, is J. Misra’s theory of orchestration, called Orc [34], which was further
developed by Misra and Cook [35]. Orc defines an elegant theory and programming model
for timed service compositions that, unlike other approaches, provides simple abstractions
for services with powerful and expressive orchestration primitives. Services are represented
by sites, which may produce values when invoked and whose names may be passed around
as values. The Orc theory inspired later developments of process-calculus-based formalisms
for various aspects of service compositions, such as the Calculus of Sessions and Pipelines
(CaSPiS) [36], which is a calculus for describing service sessions and their interactions, and
the the Signal Calculus (SC) [37], a variant of Ambient Calculus [38] for event-notification-
based service coordination. Other calculus-based approaches also exist (e.g. [39] and [40],
which are based, respectively, on λ-calculus and event calculus, both with emphasis on safety
properties).
Other approaches that are based directly on BPEL have also been proposed (see the
manuscript [41] for a fairly comprehensive survey). Given BPEL’s unfortunate lack of formal
semantics, these approaches essentially provide formalizations of (subsets of) BPEL in some
formal model of computation, like BPEL encodings in Petri Nets [42] and the pi-calculus [43],
or devise new BPEL-inspired formal languages, such as Blite [44], a lightweight language for
service orchestrations that captures some of BPEL’s salient features, such as transactions
and process termination. However, as a result of its complexity and expansive feature-
set, a comprehensive and practical BPEL-based formal framework for the specification and
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verification of service orchestrations remains elusive.
Service Availability. The second focal point of the thesis is the problem of formally
specifying and analyzing availability of services in a communication network against denial-
of-service (DoS) attacks, which are cyber attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in the underly-
ing communication protocol to deny service to legitimate users. In recent years, DoS attacks
have become an increasingly prevalent form of security threat as more complex distributed
systems are being deployed. Moreover, distribution and interconnectivity have enabled an
even more effective and powerful form of distributed DoS attacks (or DDoS), in which a large
number of compromised systems are used collectively to carry out the attack, such as the
fairly recent, highly publicized, DDoS flooding attack, in which an extremely large number
of malicious Domain Name Service (DNS) requests overloaded a major DNS server rendering
several large e-commerce web sites inaccessible, including Amazon, Wal-Mart, and Expedia1.
Despite quick mitigation efforts by the DNS provider, the system experienced a downtime
of about an hour, and continued to experience problems a few hours after recovery.
Despite having been a serious security threat for the last few years, most currently deployed
DoS countermeasures rely on ad-hoc solutions based on heuristics and remedial procedures.
In particular, current approaches tend to rely on a combination of three techniques: (1) basic
prevention measures, such as patching known vulnerabilities and increasing user awareness
of security issues; (2) detection procedures, including sniffing network traffic, router and
firewall filtering, and intrusion detection; and (3) mitigation procedures, such as bandwidth
throttling, server replication, and load balancing [45]. In practice, such techniques may have
helped in protecting against some known attacks. However, for these countermeasures to
be more effective and comprehensive, a deeper, more formal understanding of the commu-
nication protocols, the communication channels, and the characteristics of DoS attacks is
required.
Although formal modeling and analysis of DoS vulnerabilities and defense measures of
protocols have been studied before [46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51], they remain a considerably less
understood subject than formal analysis of other, more traditional security properties, such
as secrecy, authentication and integrity. Part of the challenge is that availability proper-
1See the article at http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/12/24/cnet.ddos.attack/index.html.
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ties are intimately related to performance and reliability, and therefore have an inescapable
quantitative nature that does not have an obvious formal model or analysis technique. In
addition, DoS attacks and countermeasures are probabilistic in nature due to the inherent
behavioral uncertainties, such as underlying attacker behaviors, and the use of randomized
algorithms. Moreover, as distributed systems increase in complexity, the intricacy of such
attacks and DoS-resilient measures continues to grow accordingly. Such complications un-
derscore the need for expressive probabilistic formal models as well as efficient and scalable
automatic formal analysis techniques and tools.
1.2 Overview of the Approach
The thesis develops formal specification, simulation, prototyping, and formal analysis tech-
niques and tools, based on rewriting logic and Maude, and the Orc theory, for distributed
software services, with the overall goal of improving the reliability of Internet software. The
key idea underlying the research approach of the the thesis is that rewriting logic is both a
theoretical model, with clear and well-defined mathematical foundations, and an expressive
computational formalism, providing a practical method for performing concurrent compu-
tations through its logical deduction system. The logic is also supported by an advanced
and efficient implementation in the Maude tool with generic formal analysis tools. Addi-
tionally, extensions to real-time and probabilistic rewrite theories and their implementations
in Maude provide a unified modeling and analysis framework for the systems of interest.
By combining rewriting logic with suitable models and algorithms, we are able to provide
novel, expressive, efficient and scalable formal specification and analysis methods for service
orchestration and availability problems.
More specifically, for the orchestration problem, we systematically use and extend methods
from the rewriting logic semantics project and apply them to Misra’s theory of orchestration,
Orc, to provide a clean and efficient formal model for timed orchestration design and analysis.
The choice of Orc over other languages and models is motivated by the simplicity, elegance,
and expressiveness of its programming model. Moreover, unlike other approaches, Orc ad-
dresses the problem of timed orchestrations using high-level abstractions and constructs that
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neatly capture the essential features of an orchestration without any distracting lower-level
abstractions or implementation details. Moreover, the thesis develops a natural transfor-
mation path from formal models of Orc programs to actual, provably-correct, distributed
implementations that enable observing actual possible behaviors of service orchestrations
in realistic environments. In spite of its inherent simplicity, the formal semantics and dis-
tributed implementation of Orc present some major challenges, including: (1) the real-time
nature of the language, (2) the different priorities among its actions, (3) the efficiency of spec-
ification execution and analysis, and (4) formal analysis at the implementation level. While
some of these challenges are addressed by adapting existing techniques and tools, such as
modeling and analysis of real-time behaviors in rewrite theories, others are addressed by
new, specialized techniques that we propose as part of this work, as discussed in Chapters 3,
4 and 5 of the thesis.
For the service availability problem, the thesis extends current methods based on rewrit-
ing logic for the specification and analysis of availability properties against DoS attacks
with the goal of improving their efficiency and scalability. In particular, the thesis first
presents parallel versions of the statistical model checking and quantitative analysis algo-
rithms developed in [1] and [2], which have implementations in the VeStA tool. The parallel
algorithms are implemented in a parallel, client/server extension of VeStA’s implementa-
tion, namely PVeStA. This development takes advantage of an inherent parallelization
opportunity within the statistical model-checking algorithm, where multiple, independent
Monte-Carlo simulations are performed. Furthermore, since such simulations are usually
very time-consuming and tend to significantly dominate the cost of other computations in
the algorithm, performance gains and increased scalability are in practice remarkable, which
is demonstrated using several experiments. Despite the focus of the thesis on services, the
parallel statistical model checking algorithms remain fully generic.
In addition, the thesis proposes an expressive and modular method for the formal specifi-
cation and analysis of service availability against DoS in service compositions using generic
Adaptive Selective Verification (ASV) wrappers. This is achieved essentially by combining
techniques developed for Orc service orchestrations and service availability analysis based on
rewriting logic, Maude, and PVeStA. The method is illustrated by specifying and analyzing
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an ASV-wrapped service orchestration pattern in Orc.
1.3 Summary of Contributions
In general, the thesis contributes to several ongoing research efforts, while creating new
possibilities for further research, within the broad areas of formal methods, programming
languages, and web services. The following list highlights the main research contributions
of the thesis:
1. An efficiently executable formal specification in rewriting logic of the real-time, syn-
chronous semantics of Orc capturing Orc’s intended operational semantics.
2. A high-level, web-based tool, MOrc, for the formal specification and analysis of Orc
orchestrations based on Orc’s rewriting semantics and Real-Time Maude.
3. A new, elegant and effective formal approach to the specification and analysis of web
service orchestrations using MOrc for improving Internet software reliability.
4. A verifiably correct, distributed implementation of Orc in Maude, based on its rewriting
semantics, with physical timing, endowed with formal analysis using Real-Time Maude.
5. Parallelization and optimization of existing algorithms for formal statistical model
checking and quantitative analysis, and their implementation in PVeStA.
6. Further developing the rewriting-based techniques for the probabilistic modeling and
statistical analysis of probabilistic systems, and using them to formally model and
verify quantitative properties of the ASV protocol.
7. An object-based, probabilistic, formal specification of the ASV protocol as a generic
protocol wrapper enabling modular specification of DoS-resilient communication sys-
tems.
8. A novel approach to the formal statistical analysis of availability of services under DoS
attacks of service orchestrations based on Orc and ASV wrappers.
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1.4 Thesis Outline
This section gives a brief outline of the thesis, along with references to previous work on
which the different parts of the thesis are based.
The thesis begins in Chapter 2 by reviewing preliminaries on rewrite theories and their
real-time and probabilistic extensions. The chapter also describes at a high level how such
units of specifications in rewriting logic can be executed and analyzed in Maude and its
real-time extension in Real-Time Maude. This is followed in Section 2.3 by a quick overview
of Orc, its syntax, semantics, and some of its algebraic properties as used in the thesis.
Chapter 3 discusses in detail the first main contributions of the thesis by introducing the
SOS-based rewriting semantics RsosOrc and the semantically equivalent reduction rewriting
semantics RredOrc of Orc. The chapter gives proofs of desirable executability properties about
them and validates with experiments the efficiency advantage of RredOrc over RsosOrc. The work
presented in this chapter extends previous work that appeared in [52, 53] and in the extended
report [54].
Chapter 4 introduces a natural semantic extension to the reduction rewriting semantics
of Orc to an object-based semantics, ROrc, on which subsequent developments are based.
An initial version of this extension originally appeared in [54, 53]. This is followed by a
description of MOrc, a web-based tool, based on ROrc, enabling various formal analysis
methods, including LTL model checking, on Orc expressions at the level of Orc, using Real-
Time Maude as a back-end. The tool is illustrated with several examples.
In Chapter 5, we describe a general transformation method, based on Maude’s support
for communication with external objects through sockets, in which a real-time formal spec-
ification of a language such as Orc can be turned with minimal effort into a distributed
implementation with physical timing. The transformation is described in detail for Orc and
illustrated with a case study. This is followed by showing how such a distributed implemen-
tation, can be formally modeled and analyzed in Real-Time Maude. This chapter is based
on previously published work in [55] and the technical report [56].
In Chapter 6, we describe in detail parallel algorithms for statistical model checking of
probabilistic formulas in PCTL/CSL and statistical quantitative analysis of QuaTEx ex-
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pressions, and their implementations in PVeStA. Substantial speedup gains as a result of
parallelization are validated through several statistical analysis examples, including statisti-
cal analysis of availability properties of the ASV protocol modeled as a probabilistic rewrite
theory. The parallel statistical model checking work presented in this chapter extends pre-
vious results that appeared in [57], and the formal analysis of the ASV protocol is based on
previous work in [58].
Chapter 7, introduces a modular approach to endow formal specifications of systems and
their distributed deployments with ASV-based DoS protection measures using generic ASV
protocol wrappers, specified as a probabilistic rewrite theory. This chapter, which is based
on previous work in [58], describes the specification of ASV wrappers in detail and discusses
the assumptions under which statistical model-checking analysis can be applied. This is
followed by an application of ASV Wrappers to Orc to analyze availability of services in an
Orc service orchestration pattern.
Finally, a discussion of related work is given in Chapter 8, followed by a discussion of
further research directions in Chapter 9.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
In this chapter, we review, at a high level, some preliminaries on rewriting logic, the Maude
system, and the theory of Orc. More details can be found in the cited references below.
2.1 Rewriting Logic
Rewriting logic [59] is a general formalism that unifies in a natural way different concurrency
models [10, 60]. It is also an expressive semantic framework that is well suited to give formal
semantic definitions of sequential and concurrent systems and languages (see [61, 62, 63]
and references there). Furthermore, with recent real-time and probabilistic extensions, the
logic is capable of succinctly modeling real-time, stochastic, and hybrid systems [64, 65, 66].
Moreover, with the availability of high-performance rewriting logic implementations, such
as Maude [20], specifications can both be executed and formally analyzed.
2.1.1 Rewrite Theories
The unit of specification in the logic is a rewrite theory, which gives a formal description of
a concurrent system including its static state structure and its dynamic behavior. Assuming
that t, u, v and w (and their decorated variants) are terms and s is a sort, a rewrite theory, in
its most general form, is a tuple R = (Σ, E∪A,R, φ), consisting of: (i) a theory (Σ, E∪A) in
membership equational logic (MEL) [67], where Σ is a MEL signature having a set of kinds,
a family of sets of operators, and a family of disjoint sets of sorts, E is a set of Σ-sentences,
which are universally quantified Horn clauses with atoms that are either equations (t = t′) or
memberships (t : s), and A is a set of equational axioms, such as commutativity, associativity
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and/or identity axioms for some operators in Σ; (ii) a set R of universally quantified labeled
conditional rewrite rules of the form:
(∀X) r : t→ t′ if
∧
i
ui = u
′
i ∧
∧
j
vj : sj ∧
∧
l
wl → w′l (2.1)
where r is a label; and (iii) a function φ : Σ→ P(N) that assigns to each operator symbol f
in Σ of arity n > 0 a set of positive integers φ(f) ⊆ {1, . . . , n} representing frozen argument
positions where rewrites are forbidden.
While the MEL theory (Σ, E∪A) specifies the user-defined syntax and equational axioms,
which define the system states as elements of the initial algebra associated to (Σ, E ∪ A), a
rule r : t→ t′ if C in R gives a general pattern for a possible concurrent change or transition
in its state (modulo the restrictions imposed by φ), with the intuition that an instance θ(t)
of t (with θ a substitution) may rewrite to θ(t′) in the state of the system whenever the
condition θ(C) is satisfied. Such rewrites are deduced according to the inference rules of
rewriting logic, which are described in detail in [68]. Using these inference rules, a rewrite
theory R proves a statement of the form (∀X) t → t′, meaning that, in R, any instance of
the state term t can reach the corresponsing instance of the state term t′ in a finite number
of steps. A detailed discussion of rewriting logic as a unified model of concurrency and its
inference system can be found in [10]. [68] gives a precise account of the most general form
of rewrite theories and their models.
2.1.2 Probabilistic Rewrite Theories
Probabilistic rewrite theories [65] extend regular rewrite theories with probabilistic rules,
which can specify probabilistic behaviors of systems. Assuming −→x and −→y are disjoint sets
of variables, a probabilistic rewrite rule has the following form:
(∀−→x ,−→y ) r : t(−→x ) −→ t′(−→x ,−→y ) if C(−→x ) with probability −→y := pi(−→x )
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A probabilistic rule introduces on its right-hand side term new variables −→y , the values of
which depend on a probability distribution function pi parametrized by θ(−→x ), where θ is a
matching substitution satisfying the condition C. An example of a probabilistic rewrite rule,
borrowed from [20], is the following rule:
clock(t, c) −→ if B then clock(t+ 1, c− (c/1000.0)) else broken(t, c)
with probability B := Bernoulli(c/1000.0)
The rule specifies a battery-operated clock transition that is based on the outcome B of a
biased coin toss, where the bias is proportional to the current battery charge c. In general,
probabilistic rewrite theories can model different probabilistic systems with discrete or con-
tinuous probability distribution functions. Furthermore, they can express models involving
both probabilistic and non-deterministic features. The reader is referred to [2] for a more
rigorous definition of probabilistic rewrite theories.
2.1.3 Real-Time Rewrite Theories
A real-time rewrite theory [64] extends a regular rewrite theory with support for modeling
real-time behaviors of systems. In particular, in a real-time rewrite theory Rτ = (Στ , Eτ ∪
Aτ , Rτ , φ): (i) the equational theory (Στ , Eτ ∪Aτ ) contains a sort for Time representing the
time domain, which can be either dense or discrete, and declares a system-wide operator
that encapsulates the whole system being modeled into a special sort GlobalSystem for
managing time elapse, and (ii) the set of rewrite rules Rτ is the disjoint union of two sets
RI and RT , where RI consists of instantaneous rewrite rules having the form (2.1) above
and representing instantaneous transitions in the system, and RT consists of tick rewrite
rules modeling system transitions that take a non-zero amount of time to complete. A tick
rewrite rule has the following form
r : {t} τ−→ {t′} if C
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where τ is a term of sort Time representing the duration of time required to complete the
transition specified by the rule. The global operator { } encapsulates the whole system into
the sort GlobalSystem to ensure the correct propagation of the effects of time elapse to every
part of the system. A detailed discussion of real-time rewrite theories and their semantics,
including a detailed explanation of how they can be reduced to ordinary rewrite theories by
explicitly introducing a global clock as part of the global state, can be found in [64, 69].
2.2 The Maude System
Maude [20] is a high-performance implementation of rewriting logic and its underlying MEL
sublogic. A basic unit of specification in Maude can be either a functional module, corre-
sponding to a MEL theory E = (Σ, E ∪ A), or a system module, defining a rewrite theory
R = (Σ, E ∪ A,R, φ). A functional module may contain module inclusion assertions, sort
and subsort declarations, operator symbols declarations (optionally with some equational
attributes, including equational axioms A such as associativity, commutativity and/or iden-
tity), and conditional equations and membership axioms. Admissible functional modules,
which are modules that satisfy some reasonable executability requirements, including ground
confluence and termination (modulo the axioms A) and sort-decreasingness of the equations,
can be executed in Maude by equational simplification modulo axioms using the equations E
as simplification rules from left to right and Maude’s matching algorithms modulo A to sim-
plify a term to its canonical form with a least sort. Equational simplification modulo axioms
of an admissible functional module yields an operational semantics, defined by the algebra
of canonical forms CanΣ/E∪A, for its corresponding theory that coincides with its mathe-
matical, initial algebra semantics, given by the initial algebra TΣ/E∪A (see Sections 4.6–4.8
in [20] and cited references there). Simplification modulo axioms A can be performed by the
reduce command in Maude.
An admissible system module, which may additionally contain possibly conditional rewrite
rules, must satisfy the executability requirements for its equational part in addition to the
ground coherence of the rules R with respect to the equations in E and to admissibility
conditions on the rules, which ensures that all variables in the rules can be instantiated by
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(incremental) matching. Such admissible modules can be executed in Maude by rewriting
with rules (abiding by the restrictions imposed by φ) and oriented equations modulo the
axioms A, which in this case corresponds exactly to the mathematical semantics of R, which
rewrites with R modulo the equational theory E ∪ A (see Section 6.3 in [20] and [68, 70]).
Rewriting of system modules can be performed in Maude by means of the rewrite command,
which applies a rule-fair strategy to explore a possible behavior of the system, the frewrite
command, which applies a position-fair and rule-fair strategy, or the search command,
which explores the entire reachable state space of the system, to find states instantiating a
given pattern and satisfying a given semantic condition, following a breadth-first strategy.
Furthermore, Maude provides a linear temporal logic (LTL) model checker for verifying safety
and liveness properties, under the assumption that the set of states reachable from a given
initial state is finite.
2.2.1 Simulating and Analyzing Probabilistic Rewrite Theories
In general, probabilistic rewrite theories are not directly executable, since probabilistic
rewrite rules are nondeterministic, as noted in Section 2.1.2 above. However, they can
be simulated in Maude by sampling values for the new variables appearing in the right-hand
sides of the probabilistic rewrite rules from appropriate probability distributions. Sampling
is performed using Maude’s built-in random number generator function random(s), with s
a seed, and a counter function counter that rewrites with an internal strategy to the next
natural number [2].
Monte Carlo simulations of probabilistic rewrite theories obtained in this way can be an-
alyzed statistically using statistical model checking and quantitative analysis algorithms,
provided any unquantified non-determinism is avoided [2, 1], which is easily achievable
for object-oriented probabilistic rewriting specifications. Statistical model checking veri-
fies, within a desired statistical confidence level, formulas in a probabilistic temporal logic,
such as the Continuous Stochastic Logic (CSL) [71]. Statistical quantitative analysis, on the
other hand, uses an expressive temporal language, called Quantitative Temporal Expressions
(QuaTEx) [2], that supports parametrized, real-valued recursive function declarations, an
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if-then-else construct, and a next operator ©, to quantitatively specify richer properties
about probabilistic models. Both techniques rely on discrete-event simulations of the model,
obtained by Monte Carlo simulations of the form described above, and are implemented
in a tool called VeStA 2.0 (or simply VeStA in the rest of the thesis), with support for
probabilistic rewrite theories [72]. We will elaborate on these statistical analysis algorithms
in Chapter 6. Further details can be found in [2, 1, 73].
2.2.2 Real-Time Maude
While real-time rewrite theories with deterministic tick rules can be specified in Maude and
analyzed using its standard analysis tools, a more expressive and flexible implementation
and analysis of such theories, for both discrete and continuous time domains, is provided by
Real-Time Maude (RTM) [74], which is an extension to Maude written using its reflective
features. RTM modules provide the data types, operators, and execution strategies that
enable the specification of timed modules with built-in or user-defined time domains. For
example, the RTM module POSRAT-TIME-DOMAIN-WITH-INF specifies a dense time domain
represented by the non-negative rationals with the infinity element. Time tick rewrite rules
are in general non-deterministic, since the amount of time τ by which a system may ad-
vance its clock may be non-deterministic. Therefore, tick rules are in general not directly
executable, and, for this reason, RTM defines a number of time sampling strategies, such as
the general maximal sampling strategy (which advances time until the next instant when
some instantaneous rewrite rule becomes enabled), which can be used to execute timed
modules. Furthermore, RTM comes equipped with a range of formal analysis tools for timed
modules, including timed rewriting (the commands trewrite and tfrewrite), timed and
untime search (tsearch and utsearch), and time-bounded and time-unbounded LTL model
checking (the command mc). For timed modules with non-deterministic time tick rule(s),
the analysis is carried out with respect to a chosen time sampling strategy. O¨lveczky and
Meseguer [75] characterized a very broad class of timed rewrite systems for which this model
checking analysis is sound and complete, when using the general maximal time sampling
strategy. A complete description of RTM and its formal analysis features can be found
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in [74].
2.2.3 Sockets and External Objects in Maude
Maude provides a low-level implementation of sockets, which effectively enables a Maude pro-
cess to exchange messages with other processes, including other Maude instances, according
to the connection-oriented TCP communication protocol. More specifically, a Maude config-
uration CF, which is a Maude term of the sort Configuration corresponding to a multiset of
objects and messages, such that CF contains a socket portal, which is a predefined constant
<> of sort Portal (a subsort of Configuration), may communicate with objects external
to the Maude process executing CF through a set of special messages defining an interface
to Maude sockets. Assuming that O is an identifier for an object in CF, these messages are
as follows:
1. createClientTcpSocket(socketManager, O, ADDRESS, PORT), which asks Maude’s
socket manager, a factory for socket objects, for a client socket to a server located at
ADDRESS:PORT. Maude then responds with either a createdSocket(O, socketManager,
SOCKET) message, indicating successful creation of the client socket SOCKET, or a
socketError(O, socketManager, S) message, with S a string briefly describing the
reason for failure.
2. send(SOCKET, O, S), which asks for the string S to be sent through SOCKET. This
message elicits either a message sent(O, SOCKET), when the string is successfully
sent, or a message closedSocket (O, SOCKET, S), if an error occurred.
3. receive(SOCKET, O), which solicits a response through SOCKET. When a response
is received, Maude issues the message received(O, SOCKET, S), with S the string
received. In case of an error, the socket is closed with the message closedSocket(O,
SOCKET, S).
4. createServerTcpSocket(socketManager, O, PORT, BACKLOG), which asks Maude’s
socket manager to create a server socket at port PORT, with BACKLOG a positive inte-
ger specifying the maximum allowed number of queue requests. The message elicits
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either a messagecreatedSocket(O, socketManager, SERVER-SOCKET), or a message
socketError(O, socketManager, S).
5. acceptClient(SERVER-SOCKET, O), which causes Maude to listen for incoming con-
nections at SERVER-SOCKET. If a client connection is accepted, Maude responds back
with the message acceptedClient (O, SERVER-SOCKET, ADDRESS, SOCKET), where
ADDRESS is the client’s address and SOCKET is a newly created socket for communicating
with the client. The message socketError(O, socketManager, S) is issued in case
of failure.
6. closeSocket(SOCKET, O), which causes Maude to close the socket and issue the mes-
sage closedSocket(O, SOCKET, S).
Rewriting a term with external objects in Maude is performed with the erewrite com-
mand (also abbreviated as erew). A more detailed discussion of sockets and support for
external objects in Maude can be found in [20].
2.3 The Orc Theory
Orc [34, 35] is a timed theory for orchestration of services. It provides an expressive and
elegant programming model for describing timed, concurrent computations. A site in Orc
represents a service, which may range in complexity from a simple function to a complex web
search engine, depending on the orchestration problem. A site may also represent the inter-
action with a human being, most commonly within the context of business workflows [76].
A site, when called, may produce, or publish, at most one value. A site may not respond to
a call, either by design or as a result of a communication problem. For example, if CNN is a
site that returns the news page for a given date d, then CNN (d) might not respond because
of a network failure or it may choose to remain silent because of an invalid input value d.
Site calls are strict, i.e., they assume call-by-value semantics.
Being a timed theory, different site calls in Orc may occur at different times. A site call
may be purposefully delayed using the internal site Rtimer(t), which publishes a signal after t
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E ∈ ExpressionName x ∈ Variable w ∈ Value ∪ {stop}
Orc program ::= ~d ; f
d ∈ Declaration ::= E(~x) , f
f, g ∈ Expression ::= 0 | p(~p) | E(~p)
| f | g | f >x> g | g <x< f | f ; g
p ∈ Parameter ::= x | w
Figure 2.1: Syntax of Orc
time units. Furthermore, responses from calls to external sites may experience unpredictable
delays and communication failures, which could affect whether and when other site calls
are made. Unlike external sites, however, responses from internal sites, such as Rtimer , are
assumed to have completely predictable timed behaviors; for example, Rtimer(t) will publish
a signal in exactly t time units. Orc also assumes a few more internal sites, which are needed
for effective programming in Orc. They are: (1) the if (b) site, which publishes a signal (an
Orc value signal) if b is true and remains silent otherwise, (2) let(~x), which publishes a tuple
of the list of values in ~x, or the value of ~x itself if |~x| = 1, and (3) Clock , which publishes
the current time value.
2.3.1 Syntax of Orc
An Orc expression describes how site calls (and responses) are combined in order to perform
a useful computation. Orc expressions are built up from site calls using four combinators,
which were previously shown in [35] to be capable of expressing a wide variety of timed,
distributed computations succinctly and elegantly1. The abstract syntax of Orc is shown in
Figure 2.1.
We assume a syntactic category Value that contains not only standard Orc values, such as
numeric and boolean values and the signal value, but also site names as a distinguished sub-
category SiteName of values that can be called (i.e., SiteName ⊂ Value). We also assume
a special site response value stop, which may be used to indicate termination of a site call
without necessarily publishing a standard Orc value.
1The otherwise combinator was fairly recently added to Orc. Its syntax and a brief discussion on its
semantics can be found in [77].
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An Orc program consists of an optional list of declarations, giving names to expressions,
followed by an Orc expression to be executed. An expression can be either: (1) the silent
expression (0), which represents a site that never responds; (2) a parameter or an expression
call having an optional list of actual parameters as arguments; or (3) the composition of two
expressions by one of the following four composition operators:
Symmetric parallel composition, f | g, which models concurrent execution of inde-
pendent threads of computation. For example, CNN (d) | BBC (d), where CNN and BBC
are sites, calls both sites concurrently and may publish up to two values depending on the
publication behavior of the individual sites.
Sequential composition, f >x> g, which executes f , and for every value v ∈ Value
published by f , creates a fresh instance of g, with x bound to v, and runs that instance in
parallel with the current evaluation of f >x> g. For example, if Email(x) is a site that sends
an e-mail message given by x to a fixed address a, then the expression CNN (d) >x> Email(x)
may cause a news page to be sent to a. If CNN (d) does not publish a value, Email(x) is
never invoked. Similarly, the expression (CNN (d) | BBC (d)) >x> Email(x) may result in
sending zero, one, or two messages to a.
Asymmetric parallel composition, f <x< g, which executes f and g concurrently but
terminates g once it has published its first value v ∈ Value, which is then bound to x in f .
For instance, the expression Email(x) <x< (CNN (d) | BBC (d)) sends at most one message,
depending on which site publishes a value first. If neither site publishes a value, the variable
x is not bound to a concrete value and, therefore, the call to Email is never made.
Otherwise composition, f ; g, which attempts to execute f to completion. If f ter-
minates without ever publishing a value v ∈ Value, g is then executed. Otherwise, if f
publishes a value v during its execution, g is ignored. For example, suppose CNN publishes
a stop value when called with invalid date values. Then, if d is a valid date value, the
composition CNN (d) ; Email(err msg) never invokes Email and may publish the news page
from CNN . Otherwise, if d is invalid, an e-mail is sent and the value published by Email is
the value published by the composition.
As can be noted from the informal description above, the execution of an Orc expression
may in general involve several concurrently running threads, and may result in publishing a
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(time-ordered) stream of values.
A variable x occurs bound in an expression g when g is the right (resp. left) subexpression
of a sequential composition f >x> g (resp. an asymmetric parallel composition g <x< f).
If a variable is not bound in either of the two above ways, it is said to be free. We use the
syntactic sugar f  g (resp. g f) for sequential composition (resp. asymmetric parallel
composition) when no value passing from f to g takes place, which corresponds to x being
not a free variable in g. To minimize use of parentheses, we assume the following precedence
order:   |    ; , with the otherwise combinator having the least precedence.
2.3.2 Some Small Examples
We now list a few example Orc expressions, borrowed from [35]. Many more examples and
larger programs can be found in [35, 78, 79, 80].
Consider the Orc expression below, which specifies a timeout t on the call to a site M :
let(x) <x< (M() | Rtimer(t) let(signal) )
Upon executing the expression, both sites M and Rtimer are called. If M publishes a value
v before t time units, then v is the value published by the expression. But if M publishes v
in exactly t time unites, then either v or signal is published. Otherwise, signal is published.
Another example is the standard programming idiom of the two-branch conditional if b
then f else g, which can be written in Orc as the expression if (b) f | if (¬b) g. Given
the behavior of the internal site if , only one of the expressions f and g is executed, depending
on the truth value of b.
A third example is the following Orc expression declaration, which defines an expression
that recursively publishes a signal every t time units, indefinitely.
Metronome(t) , let(signal) | Rtimer(t)Metronome(t)
The expression named Metronome can be used to repeatedly initiate an instance of a task
every t time units. For example, the expression Metronome(100) UpdateLocation() calls
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on the task of updating the current location of a mobile user every hundred time units.
2.3.3 Operational Semantics of Orc
A structural operational semantics for the instantaneous (untimed) behaviors of Orc was
originally given by Misra and Cook [35]. Figure 2.2 lists an updated set of small-step SOS
rules, based on the original SOS specification, that includes rules for the semantics of the
otherwise combinator and stop site responses. The semantics uses two forms of internal
expressions to represent intermediate transitional steps in the execution of an Orc expression,
namely “!v”, which publishes the value v ∈ Value, and “?h”, with h a handle name, which
is used to uniquely identify an unfinished site call.
The SOS semantics specifies the possible behaviors of an Orc expression as a labeled transi-
tion system with four label schemes corresponding to four types of actions an Orc expression
may take: (1) publishing a value, !v, (2) calling a site, M〈~v, h〉, with h a fresh handle name
uniquely identifying this site call instance, (3) making an unobservable transition, τ , which
may represent an expression call or a substitution event, and (4) consuming a site response,
h?w, with h the handle for the corresponding site call and w ∈ Value∪{stop}. In Figure 2.2,
n ranges over labels for non-publishing events, namely labels of types (2)–(4), while l ranges
over all labels.
Two important refinements to the SOS specifications that are of central relevance to this
work were proposed. First, as discussed by Misra and Cook in [35], the SOS semantics
is highly non-deterministic, allowing internal transitions within an Orc expression (value
publishing, site calls, and τ transitions) and the external interaction with sites in the en-
vironment (through site return events) to be interleaved in any order. This high degree of
non-determinism may be undesirable. For example, in the expression
let(x) <x< Rtimer(1)N() |M()
which is supposed to give M priority over N , the call to M may actually be delayed in this
semantics, thus defeating the purpose of prioritizing it over the call to N . In order to rule
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h fresh
M(~v)
M〈~v,h〉
↪−→ ?h
(SiteCall)
?h
h?v
↪−→ !v (SiteRetV)
?h
h?stop
↪−→ 0 (SiteRetN)
!v
!v
↪−→ 0 (Publish)
E(~x) , f ∈ D
E(~p)
τ
↪−→ [~p/~x]f
(Def)
f
!v
↪−→ f ′
f ; g
!v
↪−→ f ′
(OtherV)
f
n
↪−→ f ′
f ; g
n
↪−→ f ′ ; g
(OtherN)
f
l
↪−→ f ′
f | g l↪−→ f ′ | g
(Sym)
f
!v
↪−→ f ′
f >x> g
τ
↪−→ (f ′ >x> g) | [v/x]g
(Seq1V)
f
n
↪−→ f ′
f >x> g
n
↪−→ f ′ >x> g
(Seq1N)
f
!v
↪−→ f ′
g <x< f
τ
↪−→ [v/x]g
(Asym1V)
f
n
↪−→ f ′
g <x< f
n
↪−→ g <x< f ′
(Asym1N)
g
l
↪−→ g′
g <x< f
l
↪−→ g′ <x< f
(Asym2)
Figure 2.2: Instantaneous, asynchronous structural operational semantics of Orc
out such undesirable behaviors, a synchronous semantics was proposed in [35] by placing
further constraints on the application of SOS semantic rules. The synchronous semantics
was arrived at by distinguishing between internal and external events, and splitting the
SOS transition relation ↪→ into two sub-relations ↪→R, and ↪→A, and characterizing set-
theoretically, the complementary subsets of expressions (quiescent vs. non-quiescent) to
which they are respectively applied. In previous work [52], we have presented two different
approaches, namely strategy expressions and equational conditions, in which this splitting
into ↪→R and ↪→A can be faithfully captured in a rewriting logic semantics of Orc by enforcing
an execution strategy that gives transitions corresponding to internal actions precedence over
the external site return action. In Section 3.1.2 of Chapter 3, we describe a third, typed
approach, based on sorts and subsorts, that is both more elegant and, in practice, more
efficiently executable than the two previous approaches just mentioned.
A second refinement of the Orc SOS, by Wehrman et. al [81], endowed the original SOS
specification with timing semantics in a way similar to timed process algebras [14]. This
was achieved mainly by refining the SOS transition relation into a relation on time-shifted
Orc expressions and timed labels of the form (l, t), where t is the amount of time taken by a
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(f | g) | h = f | (g | h) (2.2)
f | g = g | f (2.3)
f | 0 = f (2.4)
(f ; g) ; h = f ; (g ; h) (2.5)
f ; 0 = 0 ; f = f (2.6)
0 >x> f = 0 (2.7)
f <x< 0 = [stop/x]f (2.8)
!v ; f = !v (2.9)
M(~p) = 0 if stop ∈ ~p (2.10)
w(~p) = 0 if w /∈ SiteName (2.11)
! stop = 0 (2.12)
Figure 2.3: Some algebraic properties of Orc expressions
transition. In this extended relation, a transition step of the form f
(l,t)
↪−→ f ′ states that f may
take an action l to evolve to f ′ in time t, and, if t 6= 0, no other transition could have taken
place during the t time period. To properly reflect the effects of time elapse, parts of the
expression f may also have to be time-shifted by t. However, for simplicity of presentation,
the semantics described in [81], abstracted away the non-publishing events as unobservable
transitions and considered only the asynchronous semantics of Orc. Sections 3.2 and 3.3
present a rewriting logic approach to capturing timed behaviors of Orc expressions, which
also takes into account the synchronous semantics of Orc as described above.
2.3.4 Some Algebraic Properties
Orc was shown to posses several desirable structural properties, either using bisimulations
based on the original and timed SOS semantics [82, 83], or, alternatively, using graph iso-
morphisms in a tree-based denotational semantics [84]. We focus our attention here on the
subset of these algebraic properties shown in Figure 2.3. Our choice of this subset is mo-
tivated by the fact that the equations (2.7)–(2.12) are confluent and terminating modulo
the axioms (2.2)–(2.6), so that equality under (2.2)–(2.12) becomes decidable by rewriting.
Furthermore, since a rewrite theoryR = (Σ, E,R) has both rules R and equations E, so that
states are equivalence classes modulo E, we can obtain a more abstract and more efficient
rewriting logic semantics of Orc by adding equations (2.2)–(2.12) to the set E of equations
in the rewrite theory R axiomatizing Orc.
Associativity, commutativity and identity axioms for symmetric parallel composition were
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proved in [82, 83, 84]. Associativity and right identity axioms of the otherwise combinator
can also be proved by strong bisimulation (see Appendix A), and its left identity is assumed
as a structural equivalence rule that is required to achieve its intended semantics. Proofs of
the identities (2.7) and (2.10)–(2.12) are trivial, since both sides of these identities have no
behavioral transitions, and are, thus, strongly bisimilar. The remaining two laws, namely
(2.8) and (2.9), are also easy to show, and their proofs are given in Appendix A.
Other algebraic properties of Orc expressions, which were shown in [82, 83, 84], are not
suitable for algebraic simplification purposes because, when viewed as equations, they either
fail to satisfy executability requirements, such as confluence and/or coherence with the Orc
semantic rules, or they do not necessarily compute simpler normal forms. In particular,
algebraic laws shown using weak bisimulations that ignore τ transitions, such as the law
f >x> let(x) = f [83], may break coherence of the semantic rules when used as equational
properties, since they may cause an Orc expression to miss some behavioral transitions.
Other identities may result in equations that are not confluent, such as the restricted left
associativity law of sequential composition [82, 83], where FV (h) computes the set of free
variables in h:
f >x> (g >y> h) = (f >x> g) >y> h if x /∈ FV (h)
(consider for example the term f1 >x> (f2 >y> (f3 >z> f4)), with x /∈ FV (f3)∪FV (f4) and
y /∈ FV (f4)). Finally, some identities, when used as oriented equations, may compute normal
forms that are not necessarily structurally simpler than the original expressions, such as, for
example, the law of distributivity of parallel composition over sequential composition [82, 83]:
(f | g) >x> h = f >x> g | g >x> h. Such equations add extraneous “simplification” steps
that may adversely affect execution performance without actually arriving at simpler normal
forms. We prove in Sections 3.2.4 and 3.3.4 that the identities listed in Figure 2.3 satisfy all
the desirable executability requirements when used as equations in both the SOS-based and
the reduction rewriting semantics specifications of Orc.
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CHAPTER 3
REWRITING SEMANTICS OF ORC
Orc is a language for orchestration of services that offers simple, yet powerful and ele-
gant, constructs to program sophisticated orchestration applications. Despite its simplicity,
developing an efficiently executable formal semantics of Orc poses interesting challenges,
including, most importantly, its real-time nature and the urgency of internal actions over
external actions. The rewriting logic semantics of Orc described in this chapter captures the
real-time, synchronous semantics of Orc, and is based on the operational semantics of Orc by
Misra and Cook [35] and Orc’s algebraic properties, as described in Section 2.3 of Chapter 2.
We begin by describing the specification of the two variants of the rewriting semantics of
Orc: the SOS-based rewriting semantics RsosOrc and the reduction rewriting semantics RredOrc.
3.1 The Semantic Infrastructure
The different styles of the rewriting logic semantics of Orc share a common infrastructure,
which can be specified as a sub-theory RΩ ⊂ RsosOrc and RΩ ⊂ RredOrc describing the structures
for the semantic entities and the common behaviors that are needed for a complete specifica-
tion of Orc’s Semantics. We, therefore, begin by describing the most important components
of RΩ, on which all later developments are based.
3.1.1 Parameters and Substitution
We assume a sort Var for Orc variables. To account for substitution of variables with
other parameters, we use the CINNI calculus of explicit substitution [85]. This is consistent
with our choice of a first-order representation of Orc in rewriting logic and does not im-
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ParamList
ResValueList Param
ValueList ResValue IVar
Value SpecialValue
SiteName OrcValue
Figure 3.1: Parameter subsort structure
pair readability, since the CINNI notation is just a slight refinement of the usual textbook
notation for higher-order syntax with explicit names. Therefore, in instantiating CINNI to
Orc, we introduce indexed variables, captured by the sort IVar and declared with syntax:
{ } : Var Nat → IVar, with Nat the sort of natural numbers. An indexed variable repre-
sents either a free or a bound occurrence of a variable (as opposed to non-indexed names
of variables in binding operators, which are captured by the sort Var). The index of an
indexed variable name indicates the level at which the variable may be bound. For example,
in the specialization of CINNI to Orc, the standard representation of the Orc expression
f(x) >x> g(x) in CINNI is f(x0) >x> g(x0), where the index 0 means that the variable
represented by x0 may be bound by the closest binding instance of x, if available, i.e., since
x in f >x> g binds the occurrences of x in g, x is free in f but bound in g. This is in contrast
to, for example, the representation f(x0) >x> g(x1), in which both instances of x occur free
in the expression.
In addition, we assume a sort Param for Orc parameters, which, according to Orc’s syntax
in Figure 2.1, are either (indexed) variables of the sort IVar or site response values (including
the special value stop) of the sort ResValue. Furthermore, response values other than stop
are identified as either standard data types, such as integers and booleans, of the sort
OrcValue, or as site names of the sort SiteName, which are values representing sites that can
also be called. This classification of parameters is crucial to the semantics and is neatly
captured by the subsorted structure illustrated in Figure 3.1. In this figure, a separate sort
SpecialValue is used to represent the stop value, and three list super-sorts are declared.
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[p/x] ↑x ⇑xα
x{0} p x{1} x{0}
x{1} x{0} x{2} ↑x (α (x{0}))
...
...
...
...
x{n} x{n− 1} x{n+ 1} ↑x (α (x{n− 1}))
y{n} y{n} y{n} ↑x (α (y{n}))
Table 3.1: The effects of applying CINNI’s explicit substitution operators to indexed
variables
The sort Subst is the sort of substitutions, which, according to the CINNI calculus of
explicit substitutions [85], may have one of three forms: (1) the simple substitution [p/x],
which accounts for substituting a parameter for a free variable (assuming no free variable
capture), (2) the shift-up substitution ↑x , having the effect of substituting fresh variable
names for free variables, and (3) the lift substitution ⇑xα , which represents a more general
substitution that avoids capturing free instances of x while applying the substitution α.
Table 3.1 illustrates the effects of these substitutions on indexed variables, where we assume
that x 6= y and α is a meta-variable ranging over terms of sort Subst. A more detailed
discussion of the CINNI calculus can be found in [85].
3.1.2 Orc Expressions
The set of Orc expressions that can be constructed from the syntax of Figure 2.1, in addition
to the internal publishing and handle expressions of the forms !w and ?h, is represented by a
sort Expr, which is subsorted into the (singleton) zero expression subsort ZExpr, containing
only 0 (which is declared as 0 :→ ZExpr), and the subsort of non-zero expressions, NZExpr.
This distinction between 0 and other expression will simplify the specification and will help
achieve a more efficiently executable semantics, as we will see later.
In the synchronous semantics of Orc, the contrast between internal actions (publishing
of values, site calls, and τ transitions) and the external action of a site return induces
a corresponding distinction between expressions that can make an internal transition and
others that cannot. To capture the synchronous semantics, we make this distinction explicit
in the type structure by introducing the notions of active and inactive Orc expressions.
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Expr
NZExpr ZExpr
AExpr IExpr
Figure 3.2: The subsort structure of Orc expressions
Intuitively, an expression is active if it contains as a sub-expression a value publishing, a
site call, or an expression call sub-expression that is enabled, and is inactive otherwise. This
notion is made more precise in the following definition.
Definition 1 (Active and inactive Orc expressions). The set of active expressions Fa is the
smallest set generated by the following rules:
1. M(~v), E(~p), and !v are in Fa.
2. If f ∈ Fa, then f >x> g ∈ Fa and f ; g ∈ Fa .
3. If f ∈ Fa or g ∈ Fa, then f | g ∈ Fa and g <x< f ∈ Fa.
A non-zero expression f is called active if f ∈ Fa; otherwise, f is inactive.
Note that this notion of active expressions corresponds exactly to that of non-quiescent
expressions in [35] (see Section 3.2.3 there). This notion can be elegantly captured in the
type structure of the rewriting semantics by further subsorting NZExpr into two subsorts:
AExpr, for active expressions, and IExpr for inactive expressions. The subsorting structure
of Orc expressions is shown in Figure 3.2.
Since any non-zero Orc expression must either be active or inactive (and cannot be both),
the subsorts must partition the sort NZExpr. This is achieved by a combination of subsort-
overloaded function symbol declarations for Orc’s syntax, along with appropriate equational
axioms and frozenness information, and a few simple membership axioms based on Defini-
tion 1, as we explain below.
Basic Orc expressions. An expression call E(~p), which is always active, has a corre-
sponding declaration of the form ( ) : ExprName×ParamList→ AExpr, whereas a parameter
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call expression p(~p), which has the general declaration ( ) : Param× ParamList→ Expr, is
active if and only if p is a site name M ∈ SiteName and ~p is a list of values ~v ∈ ValueList,
and hence we have the following subsort-overloaded declaration
( ) : SiteName× ValueList→ AExpr
which precisely characterizes active parameter calls. For Inactive calls, which are calls that
fail to satisfy the condition above (and are not semantically equivalent to 0), a third decla-
ration ( ) : IVar × ValueList→ IExpr and two membership predicates
M(~p) : IExpr if ~p /∈ ValueList ∧ stop /∈ ~p
x(~p) : IExpr if ~p /∈ ValueList ∧ stop /∈ ~p
capture precisely when a parameter call is inactive. Given the parameter subsort structure
in Figure 3.1, this declaration and the two membership predicates define inactive parameter
calls as those in which either: (1) the called parameter is a site name and the list of arguments
contains at least one variable and no stop values, or (2) the called parameter is a variable
and the argument list may contain variables or non-stop values. Note that by identities
(2.10) and (2.11) in the structural equivalence properties of Figure 2.3, the other cases, in
which the called parameter is a value or the argument list contains a stop value, are all
semantically equivalent to 0, and are, therefore, of the sort ZExpr.
The other basic expressions, comprising handle expressions ?h and publishing expressions
!p are similarly specified. In particular, handle expressions ?h are always inactive and are
simply specified by the declaration ? : Handle → IExpr. Publishing expressions !p, which
are active when p ∈ Value and inactive when p ∈ IVar, are specified by the following subsort-
overloaded family of declarations:
! : Param→ Expr ! : Value→ AExpr ! : IVar→ IExpr
Note that the third case, when p is stop, is equivalent to 0, according to identity (2.12) in
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Figure 2.3, and is, therefore, of the sort ZExpr.
Composed Orc expressions. To complete the specification of active and inactive
expressions, function symbol declarations for the four Orc combinators are also subsort-
overloaded according to Definition 1. Specifically, the symmetric parallel composition combi-
nator, which has associativity, commutativity and 0 as its identity all specified as equational
axioms, has the following subsort-overloaded family of declarations:
| : Expr × Expr→ Expr [assoc comm id : 0]
| : AExpr × Expr→ AExpr [ditto]
| : IExpr × IExpr→ IExpr [ditto]
which precisely define when a symmetric parallel composition is active or inactive, according
to Definition 1. Similarly, the following declarations specify the sequential composition
operator:
> > : Expr × Var × Expr→ Expr [frozen(3)]
> > : AExpr × Var × Expr→ AExpr [ditto]
> > : IExpr × Var × Expr→ IExpr [ditto]
Since the right subexpression of a sequential composition has no behavioral transitions,
the sequential combinator symbol is declared frozen on its third argument; i.e., we define
φ( > > ) = {3}, so that no rewriting is allowed on the third argument. The declarations
state that a sequential composition is active (resp. inactive) if and only if its left subex-
pression is active (resp. inactive). The operator declarations for the asymmetric parallel
combinator are similar to those of symmetric composition:
< < : Expr × Expr→ Expr < < : Expr × AExpr→ AExpr
< < : IExpr × IExpr→ IExpr < < : AExpr × Expr→ AExpr
Function symbol declarations for the otherwise combinator are similar, except that the
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α(0) = 0
α(?h) =?h
α(p(~p)) = (α p)(α ~p)
α(E(~p)) = E(α ~p)
α(!p) = !(α p)
α(f >x> g) = (α f) >x> ( ⇑xα g)
α(f | g) = (α f) | (α g)
α(f <x< g) = ( ⇑xα f) <x< (α g)
α(f ; g) = (α f) ; (α g)
Figure 3.3: CINNI Substitutions on Orc expressions
symbol is declared associative with the identity 0, and frozen on its second argument:
; : Expr × Expr→ Expr [frozen(2) id : 0]
; : AExpr × Expr→ AExpr [ditto]
; : IExpr × Expr→ IExpr [ditto]
Substitution. To complete the specification of Orc’s instance of the CINNI calculus,
substitution is extended from Orc parameters to Orc expressions. In general, a CINNI
substitution α is extended to language expressions by adding, for each syntactic constructor
f of arity n in the language, an equation of the form (with ⇑x α a lift substitution):
α f(P1, . . . , Pn) = f(⇑Pj1,1 . . . ⇑Pj1,m1 α P1, . . . ,⇑Pjn,1 . . . ⇑Pjn,mn α Pn) (3.1)
where each Pi is an expression in the language, and Pji,1, . . . , Pji,mi are the variable argu-
ments that f binds in the ith expression argument Pi. In the case of Orc, the substitutions
are defined using the equations shown in Figure 3.3, which are instances of the equation
3.1 above. Intuitively, when a substitution is applied to an expression, the substitution is
propagated down the expression tree while keeping track of bound variable instances, so that
the substitution can be correctly performed with no free variable capture.
Algebraic properties. To fully account for the algebraic properties of Orc expressions,
the semantic infrastructure includes equations that correspond to the algebraic identities
(2.7)–(2.12) in Figure 2.3. As mentioned above, identities (2.2)–(2.6) are specified as equa-
tional axioms of the respective Orc combinators, declared by the assoc, comm and id at-
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tributes in their operators’ declarations.
3.1.3 Orc Configurations
Following the strongly bisimilar MSOS-to-rewriting logic transformation of [86], a state in
the execution of an Orc program is defined by an Orc configuration, which is a pair 〈f, r〉,
where f is the Orc expression to be executed and r is a record structure consisting of fields of
the form ai : ui, with ai the field index and ui its value. The fields of the record r hold state
information required for the semantics of f . In the Orc semantics, five fields are used: (1)
a label field lbl : l, (2) an environment for expression names env : σ, (3) a pool of pending
messages msg : ρ, (4) a set of currently used handle names hdl : η, and (5) a clock clk : t. A
more detailed description of these semantic fields follows.
Clock. Time is abstracted by the sort Time, which is specified as a totally ordered set
with a least element zero. A supersort TimeInf of Time also includes ∞ as a top element,
which is useful for specifying the proper timed semantics of Orc. An instantiation of the
sort TimeInf can, therefore, be either discrete or dense. In our specifications we assume a
dense time domain implemented by the non-negative rationals and maintained by the clock
field in a configuration.
Environment. Since expressions may be referred to by their expression names, an en-
vironment σ is maintained by the configuration to resolve references to such names. An
environment, a term of sort Env, is defined as a set of declarations, which are terms of sort
Decl, with Decl < Env, formed with an associative and commutative multiset union operator
, , with the empty set as its identity element. Initially, an environment is created out of the
declaration list ~d of an Orc program ~d ; f so that the following conditions hold: (1) a later
declaration in the list hides all previous declarations with the same expression name; and
(2) all declarations in the resulting environment are visible to each other. This implies that
an expression name has a unique defining declaration in an environment, and that (mutual)
recursion is directly available.
Handles. A handle is a name of sort Handle that uniquely identifies a pending site call,
which is a call waiting for a response from the environment. Since, by the SiteCall rule of
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Figure 2.2, fresh handle names need to be generated, a configuration maintains in its handles
field a set η of currently used handles against which new names may be created. Sets of
handles, of sort HandleSet, are constructed by an associative, commutative comma-denoted
union operator, with the empty set of handles as its identity element.
Messages. To simulate interactions of an Orc expression with its environment, we main-
tain in an Orc configuration a message pool (MsgPool) as a multiset of messages, constructed
by the empty juxtaposition operator with the empty set as the identity element. A message,
which is a term of the sort Msg, is either a site call message or a site return message. A site
call message is of the form [M,~v, h], with M the name of the called site, ~v the list of actual
parameters of the call, and h the handle name identifying the site call. Since in the SOS
semantics the environment is treated as a “black box”, which is reasonable, since responses
from external sites are unpredictable, we need to simulate environment responses to obtain
an executable Orc semantics. This is achieved by equationally converting site call messages
into potential site return messages of the form [app(M,~v, t), h], which represents a potential
response back to the Orc expression for the call identified by h. The operator app, which is
of sort PreValue, a supersort of ResValue, serves two purposes. First, it provides a uniform
and abstract means by which the response of a particular site M can be modularly defined.
Second, it may optionally associate a (possibly random) delay, given by t, to responses of
external sites. The operational meaning is that a well-formed response is not generated until
the delay reaches the value zero. Once the delay is zero (and assuming the external site was
known to the environment), the term app(M,~v, 0) is evaluated according to the value of M
to an actual response value w (a ground term of sort ResValue), and the message becomes a
site return message of the form [w, h]. Only then, the site response is ready to be consumed
by the Orc expression.
Labels. The label field keeps track of the last event generated as a result of a configuration
evolving into another, which is needed in the SOS semantics for inferring one-step transitions.
To represent the four labels in the SOS rules in Figure 2.2, we define a sort Label, and declare
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four operators of this sort:
〈 , 〉 : SiteName× ValueList× Handle→ Label τ :→ Label
? : Handle× Value→ Label ! : Value→ Label
The label constructors above have syntax that is identical to that of the labels in the SOS
specification. We also introduce a special constant  :→ Label to represent absence of a label.
Therefore, given an Orc program ~d ; f , its initial configuration, which can be constructed
by an operator [ ] : Program→ Config, is of the form:
〈f, lbl :  | env : init(~d) | msg : ∅ | hdl : ∅ | clk : 0〉
where init is a function that initializes an environment structure from a list of declarations
~d according to the description given above.
Additionally, as part of the semantic infrastructure, we define two notions about Orc
configurations (borrowed from Real-Time Maude (RTM) [69]) that will be useful for defining
the timed behaviors of Orc for both the SOS-based and the reduction rewriting semantics.
The first is the notion of eager configurations, which are configurations that can make an
instantaneous (internal or external) transition, i.e., configurations of the form 〈f, r〉 where
either f is active or r has a pending site response that can be consumed. This notion is
made more precise in the following definition, where fˆ ranges over active Orc expressions
and f¯ over inactive expressions.
Definition 2 (Eager Orc configuration). An Orc configuration C is eager if C is of one of
the following forms: (i) 〈fˆ , r〉; or (ii) 〈f¯ ,msg : ρ[w, h] | r〉 with h a handle in f¯ .
This notion is easily captured by a (partial) predicate eager : Config → [Bool] that evalu-
ates to true if and only if the given configuration is eager using two equations corresponding
to cases (i) and (ii) in Definition 2 above. The second notion is that of the maximal time
elapse (or mte) of an Orc configuration, which specifies the maximum time shift until the
next point in time when an instantaneous event (corresponding to the evaluation of an Orc
expression as opposed to just advancing time on the configuration) may be enabled.
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Definition 3 (mte of an Orc configuration). The maximum time elapse (mte) of an Orc
configuration 〈f, msg : ρ | r〉 is the minimum time delay across all messages in ρ if ρ is
non-empty, and is ∞ otherwise.
The time shift needed to advance the clock of an Orc configuration to the next point
in time when an instantaneous action becomes enabled is determined by a function mte :
Config→ TimeInf, which is defined equationally according to the definition above.
3.2 The SOS-based Rewriting Semantics RsosOrc
We now present a rewriting logic semantics of Orc that is based directly on the SOS semantics
of Orc of Section 2.3.3. The rewriting logic semantics is obtained by mapping the SOS rules
in Figure 2.2 into a corresponding rewrite theory RsosOrc = (Σs, Es ∪ As, Rs, φs) according
to Meseguer and Braga’s semantics-preserving transformation from Modular SOS [86] to
rewriting logic. An initial version of the SOS-based rewriting semantics of Orc appeared
in [52], where we described two different ways of capturing Orc’s synchronous semantics: (1)
strategy expressions, and (2) additional equational conditions. The semantics in [52] also
captured timed behaviors in Orc, although timing, as specified there, was limited to discrete
time domains, such as the natural numbers.
Since the initial version in [52], the rewriting semantics of Orc given byRsosOrc has been thor-
oughly refined and extended to achieve a more complete, elegant, and efficiently executable
specification. First, using order-sorted structures for Orc values, a concise representation
of the new otherwise combinator and its semantics has been achieved. Moreover, order-
sorted declarations for Orc expressions and action labels, and membership equations enable
a simpler and more elegant specification of instantaneous actions that can be executed and
analyzed more efficiently than with just the many-sorted specifications used before. Fur-
thermore, the semantics is now capable of handling dense time domains, using ideas from
real-time rewrite theories [64] and Real-Time Maude [69], with implementations in both
(Core) Maude and Real-Time Maude.
Therefore, in summary, the semantics RsosOrc we present here is characterized primarily by
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being:
1. comprehensive, as it captures all the essential features of Orc, including, most notably,
urgency of internal actions and timed behaviors,
2. provably correct with respect to the semantics in [35], since its instantaneous part fol-
lows almost immediately from the SOS semantics and exploits the strong bisimulation
meta-theorem between MSOS and rewriting logic specifications in [87],
3. executable, so that one may simulate Orc programs and observe their possible behav-
iors, and
4. formally analyzable using exhaustive verification methods, such as breadth-first search
and model checking.
The rewriting semantics RsosOrc builds on the semantic infrastructure discussed in Sec-
tion 3.1, i.e., RsosOrc ⊃ RΩ. Below, we describe how RsosOrc captures the timed, synchronous
semantics of Orc expressions, and discuss some of its important properties.
3.2.1 Instantaneous Rewriting Semantics Rules
Since, by rewriting logic’s transitivity inference rule, a rewrite computation t −→ t′ may
involve a sequence of one-step rewrites t −→ t1 −→ t2 −→ . . . −→ tn −→ t′, we need to
restrict rewrites of Orc configurations to be exactly one-step rewrites, corresponding to the
single-step SOS behavior, as explained in [87]. For this purpose, we employ the SOS one-step
modifier technique of [86, 62], in which two operators are declared: (1) a (frozen) prefix dot
operator · : Config → Config, and (2) a non-frozen operator smallstep : Config → Config.
By defining the rewrite rules that correspond to the SOS rules in Figure 2.2 in the following
format
·〈f, r〉 → 〈f ′, r′〉 if
n∧
i=1
·〈fi, ri〉 → 〈f ′i , r′i〉 ∧ C
with C an equational condition, we effectively restrict rewriting to single steps using the
equation:
smallstep(〈f, lbl : l | r〉) = smallstep(·〈f, lbl :  | r〉)
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SiteCall : ·〈M(~v), lbl : l | msg : ρ | hdl : η | r〉
→ 〈?h, lbl : M〈~v, h〉 | msg : ρ[M,~v, h] | hdl : η, h | r〉 if h := fresh(η)
SiteRetV : ·〈?h, lbl : l | msg : ρ[v, h] | hdl : η, h | r〉 → 〈!v, lbl : h?v | msg : ρ | hdl : η | r〉
SiteRetN : ·〈?h, lbl : l | msg : ρ[stop, h] | hdl : η, h | r〉
→ 〈0, lbl : h?stop | msg : ρ | hdl : η | r〉
Publish : ·〈!v, lbl : l | r〉 → 〈0, lbl : !v | r〉
Def : ·〈E(~p), lbl : l | env : σ,E(~x) , f | r〉 → 〈[~p/~x]f, lbl : τ | env : σ,E(~x) , f | r〉
Figure 3.4: Rewrite rules in RsosOrc for basic expressions
where the label field is reset in preparation for the next transition step, which is enabled by
the newly introduced prefix dot.
The rewrite rules inRsosOrc that specify the semantics of the basic Orc expressions are shown
in Figure 3.4. The rules precisely match the correspondingly labeled SOS rules in Figure 2.2.
When executing a site call, according to the site call rewrite rule, the call expression is
replaced by the handle expression (?h), where h is a fresh handle name generated by a
function fresh with respect to the currently used set of handle names η, using a matching
equation in the condition (see [88], Section 4.3). Furthermore, the rule emits a message
targeted to M into the message pool, adds a site call event label, and updates the handles
set. When a site response that corresponds to the call with handle h appears in the message
pool, one of the site return rules applies, depending on whether the response is the stop
value or not. In both cases, the site return rules replace the handle expression with the
appropriate Orc expression, add a site return event label, remove the message from the pool,
and update the set of handles. The rules for publishing expressions and expression calls are
very similar to their counterparts in the SOS specification.
Figure 3.5 lists the rewrite rules in RsosOrc that specify the synchronous, instantaneous se-
mantics of the Orc combinators. In the figure, we let fˆ , gˆ range over active expressions (of
the sort AExpr), f¯ , g¯ over inactive expressions (IExpr), and f˜ , g˜ over non-zero expressions
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(NZExpr). We also let i denote an internal action label (i.e., a non-site-return label), and n
a non-publishing internal action label (i.e., a site call or a τ label). An important distinction
between the rewrite rules in RsosOrc and the SOS rules in Section 2.3.3, is that the former
capture the synchronous semantics of Orc expressions whereas the rules in Section 2.3.3
describe the unrestricted asynchronous semantics. This explains the larger number of rules
in Figure 3.5 compared to those in Figure 2.2. Indeed, for each rule in the SOS rules for
Orc’s combinators in Figure 2.2, there are one or more rewrite rules in RsosOrc that correspond
to it. For example, The SOS rule Sym for symmetric parallel composition has two corre-
sponding rewrite rules in RsosOrc, one capturing internal actions for active expressions (SymI),
while the other deals with inactive expressions consuming site returns (SymE). Since the
symmetric combinator is commutative with identity 0, the two rewrite rules fully specify
the synchronous semantics of parallel composition. Similar observations also apply to the
remaining rewrite rules in Figure 3.5.
3.2.2 The Tick Rule
Following the standard approach for specifying time in rewriting semantic definitions of
real-time systems [64] – using either regular or real-time rewrite theories, the theory RsosOrc
includes a time tick rewrite rule to capture the timed semantics of Orc, in addition to the
instantaneous rewrite rules in Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5. The tick rule in RsosOrc is a one-step
rule defined as follows (with t′ of the sort Time):
Tick : ·〈f, clk : t | r〉 → 〈f ′, clk : t+ t′ | δ(r, t′)〉
if eager(〈f, clk : t | r〉) 6= true ∧ t′ := mte(r) ∧ t′ 6= 0
Note that the variable t′ only appears in the righthand side. The value of t′ is determined,
by the matching equation t′ := mte(r) in the condition, to be the maximum time elapse (see
Definition 3). The function δ propagates the effect of a clock tick t′ down the record structure
of a configuration (somewhat similar to time-shifting in [81]). It essentially updates delays
of messages in the message pool, which makes response messages from site calls become
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SymI : ·〈fˆ | g˜, lbl : l | r〉 → 〈f ′ | g˜, lbl : i | r′〉 if ·〈fˆ , lbl :  | r〉 → 〈f ′, lbl : i | r′〉
SymE : ·〈f¯ | g¯, lbl : l | r〉 → 〈f ′ | g¯, lbl : h?w | r′〉 if ·〈f¯ , lbl :  | r〉 → 〈f ′, lbl : h?w | r′〉
Seq1V : ·〈fˆ >x> g, lbl : l | r〉 → 〈(f ′ >x> g) | [v/x]g, lbl : τ | r′〉
if ·〈fˆ , lbl :  | r〉 → 〈f ′, lbl : !v | r′〉
Seq1NI : ·〈fˆ >x> g, lbl : l | r〉 → 〈f ′ >x> g, lbl : n | r′〉 if ·〈fˆ , lbl :  | r〉 → 〈f ′, lbl : n | r′〉
Seq1NE : ·〈f¯ >x> g, lbl : l | r〉 → 〈f ′ >x> g, lbl : h?w | r′〉
if ·〈f¯ , lbl :  | r〉 → 〈f ′, lbl : h?w | r′〉
Asym1V : ·〈g <x< fˆ , lbl : l | r〉 → 〈[v/x]g, lbl : τ | r′〉 if ·〈fˆ , lbl :  | r〉 → 〈f ′, lbl : !v | r′〉
Asym1NI : ·〈g <x< fˆ , lbl : l | r〉 → 〈g <x< f ′, lbl : n | r′〉 if ·〈fˆ , lbl :  | r〉 → 〈f ′, lbl : n | r′〉
Asym1NEa : ·〈g¯ <x< f¯ , lbl : l | r〉 → 〈g¯ <x< f ′, lbl : h?w | r′〉
if ·〈f¯ , lbl :  | r〉 → 〈f ′, lbl : h?w | r′〉
Asym1NEb : ·〈0 <x< f¯ , lbl : l | r〉 → 〈0 <x< f ′, lbl : h?w | r′〉
if ·〈f¯ , lbl :  | r〉 → 〈f ′, lbl : h?w | r′〉
Asym2I : ·〈gˆ <x< f˜ , lbl : l | r〉 → 〈g′ <x< f˜ , lbl : i | r′〉 if ·〈gˆ, lbl :  | r〉 → 〈g′, lbl : i | r′〉
Asym2E : ·〈g¯ <x< f¯ , lbl : l | r〉 → 〈g′ <x< f¯ , lbl : h?w | r′〉
if ·〈g¯, lbl :  | r〉 → 〈g′, lbl : h?w | r′〉
OtherV : ·〈fˆ ; g˜, lbl : l | r〉 → 〈f ′, lbl : !v | r′〉 if ·〈fˆ , lbl :  | r〉 → 〈f ′, lbl : !v | r′〉
OtherNI : ·〈fˆ ; g˜, lbl : l | r〉 → 〈f ′ ; g˜, lbl : n | r′〉 if ·〈fˆ , lbl :  | r〉 → 〈f ′, lbl : n | r′〉
OtherNE : ·〈f¯ ; g˜, lbl : l | r〉 → 〈f ′ ; g˜, lbl : h?w | r′〉 if ·〈f¯ , lbl :  | r〉 → 〈f ′, lbl : h?w | r′〉
Figure 3.5: Rewrite rules in RsosOrc for the combinators
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eventually available.
Ticking the clock and updating the record structure accordingly are not enough for the
proper timed semantics of Orc, because if not appropriately controlled, new undesirable
behaviors may be introduced, such as advancing time indefinitely or beyond a point when
an instantaneous action was enabled (and, in effect, missing that action). This is avoided by
defining a maximal, time-synchronous execution semantics, in which an Orc configuration
with no enabled instantaneous actions is allowed to advance its clock all the way up to the
next point in time when an instantaneous action will be enabled1. This restriction is formally
specified by making the tick rule conditional on: (1) the configuration not being eager, i.e.,
being incapable of making an instantaneous transition as defined by the eager predicate, and
(2) the time shift t′ being equal to the maximal time elapse of the configuration, as defined
by the mte function, which must be non-zero (see Section 3.1.3 for definitions of eagerness
and maximal time elapse of configurations). These conditions ensure that time is advanced
as much as possible in every application of the tick rule, but only enough so as to be able
to capture all events of interest.
3.2.3 Correctness of RsosOrc
The original SOS transition relation ↪→ proposed in [35] (a variant of which was shown in
Figure 2.2) and it’s refinement, also in [35], into two sub-relations ↪→R and ↪→A for quiescent
and non-quiescent Orc expressions, respectively, defined the synchronous semantics of the
instantaneous actions in Orc. Although a non-trivial timed extension of the original SOS
specification was later proposed in [81], the extension did not consider the synchronous
semantics, and abstracted non-publishing actions as unobservable actions for simplicity of
presentation. We, therefore, show correctness of the rewriting semantics given by RsosOrc with
respect to the SOS semantics in [35] by comparing the transition systems defined by the
refined SOS relation ↪→R ∪ ↪→A and the instantaneous part of the rewrite theory RsosOrc,
1For the analysis to be mechanizable, we also assume Orc programs with “non-Zeno” behaviors [75], such
that only a finite number of instantaneous transitions are possible within any finite period of time.
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namely, the theory RsosOrc without the Tick rule.2
First, a simple lemma relating the notions of non-quiescent expressions in [35] and active
expressions as defined in Section 3.1.2.
Lemma 1. f is non-quiescent (resp. quiescent) iff f is active (resp. inactive).
Proof. Straightforward by structural induction on f .
We denote by RsosOrc ` t →1I t′ a single rewrite step obtained by an application of an
instantaneous (non-tick) rewrite rule, i.e., a rule I ∈ Rs − {Tick}. Correctness of RsosOrc is
expressed by the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Correctness of RsosOrc). For any two Orc expressions f and f ′, and for X ∈
{A,R},
f ↪→X f ′ ⇐⇒ RsosOrc ` smallstep(·〈f, lbl : l | r〉)→1I smallstep(〈f ′, lbl : lX | r′)
with lA an internal action label and lR a site return action label.
Proof. The proof follows trivially by construction of RsosOrc, based on the correctness of the
MSOS-to-rewriting logic transformation methodology, given by the strong bisimulation the-
orem (Theorem 1) in [87], and from Lemma 1.
3.2.4 Executability Properties of RsosOrc
As we show in this section, the specification of the theory RsosOrc is not only correct with
respect to Orc’s synchronous semantics but also satisfies some desirable admissibility and
executability properties that make it computable and amenable to sound and complete
formal analysis and verification. In particular, the signature Σs is As-preregular [20] and
the equations Es and the rules Rs are deterministic. Furthermore, the equations Es are
operationally terminating, confluent, and sort-decreasing modulo the axioms As, and the
2Further refining the timed semantics in [81] to capture Orc’s synchronous semantics within the SOS
framework, and investigating its relationship to the rewriting semantics RsosOrc is an interesting direction for
future work.
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rules Rs are coherent with Es. As a result, the specificationRsosOrc, through its implementation
in Maude as the system module named SOS-ORC, can be executed and formally analyzed.
Since the current Maude tools for checking confluence of equations and coherence of rules
with respect to equations [89, 90] only support order-sorted specifications (as opposed to
more general membership equational specifications), we apply a simple, semantics-preserving
transformation to convert the underlying conditional membership equational logic theory
(Σs, Es ∪As) into a semantically equivalent conditional order-sorted equational logic theory
(Σˆs, Eˆs∪As) with no kinds or membership assertions so that the original theory is executable
iff the transformed one is. The resulting rewrite theory is denoted RˆsosOrc (see Appendix B.1
for details on this transformation). Moreover, the corresponding Maude specification in
SOS-ORC is also transformed so that it is order-sorted, and does not use the owise attribute
or any built-in function [89, 90].
While the syntactic requirements of preregularity and determinism can be easily checked
automatically by Maude, the other properties require a more thorough and careful investi-
gation.
Operational termination of the conditional membership rewrite theory associated with
(order-sorted) equational theory (Σs, Es∪As) can be automatically proved using the Maude
Termination Tool (MTT) [91] with AProVE [92] as the back-end tool. When supplied with
the specification of the theory (Σs, Es ∪ As), MTT applies a sequence of non-termination-
preserving theory transformations (see [93]) to convert the conditional order-sorted equa-
tional theory into an unsorted, unconditional term rewriting system (TRS) T , which is then
fed into AProVE for an automatic termination check3. Therefore, we have the following
result.
Lemma 2 (Operational Termination). The set of equations Eˆs in RˆsosOrc = (Σˆs, Eˆs∪As, Rs, φs)
is operationally terminating modulo the axioms As.
Since Eˆs is terminating modulo As, the ground confluence and descent properties of Eˆs can
be verified (semi-)automatically using Maude’s Church-Rosser Checker (CRC) tool [89]. The
3The TRS T was obtained using the C;Uk;B transformation in MTT [93]. Its specification in TPDB
notation and the generated termination proof script are available online at http://www.cs.illinois.edu/
~alturki/.
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CRC tool, when given RˆsosOrc as input, computes all the (conditional) critical pairs between
the equations in Eˆs and attempts, using various techniques, to show them either unfeasible
or context joinable. For Eˆs in RˆsosOrc, the tool was able to discharge the vast majority of
the critical pairs generated, leaving only a few that can be easily discharged by inductive
reasoning. Some more details about such proof obligations generated by the tool can be
found in Appendix B.1.
Lemma 3 (Ground Church-Rosser). The set of equations Eˆs in RˆsosOrc = (Σˆs, Eˆs∪As, Rs, φs)
is ground confluent modulo the axioms As and ground sort-decreasing.
Since Rs contains conditional rewrite rules with rewrites in their conditions, the Maude
Coherence Checker (ChC) tool [90], which assumes that the conditions of rules are equational,
cannot be directly used to show coherence of the specification. It turns out, however, that
the coherence property for RˆsosOrc can be shown manually fairly easily, primarily because RˆsosOrc
is a top-most theory, with Config as the top sort. A fairly detailed proof showing sufficient
conditions checked for ground coherence can be found in Appendix B.1.
Lemma 4 (Ground coherence). The set of rewrite rules Rs in RˆsosOrc = (Σˆs, Eˆs ∪As, Rs, φs)
is ground coherent with respect to Eˆs.
Executability of RˆsosOrc (and, hence, executability of RsosOrc) follows immediately from its
admissibility properties and Lemmas (2)–(4) above.
Theorem 2 (Executability of RˆsosOrc). The specification given by RˆsosOrc satisfies the executabil-
ity requirements of generalized rewrite theories.
3.3 The Reduction Rewriting Semantics RredOrc
Although the rewriting specification RsosOrc is readily understandable and its correctness with
respect to the SOS semantics in [35] is straightforward, its execution, in practice, is quite
expensive and inefficient. This is partly because RsosOrc makes extensive use of conditional
rewrite rules (corresponding to the rules in the SOS specifications) which are particularly
expensive to execute as compared to unconditional rules. Moreover, most of these rewrite
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rules, besides being conditional, have rewrites (as opposed to equations) in their conditions,
which is typical of the SOS specification style. Rewrite conditions, as opposed to equational
conditions, can be particularly expensive to find a proof for or to disprove as they are
non-deterministic in nature. In addition, the relatively large number of such rules in the
specification can potentially cause nested (recursive) rewrite checks when checking a rule’s
conditions, which adversely affect performance of execution and analysis.
This section introduces a specification for a rewrite theory RredOrc that is not directly based
on the SOS specifications but is instead more akin to a reduction semantics. It utilizes the
inherently distributed semantics of rewriting logic, and uses both equations, for modeling
deterministic computation steps, and rewrite rules, for modeling the non-deterministic tran-
sitions. This is achieved primarily by localizing the rewrite rules as much as possible, and
specifying equationally any required propagation of information between the subexpression
to be rewritten (the redex ) and the enclosing Orc configuration (the context). In effect,
this approach minimizes the number of rewrite rules needed and reduces their complexity,
and thus achieves a simpler and superior semantic specification that can be executed and
analyzed much more efficiently.
Despite the superior execution and analysis efficiency of RredOrc over RsosOrc, the semantics
defined by RredOrc is still operational, in that it describes in detail how Orc programs are
evaluated, and is, in fact, equivalent to RsosOrc, in the sense that, given any Orc program
P , the state transition systems of the semantics of P given by RsosOrc and RredOrc are strongly
bisimilar, assuming that program configurations are closed4. This implies thatRredOrc captures
precisely the intended semantics of Orc while providing an efficient means for execution and
formal analysis of Orc programs.
The specification of the reduction rewriting semantics builds on the semantic infrastructure
introduced in Section 3.1, with the main difference that, unlike for RsosOrc, action labels are
not essential to RredOrc, since label information is implicitly managed by auxiliary operators
in RredOrc. However, to maintain equivalence with RsosOrc, the label field lbl : l is maintained
in Orc configurations as before. Furthermore, the one-step modifier strategy used in the
4Roughly speaking, a configuration 〈f, r〉 is closed if every expression name referenced in f has a decla-
ration in r. This is discussed in more detail when we introduce the equivalence theorem in Section 3.4.
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SOS-based semantics to implement one-step rewrites is no longer needed, as the semantics
is not a direct translation of the SOS specification in Figure 2.2, but is instead a rewriting
logic semantics.
We describe next the specification of the synchronous, timed semantics given by the theory
RredOrc.
3.3.1 The Internal Actions
Transition steps that correspond to internal actions of Orc expressions are specified using
the IAction rewrite rule (with act↑ an auxiliary function symbol, which will be described
shortly):
IAction : 〈fˆ , r〉 → 〈act↑(f ′, i), r〉 if fˆ → act↑(f ′, i)
The rule simply states that an (eager) configuration with an active expression may make
an internal transition if the expression is able to make that transition. Note that, this rule
is global at the configuration level, which is required in order to maintain equivalence with
the interleaving semantics defined by the original Orc semantics, and is also essential for
executability of the specification. An active expression may make an internal transition
according to one of the following rules:
SiteCall : M(~v)→ act↑(tmp, siteCall(M,~v))
ExprCall : E(~p)→ act↑(tmp, exprCall(E, ~p))
Publish : !v → act↑(0, publish(v))
Therefore, an active, basic sub-expression may rewrite to a frozen, auxiliary operator symbol
act↑ : Expr × InternalEvent → [Expr], whose purpose is to propagate the action up the
expression tree all the way to the top so that: 1) its effects are reflected in the configuration
(e.g. emitting a site call message into the configuration) , and 2) any necessary information
in the configuration can be propagated back to the sub-expression (e.g. getting globally
fresh handle names for site calls). This process of propagating information back and forth
between redexes and contexts is specified equationally by induction on the structure of
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Orc expressions. In particular, for site and expression calls, act↑ replaces the call with a
temporary placeholder expression tmp and propagates the action up to the configuration
according to the following equations (where c stands for a site call event siteCall(M,~v), or
an expression call event exprCall(E, ~p)):
act↑(f, c) | g˜ = act↑(f | g˜, c) act↑(f, c) >x> g = act↑(f >x> g, c)
act↑(f, c) <x< g˜ = act↑(f <x< g˜, c) act↑(f, c) ; g˜ = act↑(f ; g˜, c)
g <x< act↑(f, c) = act↑(g <x< f, c)
Once the call reaches the root of the expression, the effect of the call is reflected in the
containing configuration, using one of the following equations, depending on the call type:
〈act↑(f, siteCall(M,~v)), lbl : l | msg : ρ | hdl : η | r〉
= 〈act↓(f, ?h), lbl :  | msg : ρ[M,~v, h] | hdl : η, h | r〉 if h := fresh(η)
〈act↑(f, exprCall(E, ~p)), lbl : l | env : σ,E(~x) , g | r〉
= 〈act↓(f, [~p/~x]g), lbl :  | env : σ,E(~x) , g | r〉
which capture precisely the semantics of site and expression calls, respectively. The specifica-
tions of the effects of site calls and expression calls on the record structure of a configuration
are identical to those in the SiteCall and Def rules of the SOS-based semantics of RsosOrc,
except that the label field is reset to . Note that since both the handle h in a site call and
the instantiated body g of the expression definition in an expression call need to propagate
back to the subterm where the call was made (which was temporarily substituted by the
expression tmp), act↑ does not rewrite immediately to f , but rather to another (frozen) op-
erator, act↓ : Expr × Expr → Expr, that traverses down the expression tree until it reaches
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the appropriate subterm, using the following equations:
act↓(f˜ | f˜ ′, g) = act↓(f˜ , g) | act↓(f˜ ′, g) act↓(f˜ ; f˜ ′, g) = act↓(f˜ , g) ; f˜ ′
act↓(f˜ >x> f ′, g) = act↓(f˜ , g) >x> f ′ act↓(b, g) = b
act↓(f <x< f˜ ′, g) = act↓(f, g) <x< act↓(f˜ ′, g) act↓(tmp, g) = g
where b is a basic Orc expression, and g is either a handle expression (for a site call), or the
body expression of a declaration (for an expression call).
The internal action of publishing a value is defined slightly differently, although the overall
operational behavior is similar. This is primarily because published values may be bound
in an expression by sequential or asymmetric parallel compositions. In particular, if the
published value v is not bound in the expression, the value is propagated all the way to the
top, using the following equations:
act↑(f, publish(v)) | g˜ = act↑(f | g˜, publish(v))
act↑(f, publish(v)) <x< g˜ = act↑(f <x< g˜, publish(v))
act↑(f, publish(v)) ; g˜ = act↑(f, publish(v))
In this case, the published value reaches the top of the expression in the enclosing config-
uration: 〈act↑(f, publish(v)), lbl : l | r〉 = 〈f, lbl :  | r〉. Otherwise, if the value published
is bound by a sequential composition expression or an asymmetric parallel composition ex-
pression, then one of the following equations applies:
act↑(f, publish(v)) >x> g = act↑(f >x> g | [v/x]g, publishτ )
g <x< act↑(f, publish(v)) = act↑([v/x]g, publishτ )
These equations reflect the semantics specified by the SOS rules Seq1V and Asym1V
of Figure 2.2 (and the corresponding rewrite rules in RsosOrc). They also change the value
publishing event to a τ publishing event publishτ , which ultimately causes the label field of
the configuration to reset (the equations for terms of the form act↑(f, publishτ ) are similar).
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fact
actact
(a) Site and expression calls
f
act
actact
(b) Publishing and τ actions
Figure 3.6: Schematic diagrams of the equational propagation of information in an
expression tree
Notice that in both cases, when a publishing (or a τ) event reaches the configuration, no
further information needs to be communicated back down the expression, unlike the cases
of site and expression calls. Figure 3.6 gives a schematic representation of the mechanics of
the internal actions. The figure shows that the structures of a site call and an expression
call are similar, although the information propagated in both directions (and the side effects
on the enclosing configurations) are different.5
3.3.2 The Site Return Action
The external action of a site return is modeled by the following rewrite rule:
SiteReturn : 〈f¯ , lbl : l | msg : ρ[w, h] | hdl : η, h | r〉
→ 〈sret(f¯ , w, h), lbl :  | msg : ρ | hdl : η | r〉 if h ∈ handles(f¯)
which corresponds to the SiteRetV and SiteRetStop rules in the SOS rules and the SOS-
based rewrite rules of RsosOrc. Note that application of the site return rule above is subjected
to the condition that the handle name of the message to be consumed is referenced in f¯ .
This is to avoid useless transitions that could take place when a thread, having an unfinished
site call, is pruned using asymmetric parallel composition, and thus, maintains a comparable
behavior to site returns in the SOS specification. In addition, the rule SiteReturn captures
the synchronous semantics of Orc by matching an inactive expression f¯ to consume the
5Unwanted concurrent execution of site calls, expression calls and publishing of values is avoided by
equations that will introduce an error constant of the kind [Expr] in such cases. For reasons of confluence of
the equations Er, an expression having error as a subterm immediately collapses to error (see [54]).
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site return message. By this rule, the expression f¯ rewrites to a frozen auxiliary operator
sret : Expr × ResValue × Handle → Expr which carries the response parameters down to the
appropriate pending handle expression, using a set of equations with a similar structure to
the equations defining the semantics of the operator act↓ above, except for handle expressions,
which are specified with the following equations:
sret(?h′, v, h) = if (h′ == h) then !v else ?h′ fi
sret(?h′, stop, h) = if (h′ == h) then 0 else ?h′ fi
3.3.3 Timed Semantics
Like the SOS-based rewriting semanticsRsosOrc, time and the effects of time elapse are specified
in the reduction semantics RredOrc using a tick rewrite rule and the δ methodology. In fact, the
tick rewrite rule is almost identical to that of RsosOrc – but without the SOS one-step modifier:
Tick : 〈f, clk : t | r〉 → 〈f ′, clk : t+ t′ | δ(r, t′)〉
if eager(〈f, clk : t | r〉) 6= true ∧ t′ := mte(r) ∧ t′ 6= 0
The rule uses in its condition the eager and mte functions to capture the maximal, time-
synchronous execution semantics, described before in Section 3.1.3.
3.3.4 Executability Properties of RredOrc
This section shows that, like RsosOrc, the theory RredOrc = (Σr, Er ∪ Ar, Rr, φr) is executable,
which implies that formal analysis using its implementation in Maude, as a system mod-
ule RED-ORC, is both sound and complete. However, the additional equations defining the
auxiliary operators for propagating event information and the fact that rewrite proofs for
applications of the IAction rule may contain rewrites at the expression level (using the rules
SiteCall , ExprCall, and Publish), all make the task of checking these executability
properties slightly more involved.
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As before, the membership equational logic sub-theory of the rewrite theory RredOrc is trans-
formed to a semantically equivalent order-sorted equational theory, so that we may leverage
existing Maude tools for checking executability properties. The transformed theory is de-
noted RˆredOrc = (Σˆr, Eˆr∪Ar, Rr, φr). The transformation is also reflected in the corresponding
Maude module ORC-RED.
Operational termination of the conditional membership rewrite theory associated with
(Σˆr, Eˆr ∪Ar) can be shown automatically using the MTT [91] and AProVE [92], using the
same sequence of transformations as for the SOS-based rewriting semantics specification in
Section 3.2.4, yielding the following result.
Lemma 5 (Operational termination). The set of equations Eˆr in RˆredOrc is operationally
terminating modulo the axioms Ar.
The ground confluence and descent properties can be shown using Maude’s CRC tool and
inductive reasoning. More details can be found in a proof sketch in Appendix B.2 of the
following lemma.
Lemma 6 (Ground Church-Rosser). The set of equations Eˆr in RredOrc is ground confluent
modulo the axioms Ar and ground sort-decreasing.
For ground coherence, the specification of RˆredOrc cannot be directly checked using Maude’s
ChC tool because Rr has a rule with a rewrite condition, namely the rule IAction. However,
since there is only one such rule and since the rewrite condition is the only condition of this
rule, we may consider the sub-theory Rˆ◦ of RˆredOrc without the IAction rule, show that it is
ground coherent using Maude’s ChC tool and induction on ground terms, and then reason
inductively on the case when a rewrite is made by IAction in RˆredOrc. The details of this
proof technique are given in Appendix B.2.
Lemma 7 (Ground coherence). The set of rewrite rules Rr in RˆredOrc = (Σˆr, Eˆr ∪Ar, Rr, φr)
is ground coherent with respect to Eˆr.
We now have the following essential theorem, which is an immediate consequence of the
admissibility properties of RredOrc and Lemmas (5)–(7) above.
51
Theorem 3 (Executability ofRredOrc). The specification given by RredOrc satisfies the executabil-
ity requirements of generalized rewrite theories.
3.4 Equivalence of RsosOrc and RredOrc
We shall now show that the SOS-based rewriting semantics, RsosOrc, and the reduction-based
rewriting semantics, RredOrc, are semantically equivalent, in the sense that an Orc program
behaves in exactly the same way in both semantic models. We show this by proving a more
general result, stating that the semantic models given by RsosOrc and RredOrc of any closed Orc
configuration are strongly bisimilar. We first define what we mean by a configuration being
closed.
Definition 4 (Closed configurations). An Orc configuration 〈f, r〉 is well-formed if: (i) f
does not contain any auxiliary function symbol, such as act↑, sret, or tmp; and (ii) r contains
at least the five fields introduced in Section 3.1, namely: (1) lbl : l, with l ∈ Label, (2) hdl : η,
with η ∈ HandleSet, (3) env : σ, with σ ∈ Env, (4) msg : ρ, with ρ ∈ MsgPool, and (5) clk : t,
with t ∈ Time. Moreover, a closed configuration is a well-formed configuration in which no
expression name appears free in f or σ.
We observe that a closed configuration in RsosOrc is also a closed configuration in RredOrc
and vice versa. This is due to the fact that both RsosOrc and RredOrc use the same semantic
infrastructure. Moreover, we have the following easy lemma.
Lemma 8 (Preservation of closed configurations). Let C be a closed configuration. If RsosOrc `
C → C ′ for some configuration C ′, then C ′ is closed. Similarly, if RredOrc ` C → C ′, then C ′ is
closed.
Proof. This can be proved by rule induction on the rewriting relations induced by RsosOrc and
RredOrc, respectively.
Intuitively, preservation of well-formedness is trivial in both RsosOrc and RredOrc by a quick
examination of the rewrite rules. It is also easy to see that closed configurations in RsosOrc
rewrite to configurations that are also closed. Essentially, the only rule in RsosOrc that might
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introduce expression names in an expression is the [Def] rule. But since all expression
declarations are closed (have no free occurrences), and since actual parameters cannot be
expression names, the resulting expression must also be closed. A similar argument also
applies to RredOrc. In what follows, we assume all configurations are closed.
The following lemma states that the definitions of eager configurations in RsosOrc and RredOrc
coincide. The lemma is an easy consequence of the fact that the definitions of the eager pred-
icate, the mte function, active and inactive expressions, messages, and auxiliary functions
for the time domain and handle names, are all shared in the same semantic infrastructure
given by RΩ.
Lemma 9 (Timing strategy equivalence). For any configuration C, RsosOrc ` eager(C) = true
iff RredOrc ` eager(C) = true, and, similarly, RsosOrc ` mte(C) = t iff RredOrc ` mte(C) = t, for any
t ∈ Time.
Now we are ready to present the equivalence theorem, for which a detailed proof can be
found in Appendix B.3
Theorem 4. For any configurations C and C ′, the following equivalence holds,
RsosOrc ` smallstep(·C)→1 smallstep(·C ′) ⇐⇒ RredOrc ` C →1 C ′
The main result of this section can be derived as a consequence of Theorem 4 by taking
as C the initial configuration of a program P given by [P ] (see Section 3.1.3).
Corollary 1. For any Orc program P and configuration C, we have
RsosOrc ` [P ]→1 smallstep(·C) ⇐⇒ RredOrc ` [P ]→1 C
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 4 and the fact that [P ] is closed, by definition.
Therefore, for any Orc program P , the state transition systems defined by RsosOrc and RredOrc
are strongly bisimilar.
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3.5 Specification in Maude
Both rewrite theories RsosOrc, for the SOS-based rewriting semantics, and RredOrc for the reduc-
tion rewriting semantics, have been specified as admissible and executable system modules
in Maude, namely SOS-ORC and RED-ORC, respectively. These modules can be used to exe-
cute Orc programs, explore traces of computations, and verify safety and liveness properties
about them by model checking. The desirable executability properties of both theories shown
in Section 3.2.4 and Section 3.3.4 guarantee that the formal analysis performed using the
corresponding Maude modules is both sound and complete. To take advantage of some of
the time-based versions of the analysis tools available in Real-Time Maude (RTM), such as
timed search and timed model checking, we have also developed corresponding timed modules
in RTM for RsosOrc and RredOrc6.
Since Maude supports mixfix user-definable syntax, the syntax in the Maude specification
is a readable, typewriter version of the Orc syntax shown in Figure 2.1. For example, the
declarations (introduced by the keyword op) below specify the syntax of active and inactive
otherwise compositions:
op _;_ : Expr Expr -> Expr [assoc id: zero frozen(2)] .
op _;_ : AExpr Expr -> AExpr [ditto] .
op _;_ : IExpr Expr -> IExpr [ditto] .
where the combinator ; is declared associative with the expression zero as its identity, and
frozen in its second argument. Similarly, equational properties of the combinators, corre-
sponding to the algebraic laws in Figure 2.3, and definitions and properties of other auxiliary
operators, such as substitution, operations on handle sets and environment initializers, are
all specified as (possibly conditional) equations and membership predicates. For instance,
laws (2.7) – (2.9) in Figure 2.3 are declared using the following equations (introduced with
the eq keyword):
6The RTM specification is almost identical to that of Maude, with the main exception that configurations
in the RTM specification do not have to maintain a clock field since a global clock is implicitly managed
by the tool. Furthermore, our specifications of RsosOrc and RredOrc can be easily shown to model time-robust
systems [75], for which formal analysis with respect to the maximal time-synchronous execution strategy is
complete.
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eq zero > X > F = zero . eq ! V ; NZF = ! V .
eq F < X < zero = [X := stop] F .
assuming that F, X, V and NZF are Maude meta-variables representing, respectively, terms
of the sorts Expr, Var, Value, and NZExpr. The term [X := stop] F represents a substi-
tution applied to F mapping the Orc variable given by X to the special value stop. Finally,
rewrite rules in RsosOrc and RredOrc are introduced in the corresponding Maude modules using
the keyword rl (and crl for conditional rules). An example is the OtherV rule in RsosOrc
(shown in Figure 3.5):
crl [OtherV] : . < AF ; NZF , lbl : L | R > => < F’ , lbl : ! V | R’ >
if . < AF , lbl : nl | R > => < F’ , lbl : ! V | R’ > .
with AF and F’ ranging, respectively, over terms of the sorts AExpr and Expr, and R, R’
over records in a configuration. The variable L ranges over labels while the constant nl
corresponds to  and represents absence of a label.
The full specification is available for download online at http://www.cs.illinois.edu/
~alturki/.
To illustrate the use of the Maude specifications for formal analysis of Orc programs,
we use an Orc program timeout based on the timeout expression given in Section 2.3.2 to
demonstrate simple use cases of rewriting-based simulation and breadth-first search analysis.
A discussion of more sophisticated analysis of LTL properties using Maude’s model checker
is given in Section 4.2.
Suppose that the initial configuration of timeout is given by the constant to-config,
which is defined using the following equations (assuming that x, t, y are Orc variables, and
Timeout is an expression name):
eq to-decl = Timeout(x,t) := let(y{0}) < y < x{0}() | Rtimer(t{0})
>> let(signal)
eq to-config = [ to-decl ; Timeout(M, 3) ] .
55
in which the expression to be evaluated is the expression call Timeout(M, 3), which times
out in 3 time units a call to a site M. Recall that the operator [ ] constructs an initial
configuration of a given Orc program (see Section 3.1.3).
We first obtain a sample execution of the program using the rewrite command (assuming
no message transmission delays):
rewrite in RED-ORC : to-config .
result Config: < zero, lbl : nl | env : ... | clk : 3 |
msg : [signal,h(1)] | hdl : h(1) >
We observe that the call to M did not timeout as the site response signal caused by the
call to let in the message [signal,h(1)] was never consumed. To investigate the sequence
of rewrites that led to this (final) state, we may use Maude’s trace command to output a
trace of equations and rules applied with different display and detail options [20]. An easier,
although much less powerful, approach, which we demonstrate here for its simplicity, is to
use the print attribute to selectively annotate equations and rules of interest with output
messages that get displayed whenever the corresponding statement is applied [88]. Using
such annotations, the following trace can be produced using the rewrite command above:
Maude> rew to-config .
rewrite in RED-ORC : to-config .
Tau (Expr Call): Timeout(M,3)
Site Call: M(); with Handle h(0)
Site Call: Rtimer(3); with Handle h(1)
Site Return: value 1 for handle h(0)
Tau (bound value)
Site Call: let(1); with Handle h(0)
Site Return: value 1 for handle h(0)
Publishing: value 1
Time Tick : from 0 by 3
result Config: < zero, lbl : nl | env : ... | clk : 3 |
msg : [signal,h(1)] | hdl : h(1) >
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The trace lists the types of the actions taken, each of which is followed by some instantiation
details. We note that, since execution begins at time 0 and time is not advanced until the
very last step, all the instantaneous actions of this trace occur at time 0. The last step
time-shifts the configuration by 3 time units, which is the timeout period, but no site return
action takes places after that, since the thread that had the corresponding site call was
already pruned at the second tau event in the trace. The (fairly obvious) fact that, in the
absence of transmission delays, the call to M will never timeout can be exhaustively verified
by, for example, the following search command:
Maude> search to-config =>* < F:Expr, msg : [self, 1, H:Handle]
MS:MsgPool | clk : T:Time | R:Record > such that T:Time >= 3 .
No solution.
states: 18 rewrites: 371 in 1ms cpu (10ms real) (247498 rewrites/second)
which searches for a configuration having a pending response from M after 3 time units have
passed, and fails to find a solution as expected. However, when the possibility of message
transmission delays of 3 time units or longer are introduced, the response from M may now
timeout, which may be witnessed by a simulation, or – when the set of possible delays is
finite – shown by breadth-first search.
3.6 Performance Comparison
Despite being bisimilar, the reduction rewriting semantics given by RredOrc enjoys a significant
performance advantage over the SOS-based rewriting semantics given by RsosOrc. This section
validates this claim by comparing the formal simulation and analysis performance of the two
rewrite theories through their specifications in Maude.
Throughout all experiments, performance is measured in terms of the CPU time – in
milliseconds – taken to perform a particular task as reported by Maude. The tasks are:
(1) simulating six Orc programs using Maude’s rewrite command, (2) exploring the state
space of these six programs using Maude’s breadth-first search command, and (3) model
checking deadlock-freeness in four problem instances of a deadlock-free specification of the
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BCast(m,x) , (if (empty(x)) let(signal)
| if (¬empty(x)) head(x) >a> a(m)BCast(m, tail(x)))
CList(x) , (if (empty(x)) let([])
| if (¬empty(x)) head(x) >a> (append(y, ys)
<y< (a() | Rtimer(5) let(signal))
<ys< CList(tail(x))))
Figure 3.7: Expression declarations for BCast and CList examples
timeout priority par-or timed-m BCast CList
RsosOrc rewrite 1.0 1.0 8.0 14.0 3.0 10.0
search 1.0 2.0 84.0 326.0 5,492.0 6.0× 105
RredOrc rewrite 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
search 1.0 1.0 3.0 4.0 56.0 4.7× 104
Table 3.2: A performance comparison of the rewriting semantics of Orc using Maude’s
rewrite and search commands (times in milliseconds)
the dining philosophers problem using Maude’s LTL model checker. The Orc programs used
as benchmarks for these tasks were borrowed or inspired from examples in [35]. In particular,
timeout, which was also given in Section 2.3.2, priority, which prioritizes a site call over
another, par-or, which specifies a parallel (lazy) disjunction function, and timed-m, which
makes four timed calls to a site, were all borrowed from [35]. The Orc programs BCast,
which implements a sequential broadcast, and CList, which constructs in parallel a tuple
of responses from external sites with timeout, were both inspired by examples in [35]. The
expression definitions for BCast and CList are shown in Figure 3.7, where empty, head,
tail and append are (local) sites implementing list functions. . For the dining philosophers
benchmark, we use the deadlock-free specification given in [35]. For simplicity, we assume
no message delays for all the benchmarking tasks above.
The results of these experiments are summarized in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3. To guarantee
fairness in comparison, the experiments were carried out on the same machine, using the
same version of Maude, and under similar operating conditions7. The results clearly show
7The experiments were carried out on a 2.93GHz quad-core machine with 24GB of memory using Maude
2.6.
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Problem Size 2 3 4 5
RsosOrc 22.0 2,423.0 4.8× 105 ∞
RredOrc 3.0 107.0 3,230.0 1.6× 105
Table 3.3: A performance comparison of the rewriting semantics of Orc using Maude’s LTL
model checker applied to four instances of the dining philosophers problem (times in
milliseconds)
that the reduction semantics of Orc is much more efficiently executable than the SOS-based
semantics. This is mainly because the SOS-based semantics makes extensive use of rewrite
rules that are mostly conditional with rewrites in their conditions, which are, by their non-
deterministic nature, more expensive to compute than unconditional rules. The reduction
semantics, on the other hand, minimizes both the number of rewrite rules and the number of
rewrites in the conditions, while using equations to specify the deterministic features of the
language. Furthermore, unlike the SOS-based semantics, where several rules may have to
be attempted before successfully making a transition, attempts to apply the instantaneous
action rules in RredOrc never fail (as can be verified by Maude’s profiler) since transition steps
corresponding to instantaneous actions are specified only by two rules that match active
expressions for internal actions (the rule labeled IAction), and inactive expressions for the
external action of site return (the SiteReturn) rule). This significantly reduces the need
for backtracking-like behaviors when (recursively) searching for proofs of rewrite conditions.
As Table 3.2 shows, the performance difference between RredOrc and RsosOrc is only marginal
for small expressions with limited parallelism, such as timeout and priority. However, as
expressions get more complex, the performance gap between the SOS-based semantics and
the reduction semantics increases considerably, especially with the search command, since
searching tries to build proofs of all reachable states, exposing it to the limitations of the
SOS-based semantics even more. This is justified since the more complex an expression is,
the larger the number of (parallel) compositions used, which translates into a larger number
of conditional rewrite checks in the SOS-based semantics8.
8It is important to note that, like the original synchronous SOS specification of Orc, both the SOS-based
semantics and the reduction semantics are fairly detailed, operational semantics of Orc, and are, as a result,
vulnerable to the state space explosion problem, when using the search or LTL model checking commands,
particularly for programs with increasing levels of non-determinism (the CList instance, for example, had
over 8.5× 105 states).
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The performance advantage of RredOrc over RsosOrc is more pronounced in the model checking
experiments of the notoriously non-deterministic dining philosophers specification, as shown
by Table 3.3. For the SOS-based semantics, the model checker did not finish within a
reasonable amount of time for the problem instance with five philosophers.
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CHAPTER 4
OBJECT-BASED REWRITING SEMANTICS OF
ORC AND THE MORC TOOL
The Orc semantics, as described above in the SOS and the reduction rewriting semantics
specifications, focuses on the, possibly concurrent, evaluation of a single Orc expression,
abstracting away its interactions with external sites in an environment as if the environment
were a black box. It is however very natural to view both Orc expressions and sites as dis-
tributed objects, which interact with each other through message passing. Indeed, in practical
applications, many orchestration problems, especially relatively large ones, can be thought of
as compositions of multiple Orc subexpressions that independently orchestrate different but
related tasks. For example, an online auction management expression may be composed of
subexpressions managing: (1) seller inventories and product auction announcements, (2) bid
collection and winner announcements, and (3) payments and shipping coordination. Such
subexpressions need not be located on the same machine for the orchestration effort to be
completed, but are, in fact, more often run on physically distributed nodes spread across
the web. Furthermore, sites normally maintain local states to support the services they
provide, such as counter sites and channel (buffer) sites. Below, we describe a simple seman-
tic extension of the Orc theory to a distributed, object-based programming model that is
both natural and useful in specifying and analyzing distributed computations with explicit
treatment of external sites and messages.
4.1 Distributed Object-based Semantics ROrc
The distributed object-based semantics encapsulates the Orc programming model as the
underlying model for Orc expressions, and in this respect, its rewriting specification, denoted
ROrc, directly builds on the reduction semantics specification RredOrc using rewriting logic’s
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approach to distributed objects [94]. ROrc generalizes the reduction semantics to multiple
Orc expressions and models the environment explicitly by (possibly external) site objects
and asynchronous message passing. Although still a formal specification, this distributed
object semantics can be seamlessly transformed into a distributed Orc implementation using
Maude, as we discuss in Chapter 5.
4.1.1 Object-based Orc Configurations
In the distributed object semantics ROrc, an Orc program configuration is defined as a multi-
set of objects and messages, specified by associative and commutative empty juxtaposition,
with none as the identity element. An object is a term of the form 〈O : C | A〉, with O
a unique object identifier, C the class name of the object, and A a set of attribute-value
pairs, each of the form attr : value, where attr is the attribute’s name, and value is its corre-
sponding value. There are two main classes of Orc objects: Expression objects (of the class
Expr) and Site objects (of the class Site), corresponding, respectively, to Orc expressions and
sites. An expression object for an Orc program ~d ; f has three attributes: (i) env , which
holds the set of expression declarations corresponding to ~d, (ii) exp, which maintains the
Orc expression f to be evaluated, and (iii) hdl , which keeps a set of handle names that are
currently being used by the expression. For instance, a timeout expression object may have
the following initial form:
〈O : Expr | env : Timeout(x, t) , let(y) <y< x() | Rtimer(t) let(signal),
exp : Timeout(M, 10), hdl : ∅〉
In contrast, an Orc site object has the following three attributes: (i) name, which holds the
site’s name, such as if, CNN, M, . . . etc, (ii) state, which abstractly maintains the current
state of the site (the concrete definition of the state is site-specific), and (iii) op, which
tells whether the site object is currently blocking (performing some operation) or accepting
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incoming messages. For example, a simple CNN site object may have the following form:
〈O : Site | name : CNN , op : ready , state : (d0, p0), · · · (dn, pn)〉
where ready is a constant signifying that the site is ready to accept calls, and the state is
a list of dated news pages. Note that fundamental sites, such as if and Rtimer, and other
basic sites, such as arithmetic functions, are stateless and thus make no use of the state field.
In keeping with the philosophy of the Orc theory, expression objects are modeled as active
objects with one or more threads of control (given as an Orc expression), and are capable
of initiating (asynchronous) message exchange. Site objects, on the other hand, are reactive
objects having internal states but only capable of responding to incoming requests. In
order to capture timing behaviors, an additional simple Clock object is also included in the
configuration.
Messages in an Orc configuration are either site call or site return messages. Within
an expression object O, a site call expression M(~v) causes a site call message of the form
M ← sc(O,~v, t) to be emitted into the object configuration, with t a non-negative value
representing the delay of the message; that is, the time it takes for the message to reach the
site M . Once the message is received and processed by M , the site may reply back with a
site return message O ← sr(M,w, t′), with w the value published by M , and t′ the message
delay.
4.1.2 Object-based Semantics of Orc
The distributed semantics of an object-based Orc configuration is essentially given by the
semantics of the individual expression objects within the configuration, which is precisely
the semantics specified by the reduction rewriting semantics of RredOrc, with two exceptions:
(i) messages are now managed by the object-based Orc configuration, and (ii) site responses,
which were only simulated in the reduction semantics (and the SOS-based semantics), are
now generated based on the internal states of site objects, in addition to the site call param-
eters.
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Since Orc expressions and sites are now encapsulated within expression and site objects,
respectively, in the object-based configuration, rewrite rules that capture the instantaneous
actions are no longer global rules that match the entire state, like in RredOrc, but are instead
localized to individual objects. In effect, the distributed semantics adds a new level of
concurrency between objects in a configuration, in addition to concurrency within an Orc
expression using parallel composition combinators. In particular, the rewrite rule in ROrc
specifying internal action transitions is of the following form (using object-oriented notation
where attributes that are not used in the rule need not be mentioned):
IAction : 〈O : Expr | exp : fˆ〉 → 〈O : Expr | exp : act↑(f ′, i)〉 if fˆ → act↑(f ′, i)
The rule states that an expression object (possibly among other expression objects in the
configuration) may perform an internal transition if its active expression is able to perform
that transition. As in RredOrc, an expression fˆ may perform an internal action using one
of the expression-level rules SiteCall, ExprCall, and Publish, given in Section 3.3.1.
Equations that reflect the effects of an internal action on the state of an expression object
and the configuration are also localized to the relevant expression objects. For instance, the
equation that captures the effects of a site call has the following form:
〈O : Expr | exp : act↑(f, siteCall(M,~v)), hdl : η〉
= 〈O : Expr | exp : act↓(f, ?h), hdl : h, η〉 M ← sc(O,~v, h, t) if h := fresh(η)
which causes a site call message M ← sc(O,~v, h, t) to be emitted into the configuration,
with t a (possibly random) time delay. The two equations capturing the effects of expression
calls and publishing of values are similarly specified.
When a site call message to a site M becomes ready for consumption (i.e., its transmission
delay reaches zero), a site object for M may consume the message according to the following
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rule:
ProcessCall : 〈O′ : Site | name : M, op : ready〉 M ← sc(O,~v, h, 0)
→ 〈O′ : Site | name : M, op : app(~v, h,O)〉
where app(~v, h,O) indicates that the site object is about to process the call from the expres-
sion object identified by O. In general, the behavior of a site M in response to a site call may
depend on its current state, given by the state field, and the call parameters in app(~v, h,O).
Fundamental sites, such as Rtimer and Clock, and functional sites, like arithmetic add and
logical or, have no internal states, and their behaviors are specified equationally in ROrc. For
example, the behavior of the Rtimer site object is defined simply by the following equation:
〈O′ : Site | name : Rtimer , op : app(t, h, O)〉
= O ← sr(signal , h, t) 〈O′ : Site | name : Rtimer , op : ready〉
where the response is purposefully delayed to achieve the semantics of Rtimer. This is in
contrast to, say, a remote counter site counter that responds to a next message based on the
current value of its counter:
〈O′ : Site | name : counter , op : app(next , h, O), state : count(k)〉
= O ← sr(k, h, d) 〈O′ : Site | name : counter , op : ready , state : count(k + 1 )〉
with d a suitable message transmission delay.
Likewise, the external action of a site return, in which an available site return message of
the form O ← sr(w, h, 0) is consumed by the expression object O, is also specified at the
level of expression objects using the following rule:
SiteReturn : 〈O : Expr | exp : f¯ , hdl : h, η〉 O ← sr(w, h, 0)
→ 〈O : Expr | exp : sret(f¯ , w, h), hdl : η〉 if h ∈ handles(f¯)
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which consumes an incoming site return message only when its delay is zero. It is important
to note that all the auxiliary operators, including act↑, act↓, sret and handles, are defined
exactly as before (see Sections 3.1 and 3.3).
The tick rewrite rule, however, must be specified globally at the configuration level to
properly propagate the effects of a time tick across all objects and messages in the config-
uration. This is accomplished by encapsulating the entire object-based configuration using
an operator { } : Config→ System, and specifying the tick rule as follows (cf. [69]):
Tick : {〈O : Clock | clk : t〉 C} → {〈O : Clock | clk : t+ t′〉 δ(C, t′)}
if eager(C) 6= true ∧ t′ := mte(C) ∧ t′ 6= 0
where C is the configuration with all the concurrent expression and site objects, and the
operators eager and mte are defined similarly as before in Section 3.1.
In summary, the distributed, object-based semantics given by ROrc generalizes the re-
duction semantics of RredOrc to multiple Orc expressions, and provides an explicit treatment
of sites and message exchanges between expression and site objects. An implementation
of ROrc in Maude (and Real-Time Maude – RTM) as the module OO-ORC has also been
developed, and is used as the back-end of the tool MOrc, which we describe in Section 4.2.
4.1.3 Executabilty of ROrc
Like the rewriting logic specifications for the SOS-based rewriting semantics RsosOrc and the
reduction rewriting semantics RredOrc, the specification of the distributed object-based seman-
tics given by ROrc = (Σ, E ∪ A,R, φ) satisfies the executability requirements of rewrite
theories. Indeed, the membership equational theory (Σ, E ∪ A) can be shown operationally
A-terminating using the MTT and AProVE, and ground confluent and sort-decreasing using
Maude’s CRC as before. Moreover, a proof of ground coherence of R with E can be given
using a modular argument similar to that in the proof of Lemma 7 in Section 3.3.4.
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4.1.4 Object-level Concurrency vs. Orc’s Parallel Composition in ROrc
As noted before, ROrc localizes the rewrite rules capturing the untimed semantics to objects,
which implies that behavioral transitions across different objects may be taken concurrently,
adding a new dimension of concurrency to Orc’s semantics that is orthogonal to Orc’s in-
ternal concurrency using its parallel combinators. A key observation is that object-level
concurrency and symmetric parallel composition in ROrc both model independent threads
of computation running in parallel. When the Orc expression of an Orc expression object
O is a symmetric parallel composition of the form f | g, the possible behavioral transitions
of O are essentially identical to those of two separate objects Of and Og whose underlying
Orc expressions are f and g, respectively. Intuitively, this is because any enabled internal
transition in f | g is enabled either in f or in g (the IAction rule), and by assuming that
the enclosing configurations of O and of Of and Og have the same set of Orc site objects
and the same set of pending messages (with appropriate renaming of object references), the
object O and the pair of objects Of and Og will exhibit identical external and time tick
transitions (using SiteReturn, ProcessCall and Tick).
Despite being semantically equivalent, having both concurrency constructs (that is, the
Orc operator | and the configuration multiset union operator ) incorporated inROrc pro-
vides a conceptual advantage for modeling distributed concurrent systems. In particular, an
Orc symmetric parallel composition may be preferred when modeling tightly-coupled multi-
threaded computations that typically run on the same node, while concurrency across objects
may be preferred when modeling loosely-coupled parallel computations that are more often
distributed across different, independent nodes. This distinction for modeling distributed
systems is exploited when we introduce the distributed implementation of Orc in Chap-
ter 5. Object-level concurrency in ROrc is also used in Chapter 7 to arrive at simpler models
amenable to statistical model checking analysis.
4.2 The MOrc Tool
MOrc is a web-based formal specification and analysis tool for Orc programs based on
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RTM and the real-time, object-oriented, rewriting logic specification of Orc, ROrc. MOrc
provides a user-friendly interface for specifying the Orc program or expression to be ana-
lyzed, any custom sites and their definitions, and the desired formal analysis task and its
parameters. The tool supports three kinds of formal analyses: (1) rewriting-based simulation
using the timed rewrite command trew; (2) untimed and timed breadth-first search using,
respectively, the utsearch and tsearch commands; and (3) untimed and time-bounded
model-checking analysis using the mc command. The tool is designed to balance both sim-
plicity and expressiveness by supporting user inputs in standard Orc notation, by hiding
interactions with RTM, and by providing generic templates for specifying parametric pred-
icates (for both searching and model-checking), using which a wide range of properties can
be specified.
4.2.1 Components of MOrc
MOrc is implemented as a dynamic web-based application with both: (1) a front-end
client process (implemented using Javascript and the JQuery library) to display appropriate
interactive visual elements and manage interactions with the user, and (2) a back-end server
(implemented in PHP and C) that pre-processes user input, handles communication with
RTM, and post-processes Maude’s output. The diagram in Figure 4.1 shows the main
components of the tool and illustrates their interactions. MOrc can be accessed online at
http://www.cs.illinois.edu/~alturki/.
The front-end of MOrc provides an intuitive interface for specifying inputs and displaying
analysis results. The main screen, shown in a screen-shot in Figure 4.2, is divided into
three main sections: (1) an Orc program/expression and site input section, (2) a preloaded
examples section, and (3) a tabbed analysis input/output section. The user may wish to
load, and then perhaps edit, one of the examples by clicking on it on the right panel,
or he/she may specify an entirely different Orc program/expression, essentially using the
mathematical notation of the syntax of Orc defined in Section 2.3.1 (a more precise definition
of MOrc-admissible Orc syntax will be discussed in Section 4.2.2 below). Furthermore,
custom sites can be defined in the “Custom Sites” panel of the program input area. Currently,
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Figure 4.1: The architecture of MOrc
only a limited form of functional sites can be defined, which is achieved by specifying the
site’s name, its messaging interface, and its (possibly time-sensitive) behavior. Finally, the
formal analysis section presents a tabbed interface with three tabs corresponding to the
three analysis modes supported, namely, simulation, search, and model-checking. Each tab
provides a customized panel for specifying analysis parameters for the corresponding analysis
mode, such as an expression pattern for searching, or custom atomic predicates for model-
checking.
Upon specifying these parameters and pressing an analysis submission button, the front-
end constructs a request object (in Javascript Object Notation format, or JSON) encapsulat-
ing all relevant input parameters, submits it to the back-end server, and waits for a response.
As illustrated in Figure 4.1, the back-end server passes the Orc program text P to a parser
and a code generator (both written in C) to build the Maude term T (P ) corresponding to
the initial state of P . The term T (P ), along with the user-supplied analysis parameters, is
then fed into a RTM pre-processor that is responsible for generating the appropriate RTM
formal analysis command and, for searching and model-checking, a user module that extends
the RTM Orc module ORC with custom predicates capturing the analysis parameters. After
that, the generated module and command are supplied to RTM for execution. The analysis
output of RTM is parsed and processed before a server, JSON-encoded object is created and
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Figure 4.2: The main screen of MOrc’s front-end
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Figure 4.3: The main screen of MOrc showing the results of executing a search command
sent to the client.
When the client receives the server response object, the front-end replaces the analysis
panel in the user interface with a results panel that displays in a structured way the analysis
results extracted from the response object. For example, Figure 4.3 shows the results of
a timed search analysis command. The user may then press the “Back to analysis panel”
button to navigate back to the last used analysis panel.
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<program> ::= <declarations> ‘.’ <expr> | <expr>
<declarations> ::= <declarations> ‘.’ <declaration> | <declaration>
<declaration> ::= ID ‘(’ ‘)’ ‘:=’ <expr>
| ID ‘(’ <call_expr_list> ‘)’ ‘:=’ <expr>
<expr> ::= <expr> ‘>’ ID ‘>’ <expr> | <expr> ‘>>’ <expr>
| <expr> ‘<’ ID ‘<’ <expr> | <expr> ‘<<’ <expr>
| <expr> ‘|’ <expr> | <expr> ‘;’ <expr>
| ‘(’ <expr> ‘)’ | <call_expr_list>
| ‘zero’
<call_expr_list> ::= <call_expr_list> ‘,’ <call_expr> | <call_expr>
<call_expr> ::= ID ‘(’ <call_expr_list> ‘)’ | <local_call_expr>
| ID | NUMBER | STRING
| ‘signal’ | ‘true’ | ‘false’
<local_call_expr> ::= ID [ NUMBER ]
| <call_expr> <infix_bin_sn> <call_expr>
| <infix_un_sn> <call_expr>
| <prefix_bin_sn> ( <call_expr> , <call_expr> )
<infix_bin_sn> ::= ‘+’ | ‘-’ | ‘*’ | ‘/’ | ‘%’
| ‘==’ | ‘>’ | ‘>=’ | ‘<’ | ‘<=’ | ‘!=’
| ‘&&’ | ‘||’
<infix_un_sn> ::= ‘!’
<prefix_bin_sn> ::= ‘min’ | ‘max’
Table 4.1: BNF grammar of Orc syntax accepted by MOrc
4.2.2 Formal Analysis Using MOrc
This section explains and illustrates with examples how MOrc may be used to formally
analyze Orc programs. We begin by first defining the syntax of Orc accepted by the tool.
Admissible Orc Syntax
An Orc program can be specified in MOrc according to the BNF grammar shown in Ta-
ble 4.1, which is essentially an extension of standard Orc syntax, as defined in Section 2.3.1,
with built-in site names for standard arithmetic, relational, and logical operators. The gram-
mar also defines syntax for a local site call that returns the i-th element of a k-tuple x, with
0 ≤ i < k and k > 0, using the site call x[i]. Identifiers, represented by the token ID, are
sequences of alphanumeric characters beginning with an alphabetic letter. The tokens NUMBR
and STRING denote, respectively, natural numbers and double-quoted string literals.
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Simulating Orc Programs
The simulation analysis panel implements RTM’s timed rewrite command trew. For simu-
lating Orc programs, one or more limits on the simulation task may optionally be specified,
which are particularly useful for simulating non-terminating Orc programs. The possible
simulation limits are: (1) a logical time limit, which specifies an upper bound on the logical
time value of the state of the program; (2) a publications limit, which specifies an upper
bound on the number of publications allowed before stopping the simulation; and (3) a
rewrite steps limit, which specifies an upper bound on the number of rewrite steps allowed,
where a rewrite step corresponds to a transition in the semantics of Orc (i.e. an applica-
tion of one of the rewrite rules in the rewriting semantics of Orc: a site call, an expression
call, the publishing of a value, a site return, or a time tick transition). If more than one
limit is specified, simulation proceeds until one of the limits is reached. As an example, we
can load the Metronome example, whose declaration was given in Section 2.3.2, from the
“Examples” panel on MOrc’s interface:
Metronome(t) := let(signal) | rtimer(t) >> Metronome(t) .
Metronome(5)
Giving a logical time limit of 20 time units, and a publications limit of 2 causes the simulation
to stop once the second publication of signal is made at logical time 5, with the resulting
Orc expression being of the form: ?h >> Metronome(5). Finally, a timeout - in seconds
- should be specified to guard against having simulations running forever. For instance,
running the simulation command on Metronome without specifying any simulation limits
will cause the tool to display a timeout message.
Reachability Analysis Using Search
The search analysis panel implements the breadth-first search command of RTM, which is
either timed (using tsearch), or untimed (using utsearch). Timed search takes into account
explicit time-stamps of states, and allows reasoning about timed properties of the timed
transition system of the subject Orc program, such as the number of publications within
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$F[0-9]* Expressions $E[0-9]* Expr. names $M[0-9]* Site names
$V[0-9]* Values $X[0-9]* Variables $P[0-9]* Parameters
$VL[0-9]* Value lists $XL[0-9]* Variable lists $PL[0-9]* Param. lists
Table 4.2: Definitions of supported Orc expression pattern meta-variables
the first t time units, the time at which a specific value is published, or whether a pattern
is reachable after a given timeout. When timed search is selected, the user may specify the
type and value of the search time bound, or leave it unspecified for a timed search with no
time limit. Untimed search, on the other hand, ignores time-stamps on states. Therefore,
to allow for a potentially more efficient analysis, untimed search is performed with respect
to a slightly more abstract version of the rewriting semantics of Orc, ORC-UT, in which the
clock object is not maintained and only an untimed publications trace is recorded in the
state, which potentially reduces the reachable state space of a given program. This implies,
however, that only untimed properties can be specified and checked, as we will see below.
There are three configurable search parameters. First, an optional upper bound on the
number of solutions to be found can be specified. Otherwise, if left unspecified, the tool
will try to find all possible solutions. The second parameter, which is required, is the search
timeout, which specifies the timeout - in seconds - on the RTM process performing the
search. Finally, the third parameter is an option that when checked causes the search to
consider solutions corresponding only to terminal (deadlocked) states (i.e. states that cannot
be further rewritten). By default, if this option is not specified, the search considers all states
reachable by one or more rewrite steps.
To perform a search, the user may optionally provide an Orc expression pattern that a
solution state must satisfy. If specified, the search command will look for states whose Orc
expression components match at the top the given pattern. An Orc expression pattern can
be either a concrete Orc program specified according to the Orc syntax BNF grammar above
in Section 4.2.2, for example let(x) and if(x == y) >> let(true), or a symbolic pattern
containing pattern meta-variables ranging over terms of appropriate types. Syntactically,
a pattern meta-variable is an identifier of the form $[A-Z][A-Z]?[0-9]*, where the prefix
dollar sign $ distinguishes pattern meta-variables from Orc variables, and the first one or two
uppercase letters specify the type of the terms over which the pattern meta-variable ranges.
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Table 4.2 lists the currently supported meta-variables and their corresponding types. For
example, the pattern $F > $X > $F matches a sequential composition of two identical sub-
expressions, while the pattern $M($VL) | $E(1, $P) matches a parallel composition of an
enabled site call and an expression call with two parameters, the first of which is the value
1. Pattern meta-variables, which are internally translated into Maude meta-variables of
appropriate sorts, enable symbolic reachability analysis without requiring users of MOrc to
be familiar with underlying Maude.
In addition to Orc expression patterns, semantic constraints on publications of Orc values
can also be specified when using search. First, the reachable state space of an Orc program
can be constrained by an upper bound on the number of publications allowed. Further-
more, it is possible to specify timed constraints (for timed search) or untimed constraints
(for untimed search) on what values are published (Type I constraints) or the number of
values published (Type II constraints) in a state. MOrc provides two generic templates,
corresponding to both types, for the specification of such constraints, which are internally
translated into state predicates in RTM. For example, a timed Type I constraint may be
that the Orc program must have published a signal within the first five time units of its
execution, whereas an untimed Type II constraint may require that the program must have
published at least two values. The user may specify as many such constraints as desired
through MOrc’s interface. For a search task, the solution states will have to satisfy all the
specified publication constraints (i.e., the conjunction of the corresponding state predicates
in RTM).
As an example, consider the Delayed Response example from the list of examples on
the right pane, which is specified as:
DelayedResponse(x,t) := rtimer(t) >> let(z) < z < x() .
DelayedResponse(clock, 5) | let(signal)
Using timed search with a strict upper bound of 5 time units (i.e. t < 5), and using the
default values for the other search parameters, we may verify the simple property that the
site response from clock (which is the value 0) is never published before 5 time units have
passed. This can be achieved by adding a Type I constraint that looks for states with time-
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stamps strictly less than 5 in which the value 0 has been published, and making sure that
no solution is found.
Model-checking LTL formulas
The model checking analysis panel implements the linear temporal logic (LTL) model check-
ing command mc of RTM. As for search, model checking is either untimed, so that state
time-stamps are abstracted away, or time-bounded, (normally) with a given time bound, in
which a property is checked in the reachable (timed) state space up to the given time bound.
For efficiency of analysis, untimed model checking is based on a version of the rewriting se-
mantics of Orc, namely ORC-NT, in which publication traces are not kept in the state, which
implies that properties that can be verified for this type of model checking analysis cannot
refer to what, or how many, publications are made. This is in contrast to time-bounded
model checking, for which properties may refer to publications and the times at which they
were made. Other parameters include specifying: (1) an optional upper bound on the num-
ber of publications (for time-bounded model-checking), which restricts the analysis to the
subset of the reachable state space satisfying this bound, and (2) a model checking timeout,
which is required, on the RTM process.
The LTL property to be verified in MOrc can be either the generic absence-of-deadlock
property, which is a safety property that stipulates that no reachable state is terminal, or
deadlocked, or, alternatively, a custom, user-defined formula, typically based on user-defined
atomic predicates. When the custom LTL property radio button is pressed, the form fields
for specifying the property and any atomic predicates are displayed. MOrc provides three
generic templates for specifying named, parametric atomic predicates:
1. Expression pattern predicate, which specifies a predicate that is true in a state whose
expression component matches at the top the given pattern. The pattern can be
specified as described before in Section 4.2.2. Expression pattern predicates can be
used in both untimed and time-bounded model checking analyses.
2. Publication predicate, which specifies a predicate that is true in a state in which the
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<formula> ::= ‘True’ | ‘False’
| AP (* An atomic proposition *)
| ‘O’ <formula> (* Next *)
| <formula> ‘U’ <formula> (* Until *)
| ‘<>’ <formula> (* Eventually *)
| ‘[]’ <formula> (* Always *)
| <formula> ‘W’ <formula> (* Weak until *)
| <formula> ‘R’ <formula> (* Release *)
| <formula> ‘/\’ <formula> (* And *)
| <formula> ‘\/’ <formula> (* Or *)
| ‘~’ <formula> (* Not
| <formula> ‘->’ <formula> (* Implies *)
| <formula> ‘<->’ <formula> (* Equivalent *)
| <formula> ‘|->’ <formula> (* Leads to *)
| <formula> ‘=>’ <formula> (* Always implies *)
| <formula> ‘<=>’ <formula> (* Always equivalent *)
Table 4.3: BNF grammar of LTL formulas
given value is published within the given time constraints. This predicate is only
meaningful for time-bounded model checking.
3. Publication length predicate, which specifies a predicate that is true in a state in which
at least the given number of publications are made within the given time constraints.
This predicate is also only meaningful for time-bounded model checking.
The LTL formula field, which is a required field when specifying a custom formula, allows
for specifying an LTL formula that may make use of user-defined atomic predicates according
to the BNF grammar shown in Table 4.3.
In addition to the user-defined predicates above, the set of atomic predicates AP currently
includes as a predefined predicate (that may also be used in the specification of the LTL
formula) the predicate ”deadlock”, which is true in deadlocked states.
We illustrate how the model-checking interface panel may be used by means of two spec-
ifications of the Dining Philosophers problem in Orc, DF1 and DF2, given in the examples
panel on the right. We first verify the mutual exclusion property for both specifications,
which entails that no two philosophers (processes) are eating (the critical section) at the
same time, using untimed model-checking and the custom formula:
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[] ~ ((eat1 /\ eat2) \/ (eat2 /\ eat3) \/ (eat1 /\ eat3))
where eat1, eat2 and eat3 are user-defined Orc expression pattern predicates that are true
in a state when the corresponding philosopher process is about to call the site eat, i.e. when
the expression component of the state matches the pattern eat(i) >> $F | $F1 for atomic
predicate eati. We may also show that the no-deadlock property holds for DF2 but not for
DF1, using untimed model-checking and the predefined property “Absence of Deadlock” in
MOrc.
To illustrate time-bounded model checking in MOrc, we use a specification in Orc of
Fischer’s protocol with two processes, which is a timed, shared-variable-based, synchroniza-
tion protocol (assuming atomic reads and writes) for controlling multi-process access to
a critical section (see [95] for a detailed discussion of the protocol and variations). The
specification in Orc, named FPNT , uses two sites: (1) shared, which represents the shared
(synchronization) variable, which can be set to a positive value, reset to 0, or waited on (for
a possibly unbounded amount of time) to be reset again; and (2) csection, which represents
the critical section and blocks, when called, for a fixed (finite) period of time before re-
sponding back (current specification of csection responds after 2/3 time units elapses). The
mutual exclusion property can be verified in FPNT using untimed model checking of the for-
mula: [] ~ (cs1 /\ cs2), where cs(i), for i ∈ {1, 2}, are user-defined atomic predicates
specified using pattern expressions of the form csection(i) >> $F1 | $F2. Alternatively,
time-bounded model checking (with a reasonable time bound, say 15) may also be used to
verify this property up to the given bound. Another important property that is desired in
such a protocol is absence of livelock, so that some progress is being made by either process
in the protocol. This can be verified using untimed (or time-bounded – with a reasonable
time bound) model checking and the formula: [] <> (cs1 \/ cs2).
Finally, we briefly describe a third example, illustrating the use of publication predicates,
based on the specification of a simplified online auction management application Auction,
which manages posting new items for auction, coordinates the bidding process, and an-
nounces winners (the reader is referred to [55] for a detailed description of this example).
The specification of Auction, which can be loaded from the examples menu on the right,
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publishes the pair of values (N, “bidStarted ′′) when a bidding process is started for item N ,
and the pair (N, “won ′′) when its auction ends. Also, for this instance of Auction, we
assume a single seller with an item, labeled 1910, available for auction for 5 time units. A
property that is typically required in an auction management system is that an item with at
least one bid is eventually sold. This property can be specified using Type I publication pred-
icates, which specify constraints on what values are published, using the values published
by the expression. In particular, we first add a Type I atomic predicate, named bid, and
specify the tuple (1910, ‘‘bidStarted’’) as the published value with no time constraints
(i.e. time ≥ 0). Similarly, we add a second Type I predicate, “won”, with value (1910,
‘‘bidStarted’’) and no particular time constraint. Time-bounded model checking with a
time bound greater than or equal to 5 of the formula bid |-> won verifies that the desired
property holds in Auction.
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CHAPTER 5
DISTRIBUTED IMPLEMENTATION OF ORC
In this chapter, we propose a seamless, semantics-preserving transformation path from a
language specification to a distributed language implementation, which substantially nar-
rows the gap between the theoretical level of a distributed language like Orc and an actual
implementation. In addition to its formal correctness guarantees, the transformation path
enables formally reasoning about programs written in such a language in their implemented
form. To demonstrate its effectiveness, the transformation method is applied to Orc to arrive
at a distributed implementation of Orc with physical timing. This semantics-based trans-
formation builds on the object-based rewriting logic semantics of Orc, given by ROrc and
discussed in Chapter 4, and which we have shown semantically equivalent to Orc’s intended
semantics.
The key idea behind this transformation methods is that concurrent rewriting is both
a theoretical model and a practical method of distributed computation. Specifically, in
Maude, asynchronous message-passing between distributed objects can be accomplished by
concurrent rewriting via sockets. For Orc, the objects are either Orc expressions, which play
the role of clients, or sites, which play the role of servers. But since for Orc real time is of
the essence, an important issue that must be addressed is how real time is supported in the
implementation. Here, the key observation is that Orc programs assume an asynchronous and
possibly unreliable distributed environment such as the Internet, and therefore implicitly rely
on their local notion of time for their computations. As a consequence, time is supported by
local ticker objects, that interact in a tightly-coupled way with their co-located Orc objects.
Formal verification of Orc programs running in the rewriting-based distributed implemen-
tation can be performed indirectly by formally specifying both Maude sockets, supporting
external communication, and the ticker objects, supporting the real-time behavior of Orc
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expressions. In this way, both distributed message-passing computation between Orc expres-
sion clients and web sites, and time elapse are faithfully simulated in the formal specification,
in which our desired program can then be model checked. As we explain in this chapter,
under reasonable assumptions about the granularity of time chosen for the tickers and the
Orc expressions, this simulated formal analysis gives us corresponding guarantees about the
actual Orc programs running in the actual distributed Orc implementation.
5.1 Dist-Orc: A Distributed Implementation of Orc
In general, the method of transforming a real-time, object-based rewriting semantics into a
real-time distributed implementation consists of three fundamental steps:
1. Defining the distributed structure of the system being specified by specifying locations
and a globally unique naming mechanism for objects
2. Specifying the rewriting semantics of the underlying communication model for dis-
tributed objects in the system
3. Devising a mechanism for capturing physical, wall clock timing information and ex-
tending the rewriting semantics of time to incorporate this information
As explained below, a crucial enabling feature for steps (2) and (3) above is Maude’s support
for socket-based communication [20]. Through sockets, a Maude process is able to exchange
messages with other processes, including other Maude instances, according to the connection-
oriented TCP communication protocol.
By applying these transformation steps to the provably correct real-time, object-based
rewriting semantics of Orc, ROrc, we obtain in Maude a real-time, distributed implemen-
tation of Orc, which we call Dist-Orc, which is deployable on a physically distributed
communication network. The transformation entails only minor modifications to ROrc, such
as the changes of data representation needed to exchange data through sockets. This consid-
erably increases our confidence in the correctness of the implementation and greatly narrows
the gap between implementation and formal analysis.
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Below, we discuss in some detail how this method is applied to Orc’s rewriting se-
mantics, outline the design and implementation choices in Dist-Orc and explain how
they are specified in Maude. The full specification of Dist-Orc is available online at
http://www.cs.illinois.edu/homes/alturki/dist-orc.
5.1.1 Distributed Orc Configurations
In the distributed implementation, an Orc configuration may span multiple nodes in an
interconnected network, and is thus called a distributed Orc configuration. Both expression
and external site objects in a distributed configuration are identified partly by their location
(a term of the sort Loc), which is defined as a combination of an address (such as a URI or
an IP address) and a port number.
sort Loc . op loc : String Nat -> Loc [ctor] .
To fully identify expression and external site objects, expression object identifiers, of sort
EOid, and external site identifiers, of sort XSOid, also include a locally unique sequence
number.
op s : Loc Nat -> XSOid [ctor] . op e : Loc Nat -> EOid [ctor] .
Internal site objects, such as if and rtimer , are identified simply by their names, since
their locations are implicit.
Within a distributed Orc configuration, a local configuration (a term of sort LocalSystem),
or simply a configuration, which is a configuration that is located at some node, is managed
by an independent instance of Maude. In addition to expression and site objects, each
such configuration contains a clock object for maintaining local time and a socket portal for
exchanging messages with external objects in other configurations (more on this below).
sort LocalSystem . op [_] : Configuration -> LocalSystem [ctor] .
The operator [ ] encapsulates a local configuration to support managing the local clock and
the effects of time elapse (similar to the ideas presented in Real-Time Maude (RTM) [69]).
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5.1.2 Sockets and Messaging
In agreement with the Orc theory, the communication model between Orc expressions and
sites follows very closely that of the client-server architecture, where Orc expressions are
client objects requesting and using services from sites as server objects. In particular, when
an expression object O within some Orc configuration makes a site call with actual parameters
C to an external site N located at loc(SR, PT), with SR and PT the node’s address and port,
a site call message of the form s(loc(SR, PT), N) <- sc(O, C, H) is created within the
configuration, where S(loc(SR, PT), N) is the site object identifier, as described above,
and H is a temporary handle that uniquely identifies this call. This message then triggers
the creation of a client socket to the called site through the following equation:
eq s(loc(SR, PT), N) <- sc(O, C, H)
= < p(O, H) : Proxy | param : C, response : "" >
createClientTcpSocket(socketManager, p(O, H), SR, PT) .
Beside asking Maude’s socket manager for a client socket to the site, the rule creates a
temporary proxy object identified by p(O, H), which manages external communication for
this particular site call on behalf of the expression object O. The proxy object also serves
as a buffer for the site’s response, since TCP sockets do not preserve message boundaries in
general.
If a client TCP socket to loc(SR, PT) is successfully created, Maude introduces the
message createdSocket(OP, socketManager, SC) targeted to the proxy OP into the con-
figuration, which causes the proxy to send the site call message to the external site object
through the socket SC, as specified by the following rewrite rule (the variable AS denotes the
rest of the attributes in the object):
rl [SendExtCall] :
< OP : Proxy | param: C, AS > createdSocket(OP, socketManager, SC)
=> < OP : Proxy | param: C, AS > send(SC, OP, (toString(C) + sep)) .
where toString is a function that properly serializes Orc values into strings that can be
transmitted through sockets. The function uses a separator sep to distinguish message
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boundaries. At the other end, Orc values are built back from such strings using another
function toValue. Orc value serialization is described in detail in Section 5.1.3 below.
There is also the possibility of an unsuccessful client socket creation attempt due, for
example, to an unavailable server or a network failure. In this case, Maude reports the error
by issuing the message socketError(OP, socketManager, S), with S a string describing
the cause of the error. Such an error is a run-time error, which, for simplicity, is considered
fatal in Dist-Orc, so that the site call and any subsequent transitions that depend on it
will fail.
Once the site call message is sent, the reply sent(OP, SC) appears in the configuration
and the proxy object waits for a response by introducing a receive(SC, OP) message:
rl [RecExtResponse] :
sent(OP, SC) < OP : Proxy | AS > => < OP : Proxy | AS > receive(SC, OP) .
When some string S is received through the socket, the message received(OP, OD, S)
appears, and the proxy object stores S in its buffer and waits for further input.
rl [AccumExtResponse ] :
< OP : Proxy | param: C, response: S’ > received(OP, SC, S)
=> < OP : Proxy | param: C, response: S’ + S > receive(SC, OP) .
The proxy will keep waiting for and accumulating input through the socket until it is remotely
closed by the site, when the reply closedSocket appears. At this point, the site response
is reconstructed and handed in to its expression object:
rl [ProcessExtResponse] :
< p(O,H) : Proxy | response: S’ , AS > closedSocket(p(O,H), SC, S)
=> O <- sr(toValue(S’), H) .
On the server side, when a site is first initialized, it creates a server TCP socket, through
which it keeps listening for incoming connections.
eq [InitializeSite] :
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< s(loc(SR, PT), N) : Site | op : free, status : idle, AS >
= < s(loc(SR, PT), N) : Site | op : free, status : initializing, AS >
createServerTcpSocket(socketManager, s(loc(SR, PT), N), PT, 10) .
rl [CreatedServerSocket] :
createdSocket(xOS, socketManager, LISTENER)
< xOS : Site | op : free, status : initializing , AS >
=> < xOS : Site | op : free, status : active , AS >
acceptClient(LISTENER, xOS) .
Once a client has been connected with a socket CLIENT, the site becomes ready for an
incoming site call through CLIENT, while listening for other potential clients:
rl [AcceptedClient] :
acceptedClient(xOS, LISTENER, IP, CLIENT)
< xOS : Site | op : free, status : active, AS >
=> < xOS : Site | op : free, status : active , AS > receive(CLIENT, xOS)
acceptClient(LISTENER, xOS) .
The site then accumulates the request from CLIENT (which contains the actual parameters
for the site call):
crl [AccumulateRequest] :
< xOS : Site | op : free , buffer : S, AS > received(xOS, CLIENT, S’)
=> < xOS : Site | op : free , buffer : S + S’, AS > receive(CLIENT, xOS)
if find(S + S’, sep, 0) == notFound .
The rule above buffers the serialized request by checking whether the message boundary
indicator, given by sep, has been received. Once the message is received in its entirety, the
following rule fires:
crl [PrepareReply] :
received(xOS, CLIENT, S’) < xOS : Site | op : free , buffer : S, AS >
=> < xOS : Site | op : exec(toValue(substr(S’’, 0, length(S’’)
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+ (- length(sep)))), CLIENT),
buffer : "", AS >
if S’’ := S + S’ /\ n := find(S’’, sep, 0) .
This rule causes the site to process the call using the function exec(...), whose definition
is site-dependent. When appropriate, the site might publish a value as a result of this site
call, which then causes a response to be sent back to the client:
eq CLIENT <- sr(c, xOS, 0) < xOS : Site | AS >
= < xOS : Site | AS > send(CLIENT, xOS, toString(c)) .
Once the response is sent, the site closes the socket:
rl [ReplySent] :
sent(xOS, CLIENT) < xOS : Site | AS >
=> < xOS : Site | AS > closeSocket(CLIENT, xOS) .
rl [ClosedClientSocket] :
closedSocket(xOS, CLIENT, S) < xOS : Site | AS >
=> < xOS : Site | AS > .
Note that, when a site remains silent, no response is generated, and the client blocks waiting
for a response through the other end of the open socket CLIENT.
It is worth noting here that, just like in any other physically distributed communication
mechanism, messaging through sockets is inherently prone to various potential communi-
cation problems. In addition to the socket creation errors mentioned above, these include
dropped connections, lossy channels and unpredictably long delays. In Dist-Orc, such
problems are dynamic errors that might be exposed while executing a distributed Orc pro-
gram, and typically cause the Orc objects in which they appear to fail.
5.1.3 Serialization of Orc Values
Local Orc configurations communicate with each other by external site calls and returns,
which involve exchanging Orc values either as actual parameters to calls or as return values.
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Since this communication takes place through Maude’s TCP sockets, Orc values need to be
serialized as transferable strings just before they are transmitted, and then reconstructed
back to Orc values just after they are received. Similarly to how this issue was previously
approached in Maude [96, 97], we utilize Maude’s meta-level capabilities, provided by the
module META-LEVEL, to produce proper serialization and reconstruction procedures for Orc
values. More specifically, we define a module VALUE-STRING-CONVERSION that imports both
the PARAMETER module, containing declarations of Orc value sorts and operators, and the
META-LEVEL module.
mod VALUE-STRING-CONVERSION is
inc PARAMETER .
pr META-LEVEL .
...
endm
Within this module, two main operators are defined: toString and toValue, which were
briefly introduced above. The operator toString defines a partial function that attempts
to convert an Orc value or a list C of values (a term of sort ValueList) into a string S in
Maude.
op toString : ValueList ~> String .
eq toString(c(S)) = S .
eq toString(C) = qidListString(metaPrettyPrint(
upModule(’PARAMETER, false), upTerm(C), none)) [owise] .
Encapsulated strings of the form c(S) are easily converted into strings by using their
underlying string values, while conversion of any other value or list of values is performed
by building up a string out of their meta-representations. The operator qidListString
creates a string out of the list of quoted identifiers returned by the meta-level operator
metaPrettyPrint representing the different values in C (see [20] for a detailed description
of the meta-level operators).
The dual operator is toValue, which is defined in VALUE-STRING-CONVERSION and is
partially shown below.
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op toValue : String -> Value .
ceq toValue(S) = downTerm(getTerm(metaParse(
upModule(’PARAMETER, false), stringQidList(S), ’Value)), error(S))
if substr(S, 0, 6) == "signal" ---- signal value
or substr(S, 0, 4) == "b ‘(" ---- bool
or substr(S, 0, 4) == "l ‘(" ---- tuple
or substr(S, 0, 4) == "s ‘(" ---- site object id
or substr(S, 0, 3) == "let" ---- ‘let’ site id
...
or substr(S, 0, 7) == "_‘,_ ‘(" . ---- ValueList
eq toValue(S) = c(S) [owise] . ---- arbitrary string
If the input string S to the function toValue matches the meta-representation of a known
Orc value (or list of values), which is decided by examining an appropriate prefix of S,
the first equation applies and the conversion process is carried out by Maude’s meta-level
operators. Otherwise, the string is considered an encapsulated Orc string value. The op-
erator stringQidList converts a string built by qidListString back into a list of quoted
identifiers to be processed by the meta-level (see [56] for more details).
5.1.4 Timed Behavior
Orc is a timed theory. Therefore, a faithful implementation of Orc requires capturing its
timed behaviors. The notion of time in a language implementation is typically captured
by a clock against which events in a program in that language may take place. There are
several different ways in which clocks can be used to maintain timing information. For our
distributed implementation, however, a number of requirements influence the design choices
we have made. First, Orc’s communication model is asynchronous. This suggests the use
of distributed clocks (as opposed to a centralized clock), where each node in the distributed
configuration maintains its local clock. Indeed, the distributed clocks architecture empha-
sizes Orc’s philosophy of having the communicating expressions and sites as loosely coupled
as possible. Furthermore, for all the applications we have so far specified in Orc, distributed
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Maude Instance
[ ... < Orc Expr > ... ]
Ticker
Node A
Maude Instance
[ ... < Orc Site > ... ]
Ticker
Node B
Figure 5.1: A schematic diagram illustrating the general structure of a distributed Orc
configuration. Dashed rectangles represent node boundaries, solid rounded rectangles
represent local configurations, and darkened circles represent endpoints of TCP sockets.
clock synchronization is not required for preserving program correctness. This is primarily
due to the fact that in most of the applications clocking information is used either locally (for
example with the local rtimer site) or to time incoming responses. This greatly simplifies
the implementation, since no clock synchronization mechanism, such as Lamport counters
[98] or vector clocks [99, 100], is needed. Finally, since the implementation supports com-
munication using sockets with external objects, which is inherently unpredictable given the
possible transmission delays and network failures, any design of a clocking mechanism that
depends on external communication with expressions or sites would also be unpredictable
and unreliable.
Therefore, in Dist-Orc, for each node in the distributed configuration, the local clock is
managed by an independent and local ticker object with access to the node’s real-time system
clock. Since in Maude there is currently no direct support for accessing the system clock,
we employ sockets as a means of transmitting clock time ticks to Maude. It is important
to note here that, although we use sockets to implement it, the ticker object is local to its
corresponding Orc configuration and is thus guaranteed to provide fairly accurate clocking
information. Figure 5.1 illustrates schematically the deployment architecture of a distributed
Orc configuration with timing.
The diagram in Figure 5.2 outlines the steps involved in initializing a connection with
the co-located ticker object and receiving the first clock tick. Upon initialization, the
clock object within an Orc configuration requests a server socket, by issuing the message
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Maude Process
Ticker
Process
Orc configuration
< OC:Clock | ... >
socketManager 1
2
5
3
6
1: createServerTcpSocket(socketManager, OC, PORT, ...)
   - creates the server socket LISTENER, 
   - elicits createdSocket(OC, socketManager, LISTENER)
LISTENER
TICKER
2: acceptClient(LISTENER, OC)
3: Ticker requests a connection through LISTENER 
4: acceptedClient(OC, LISTENER, IP, TICKER)
   - creates the client socket TICKER
5: receive(TICKER, OC)
6: Ticker sends a tick string S to TICKER 
7: received(OC, TICKER, S)
4
7
Figure 5.2: The steps involved in establishing a connection with the ticker object and
receiving clock ticks.
createServerTcpSocket(...), to be used for listening for a connection from the local ticker
process, which is a Java process that is run in every node of a distributed configuration. The
ticker process uses the built-in Java classes Timer and Socket to generate and send a tick
message every t milliseconds to its corresponding Maude process, where t is a positive integer
value. The clock object waits for a connection as soon as the server socket is created:
rl [InitClockSocket1] :
< OC : Clock | AS > createdSocket(OC, socketManager, LISTENER)
=> < OC : Clock | AS > acceptClient(LISTENER, OC) .
where LISTENER is the newly created clock server socket. Once the ticker object is con-
nected, the message acceptedClient(OC, LISTENER, IP, TICKER) appears, with IP the
originating address of the ticker object, and TICKER the newly created client socket for com-
municating with the ticker object. This causes the clock object to become ready for incoming
clock ticks according to the following rule:
rl [InitClockSocket2] :
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acceptedClient(OC, LISTENER, IP, TICKER) < OC : Clock | AS >
=> < OC : Clock | AS > receive(TICKER, OC) .
Upon receiving a clock tick, the clock object updates its clock and reflects the effect of
time elapse on the rest of the Orc configuration using the time-updating function delta,
which decrements the relative time delays in pending messages.
crl [tick] :
[received(OC, TICKER, S) < OC : Clock | clk: c(N) > CF]
=> [< OC : Clock | clk: c(N + 1) > receive(TICKER, OC) delta(CF)]
if find(S, "#", 0) =/= notFound .
The variable CF denotes the rest of the local configuration. Recall that the operator [
CF ] encapsulates the local configuration CF. The equational condition in the above tick
rule checks whether the tick message has been fully received, as buffering is (again) required
to ensure proper message transmission (which is specified by a different rule similar to the
rule [AccumulateRequest] shown in Section 5.1.2 for sites). The process of receiving and
processing time tick messages keeps repeating as long as the Ticker object is supplying those
ticks through the clock socket.
An important observation is that the use of physical, wall clock time in Dist-Orc to
time Orc transitions eliminates the possibility of Zeno behaviors, which are a well-known
artifact of logical time. This implies that for the intended semantics to be preserved, and
hence for the correctness of the analysis later in Section 5.3, the transitions internal to
an Orc configuration must be completed before the next real-time clock tick arrives. In
other words, a single clock tick should be long enough to accommodate the instantaneous
transitions of an Orc configuration. The minimum length of a clock tick so that this property
is satisfied is specific to the Orc application and the machines used to run it. For example,
for the distributed auction case study below, and using a 2.0GHz dual-core node with 4GB
of memory, the clock tick can be made as short as 0.2 seconds. In general, deciding on a
minimum size for a clock tick given an application is hard to anticipate and is typically
accomplished through experimentation.
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Posting(seller) =def seller(“postNext”) > x > Auction(“post”, x) rtimer(1)
Posting(seller)
Bidding =def Auction(“getNext”) > (id, d,m) > Bids(id, d,m, 0) > (wn,wb) >
( if (wn = 0) Bidding()
| if (wn 6= 0) Auction(“won”, wn, id, wb) Bidding() )
Bids(id, d, wb, wn) =def ( if (d ≤ 0) let(wb,wn)
| if (d > 0) clock() > ta > min(d, 1) > t > TimeoutRound(id, wb, t) > x >
( if (x = signal) Bids(id, d− t, wb, wn)
| if (x 6= signal) rtimer(1) clock() > tb > Bids(id, d− (tb − ta), x0, x1) ) )
TimeoutRound(id, bid, t) =def
let(x) < x < ( rtimer(t) | Bidders(“nextBidList”, id, bid) > bl > MaxBid(bl) )
Figure 5.3: Orc expressions in the Auction program
5.2 Case Study: A Distributed Implementation of Auction
To illustrate Dist-Orc, we describe a distributed implementation Dist-Auction of the
online auction management application in Orc, Auction, which was first introduced in [55],
and whose expression declarations are also shown in Figure 5.3 for reference. The distributed
configuration of the auction application contains two expression configurations: one with the
Posting expression object, which is responsible for retrieving and posting items for sale by a
given seller, and the other contains the Bidding expression object for managing the bidding
process. For instance, the initial local configuration for the Posting expression object has
the form:
[ <>
< C : Clock | clk : c(0) >
createServerTcpSocket(socketManager, C, 54200, 10)
< e(loc("10.0.0.2", 44200), 0) : Expr |
env: Posting s := s("postNext") > x > AUCTIONID("post",x) >> rtimer(1) >>
Posting(s),
exp: Posting(SELLERID), ... > ... ]
where SELLERID and AUCTIONID are object identifiers for the Seller and Auction sites, re-
spectively. The Posting expression declaration is stored in the environment attribute env of
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Posting Expr Bidding Expr
Seller
Auction Bidders
MaxBid
10.0.0.2:44200 10.0.0.3:44300
10.0.0.4:44800
10.0.0.5:44600 10.0.0.6:44400
10.0.0.7:44700
Figure 5.4: The deployment architecture of the Dist-Auction Orc program
the expression object, while the attribute exp keeps the actual expression to be evaluated.
The configuration also includes objects for internal (fundamental) sites, such as if and let ,
which are omitted here for brevity.
In addition to the Posting and Bidding expression configurations, there are four site object
configurations in the distributed configuration of Dist-Auction, one configuration for each
of the sites assumed by Auction, namely Seller , Bidders , MaxBid , and Auction. For
example, the initial local configuration for a Seller site with two items for auction (identified
by numbers 1910 and 1720) may have the form:
[ <>
< C : Clock | clk : c(0) >
createServerTcpSocket(socketManager, C, 54800, 10)
< s(loc("10.0.0.4", 44800), 0) : Site |
name : ’seller, state : (item(1910, 5, 500), item(1720, 7, 700)) , ... >
createServerTcpSocket(socketManager, s(loc("10.0.0.4", 44800), 0), 44800, 10)]
We note that the site attempts to create two server sockets: one for listening to expression
object requests and the other for listening to the local ticker object.
Each local configuration in Dist-Auction may run on a different node in a communication
network. The diagram in Figure 5.4 depicts a physical deployment of Dist-Auction, with
bidirectional arrows representing communication patterns. A physical deployment can be
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conveniently achieved using an appropriate shell script to run Maude, load the Dist-Orc
module and Dist-Auction, and execute the external rewrite command erew. For example,
with initAuction, an operator that creates the initial state of the Auction site configuration,
the following command executes the Auction site:
echo "erew initAuction ." | maude orc-distributed.maude auction-manager.maude
with the following sample output, generated by the print attribute of Maude statements
(with auction items 1910 and 1720):
00 erewrite in DIST-AUCTION : initAuction .
01 Site "10.0.0.5":44600 0 initializing... Site is ready.
02 Clock server socket created.
03 Awaiting connection from ticker ...
04 Ticker connected.
05 Received "post"
06 Item 1910 posted
07 Received "getNext"
08 Bidding to start for 1910
09 Tick! ... (5 time ticks)
10 Received "won"
11 Item 1910 won by Bidder 3
12 Received "getNext"
13 Tick!
14 Received "post"
15 Item 1720 posted
16 Bidding to start for 1720
17 Tick! ... (6 time ticks)
18 Received "won"
19 Item 1720 won by Bidder 3
20 Received "getNext"
21 ...
In this particular run, the auction site receives a post request from the Posting expression
object and posts item 1910. Meanwhile, a request for the next item to be auctioned is
received from the Bidding expression object. The auction site then publishes the item
details back to the Bidding expression, which takes care of orchestrating the bidding process
for this item. After five time units (the duration of the auction for item 1910), Bidder 3 is
announced as the winner and a similar process is repeated for the second item 1720.
5.3 Formal Analysis of Distributed Orc Programs
The real-time, distributed implementation of Orc described above is very useful in proto-
typing and deploying Orc programs on physically distributed nodes in an interconnected
network. As we saw in Section 5.2, the implementation enables observing actual possible
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behaviors in practical environments, in which the effects of physical limitations of commu-
nication networks are taken into account.
However, the implementation technique as outlined above does not result in a language
specification that is immediately amenable to more rigorous formal analysis such as reach-
ability analysis and model-checking. This is fundamentally due to the fact that the imple-
mentation technique makes use of facilities that are outside the scope of the Maude formal
analysis tools. In particular, there are two fundamental facilities in the implementation that
complicate formal analysis: TCP sockets and the ticker objects. While support for sockets is
built into Maude, sockets do not have a direct and immediate logical representation that can
be subjected to formal analysis. Furthermore, the ticker objects, being written in another
general-purpose language with access to the system’s real, wall-clock time, introduce yet
another obstacle in achieving a formally analyzable specification.
Our solution to this problem, which we explain in some detail in the rest of this section,
is to develop rewriting logic specifications for these facilities, so that the distributed imple-
mentation can be turned, with minimal effort, into a formally analyzable specification in
Maude. In particular, both Maude sockets and externally defined configuration clocks must
be formally modeled at the object-level. This is discussed next.
5.3.1 Formal Specification of TCP Sockets
Maude’s TCP sockets can be formally specified by defining abstractions of Maude instances,
sockets, and their behaviors. We develop a rewriting specification RSocket of sockets, which
is based on previous work on Mobile Maude [97, 20] and algorithmic skeletons in Maude [96].
The specification models sockets as a rewrite theory RSocket, in which Maude instances are
abstracted with objects of the class Process , and server and client sockets as objects of
ServerSocket and Socket classes, respectively. Abstract processes and sockets in RSocket in-
troduce a higher layer of abstraction in which socket objects mediate communication between
processes, which encapsulate local Orc configurations.
More specifically, a process object has the form 〈PID : Process | sys : S〉, with PID an
object identifier and S an encapsulated local configuration. A client socket object of the
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form
〈SID : Socket | endpoints : [PID1,PID2]〉
abstracts a bidirectional client TCP socket set up between processes PID1 and PID2 (where
[PID1,PID2] is an unordered pair), while a server socket has the form:
〈SID : ServerSocket | address : A, port : N, backlog : K〉
where K is a positive integer specifying the maximum allowed number of queue requests.
While client sockets are created and destroyed during the course of execution of the different
configurations, server sockets are created for server objects using a Manager object, which
abstracts Maude’s socket manager (which we first encountered in Section 5.1.2). The man-
ager object itself is a simple object maintaining a counter for creation of fresh socket object
identifiers.
To maximize specification modularity and reusability, socket objects in RSocket have in-
terfaces (i.e. message formats) that are almost identical to those of Maude sockets. This
minimizes the need for making any changes in the distributed implementation of Orc when
switching between Maude sockets and their abstractions given by RSocket.
Different useful abstractions of socket behaviors can be defined. For the formal model
of Dist-Orc, we choose an abstraction level that captures most interesting behaviors and
yet can be efficiently analyzed. The abstraction essentially considers potential client socket
creation errors and a somewhat limited form of communication delays and failures. This
design choice abstracts away uninteresting behaviors, such as server socket creation problems,
and approximates actual messaging problems, such as unavailable or unreachable servers,
and unreliable networks. The main features of RSocket are explained below.
Server socket creation is straightforward, and is modeled with the following rewrite rule:
rl [CreateServerTcpSocket] :
< PID : Process | sys : [createServerTcpSocket(socketManager, O, PT) CF] >
< socketManager : Manager | counter : N >
=> < PID : Process | sys : [createdSocket(O, socketManager, server(N)) CF] >
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< socketManager : Manager | counter : (N + 1) >
< server(N) : ServerSocket | address : "localhost", port : PT > .
This rule creates a server socket object, identified by server(N), with an arbitrary address
and a given port, and transforms the socket creation request message into an appropriate
response.
When an Orc object within a process attempts to create a client socket to a server by is-
suing the message createClientTcpSocket (socketManager, O’, SR, PT), two different
transitions are possible, depending on whether the client socket creation is successful or not.
The success case is modeled by the following rule:
rl [CreateClientSocketSuccess] :
< PID : Process | sys : [acceptClient(server(N), O) CF] >
< PID’ : Process | sys : [createClientTcpSocket(socketManager, O’, SR, PT) CF’] >
< socketManager : Manager | counter : M >
< server(N) : ServerSocket | address : SR, port : PT >
=> < PID : Process | sys : [acceptedClient(O, server(N), SR, socket(M)) CF] >
< PID’ : Process | sys : [createdSocket(O’, socketManager, socket(M)) CF’] >
< socketManager : Manager | counter : (M + 1) >
< server(N) : ServerSocket | address : SR, port : PT >
< socket(M) : Socket | endpoints : [PID : PID’] > .
In this rule, the server is in a state accepting incoming connections from clients, specified
by matching a server at address and port SR:PT that is accepting connections using the
message acceptClient(...). The rule also creates a socket object socket(M) that will
mediate communication between the client and the server.
Client socket creation may also fail, representing situations where the server is unreachable
or unavailable. This case is modeled by a similar rule, labeled [CreateClientSocketFail],
with the same starting state as the rule above but with a different resulting state, where
now the client process gets the socketError (O’, socketManager, "") message from the
socket manager, and no new socket object is created.
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Once a socket is successfully created, a connection through this socket is established,
and bidirectional message exchanges may take place using send(...) and receive(...)
messages. The following rule specifies message exchange between two processes:
crl [exchange] :
< PID : Process | sys : [send(SOCKET, O, C) CF] >
< PID’ : Process | sys : [receive(SOCKET, O’) CF’] >
< SOCKET : Socket | endpoints : [PID : PID’] >
< DID : Delays | ds : DS >
=> < PID : Process | sys : [sent(O, SOCKET) CF] >
< PID’ : Process | sys : [received(O’, SOCKET, C, R) CF’] >
< SOCKET : Socket | endpoints : [PID : PID’] >
< DID : Delays | ds : DS >
if DS’ R DS’’ := DS .
The send(...) and receive(...) messages are respectively transformed into a sent(O,
SOCKET) message, acknowledging the send action to the sender, and a received(O’, SOCKET,
C, R) message, signaling delayed delivery of the sent message to the receiver in R time units.
That is, the value(s) sent, C, are delayed by some amount of time R and will only be available
to the receiver object after R time units have elapsed. The delay value for any transmitted
message is non-deterministically extracted using a matching equation in the condition from
a non-empty, set of delays DS maintained by a special object < DID : Delays | ds : DS
> in the global configuration. To maintain feasibility of exhaustive formal analysis tech-
niques, the set DS should obviously be finite. In fact, for most reasonably sized distributed
Orc programs, the delay set should have a fairly small size. An appropriate delay set for a
given distributed Orc application can be specified as part of its initial state using the Delays
object. It is worth noting here that different behaviors may result by giving different delay
sets. Two special cases of interest are: (1) DS = {0}, in which case messages are assumed to
experience no delays, and (2) ∞ ∈ DS , which represents the case of a lossy communication
channel. As we will see in Section 5.3.2 below, the real-time semantics of the model will
eventually make such delayed messages available to the receiver for processing.
Finally, closing a socket is straightforwardly modeled by the following equation:
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eq [close] :
< PID : Process | sys : [closeSocket(SOCKET, O) CF] >
< PID’ : Process | sys : [receive(SOCKET, O’) CF’] >
< SOCKET : Socket | endpoints : [PID : PID’] >
= < PID : Process | sys : [closedSocket(O, socketManager, "") CF] >
< PID’ : Process | sys : [closedSocket(O’, socketManager, "") CF’] > .
The equation drops the closed socket, and issues the closedSocket(...) message to its
endpoints.
5.3.2 Global Logical Time
As before, time and its effects on the distributed Orc configuration are formally specified
using the standard and general technique of capturing logical time in real-time rewrite the-
ories [64], and facilitated by RTM [74]. Essentially, the time domain is represented by a sort
TimeInf (time with infinity), and a global tick rewrite rule is used to synchronously advance
time and propagate its effects across the encapsulated global configuration, a term of the sort
GlobalSystem, of the form {C}, where C is the Orc configuration consisting of all process and
socket objects. configuration at a given point in time. Furthermore, the tick rule, which
plays the role of the ticker objects in the distributed implementation, is defined globally as
follows (with R’ a variable ranging over the positive rational numbers):
crl [tick] :
{CF} => {delta(CF, R’)} in time R’
if eager({CF}) =/= true /\ R’ <= mte(CF) [nonexec] .
The tick rule computes on the global Orc configuration the function delta, which advances
time for all local clock objects and updates time delays in all site calls and returns present
in the configuration. For example, clocks and delayed external messages are updated, re-
spectively, by the following two equations (plus and monus define addition and subtraction
on time domains):
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eq delta(< O : Clock | clk : c(R) > CF, R’)
= < O : Clock | clk : c(R plus R’) > delta(CF, R’) .
eq delta(received(O, O’, C, R) CF, R’)
= received(O, O’, C, R monus R’) delta(CF, R’) .
The tick rule above is not immediately executable (which is indicated by the [nonexec]
attribute), as it introduces a new variable R’ representing the amount of time elapse on
its right hand side. A strategy for sampling time needs to be specified for the rule to be
executable. As before, we assume a general maximal strategy that in each tick advances time
by the maximum time elapse, which is defined by the function mte as the minimum delay
across all site call messages and returns in the global Orc configuration. The combination
of the maximal time sampling strategy and the condition R’ <= mte(Conf) in the tick rule
ensures that time is advanced as much as possible in every tick but only enough to be able
to capture all events of interest.
To properly capture the synchronous semantics of Orc [52, 53], the tick rule is also made
conditional on the fact that no other behavioral (instantaneous) transition is possible. This
imposes a precedence of rule application, where time ticks have the lowest priority among all
transitions. This is precisely captured by the eager predicate in the tick rule’s condition.
As was discussed before in Chapter 3, the condition is necessary to precisely capture the
intended semantics of the Orc theory.
It is important to note that the abstraction of time and how it affects the global Orc
configuration as specified by the tick rule is consistent with the real-time distributed im-
plementation Dist-Orc in that, in Dist-Orc, we assumed that the granularity of a single
time tick in real-time is always large enough for instantaneous transitions within a configu-
ration to complete. Furthermore, the tick rule synchronously updates all clock objects in all
processes. This also defines yet another abstraction over Dist-Orc, where individual clocks
are not necessarily synchronized. However, since clock synchronization is not required for
Dist-Orc, as was discussed in Section 5.1.4, the abstraction considers only those behaviors
in Dist-Orc that make sense under these assumptions about time.
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5.3.3 Further Abstractions For Performance
Unlike the formal specifications of sockets and time described above, the abstractions out-
lined below are not essential for formal reasoning about distributed Orc programs. They
describe further optional abstractions that are useful for obtaining a more efficiently exe-
cutable specification without affecting the kinds of properties that one would want to verify
about Orc programs. The first optimization is to drop the meta-level operations in the
definition of external communication between Orc objects across different processes, and
define socket-based messaging at the level of Orc values rather than at the lower-level of
strings. This results in a higher abstraction that does not have to deal with serialization
and de-serialization of Orc values, as was required in the Dist-Orc implementation (see
Section 5.1.3). It also entails a slight modification to the syntax of the socket specification
in Rsocket. In particular, send and received messages each now take a list of Orc values
rather than a string as a parameter:
op send : Oid Oid ValueList -> Msg [ctor msg] .
op received : Oid Oid ValueList Time -> Msg [ctor msg] .
The rules and equations defining external, socket-based message exchange are also appro-
priately updated.
Another optimization, which aims at reducing the reachable state space of a distributed
Orc program without changing the semantics of the underlying Orc expressions and sites, is
to impose a slightly more restrictive rule application strategy. More specifically, we may give
internal transitions of an Orc expression (site calls, expression calls, and publishing of values)
priority over socket-based transitions (creating sockets, and sending and receiving external
messages). Besides being natural, this strategy does not conflict with Orc’s synchronous
semantics, as internal transitions still have precedence over the external transition of con-
suming a site return. Furthermore, it turns out that this extension can be easily specified by
simply changing the relevant rewrite rules in Rsocket so that the underlying Orc expression
objects have expressions that are inactive. For instance, here is a fragment of the modified
rule specifying successful client socket creation [CreateClientSocketSuccess]. The rule
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matches an inactive expression iF in the Orc expression object trying to make a connection
with an external site:
rl [CreateClientSocketSuccess] :
< PID : Process | sys : [acceptClient(server(N), O) CF] >
< PID’ : Process |
sys : [createClientTcpSocket(socketManager, p(OE,H ), ADDRESS, PORT)
< p(OE,H) : Proxy | > < OE : Expr | exp : iF > CF’ ] >
< socketManager ... > < server(N) ... >
=> < PID : Process |
sys : [acceptedClient(O, server(N), ADDRESS, socket(M)) CF] >
< PID’ : Process |
sys : [createdSocket(p(OE,H), socketManager, socket(M))
< p(OE,H) : Proxy | > < OE : Expr | exp : iF > CF’] >
< socketManager ... > < server(N) ... > < socket(M) ... > .
5.3.4 Formal Analysis of Dist-Auction
The formal specification of sockets and logical time provides a formal model of Dist-Orc
that can be used to verify properties about distributed applications in Orc, which take
into account some of the actual problems that can take place, not only in Orc expressions,
but also in socket communications. To illustrate this formal verification capability, we use
RTM to formally analyze the distributed implementation Dist-Auction of the auction case
study. In particular, we perform time- bounded linear temporal logic model checking with
commands of the form (mc term |=t formula in time <= timeLimit .), and timed
search using (find earliest term =>* pattern such that condition .), which finds
a state reachable within the shortest possible time that matches the given pattern and
satisfies the given condition. Verification is applied on a closed system specification that
includes definitions of all required sites (servers) and expressions (clients) in the Auction
application.
In our analysis, we assume a single seller site with two items for sale, labeled 1910 and
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1720, and offered for auction for 5 and 7 time units, respectively. The function initial(DS)
constructs an initial state for Dist-Auction in which the set of possible message transmission
delays is DS, which, in the analysis examples below, is the singleton set {0.1}, unless otherwise
indicated. The atomic predicates used are:
1. commError , which is true in states with communication errors:
op commError : -> Prop .
eq {< PID: Process | sys: [socketError(O, O’, S) CF] > CF’}
|= commError = true .
2. sold(id), which is true in states where the item id has been sold:
op sold : Nat -> Prop .
eq {< PID : Process |
sys : [< O : XSite | name : ’auction,
state : won(winner(N, id, M), WN) OST > CF] > CF’}
|= sold(id) = true .
where the term winner(N, id, M) matches a winning bid M on item id by the Nth
bidder.
3. hasBid(id), which is true when the item id has been bid on:
op hasBid : Nat -> Prop .
eq {< PID : Process |
sys : [< O : XSite | name : ’bidders,
state : bidders(b(N, [id, M] IBS) BS) OL > CF] > CF’}
|= hasBid(id) = true .
where the term b(N, [id, M] IBS) matches a bid M on item id by the Nth bidder.
4. conflict(id), which is true when item id has two different winners:
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op conflict : Nat -> Prop .
eq {< PID : Process |
sys : [< O : XSite | name : ’auction ,
state : won(winner(N, id, M),
winner(N’, id, M’), WN)
OST > CF] > CF’}
|= conflict(id) = true .
A property that is typically required in an auction management system is that an item with
at least one bid is eventually sold: 
∧
i(hasbid(idi) → ♦sold(idi)). This can be shown to
be guaranteed by Dist-Auction in the absence of communication problems and excessively
large delays. The property itself is specified in Real- Time Maude as the following formula
commitAllNoErrors (with ~ denoting the LTL negation operator) :
op commit : Nat -> Formula .
eq commit(id) = hasBid(id) -> <> sold(id) .
op commitAllNoErrors : -> Formula .
eq commitAllNoErrors = ([] ~ commError) -> [] (commit(1910) /\ commit(1720)) .
The property is then verified with the time-bounded model checking command:
Maude> (mc initial(1/10) |=t commitAllNoErrors in time <= 15 .)
rewrites: 7052663 in 14413ms cpu (14420ms real) (489317 rewrites/second) ...
Result Bool : true
The property is satisfied with a communication delay of 0.1 time units. In fact, the property
is satisfied when communication delays are bounded by 0.25 time units. This is because the
timeout value for collecting bids in a single bidding round in the TimeoutRound expression
is 1.0, while a delay of 0.25 translates into a cumulative round trip delay of 1.0 for its two
sequential site calls, which may result in an uncommitted bid. This can be verified by the
resulting counterexample when executing the command above but with initial(1/4).
Another property an auction management system must guarantee is that every item
sold has a unique winner: 
∧
i ¬conflict(idi). This property can be shown satisfiable in
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Dist-Auction regardless of communication errors. The property is specified in RTM as the
formula uniqueWinnerAll:
op uniqueWinner : Nat -> Formula .
eq uniqueWinner(id) = ~ conflict(id) .
op uniqueWinnerAll : -> Formula .
eq uniqueWinnerAll = [] (uniqueWinner(1910) /\ uniqueWinner(1720)) .
The property is verified by the following command :
Maude> (mc initial(1/10) |=t uniqueWinnerAll in time <= 15 .)
rewrites: 8613539 in 19627ms cpu (19800ms real) (438843 rewrites/second) ...
Result Bool : true
Finally, given a delay of 0.1, one can verify that the first item cannot be won before 5.5
time units have passed using the following command:
Maude> (find earliest initial(1/10) =>* {C:Configuration}
such that {C:Configuration} |= sold(1910) .)
rewrites: 268287407 in 1525921ms cpu (1544117ms real) (175819 rewrites/second) ...
Result: {< did : Delays | ds : 1/10 > ... } in time 11/2
105
CHAPTER 6
STATISTICAL MODEL CHECKING ANALYSIS
Statistical model checking (see, e.g., [1, 101]) is an attractive formal analysis method for
probabilisitic systems. Although the properties model checked can only be ensured up to a
user-specified level of statistical confidence (as opposed to the absolute guarantees provided
by standard probabilistic model checkers), the approximate nature of the formal analysis is
compensated for by its better scalability, the fact that the models to be analyzed can often
be known only approximately, and the interest in analyzing quantitative properties for which
an approximate result within known bounds is quite acceptable.
There are many systems for which this kind of statistical model checking analysis can be
very useful. For example, distributed real-time systems, including so-called cyber-physical
systems, are often probabilistic in nature, both because they often use probabilistic algo-
rithms, and due to the uncertain, stochastic nature of the environments with which they
interact. Furthermore, quality of service properties may be as important as traditional
boolean-valued properties such as safety properties. For example, in a secure communi-
cations system, availability of vital information may be as important as its secrecy, but
availability may be utterly lost due to a denial of service (DoS) attack with no loss of
secrecy. Suppose that such a system is hardened against DoS attacks. How should one for-
mally analyze the effectiveness of such a hardening? What is needed is not a Boolean-valued
yes/no answer, but a quantitative one in terms of the expected latency of messages under
certain assumptions about the attacker and the network. Quantitative information may in-
clude probabilities p ∈ [0, 1], but need not be reducible to probabilities. For this reason, it is
important to support statistical model checking not only of standard probabilistic temporal
logics such as PCTL/CSL, but also of quantitative temporal logics like QuaTEx [2], where
the result of evaluating a temporal formula on a path is a real number. This of course
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includes the case of probabilities, as values p ∈ [0, 1], and even of standard truth values, as
values in {0, 1}, as special cases.
In this chapter, we introduce parallel algorithms that drastically increase the scalability of
statistical model checking, and also make such scalability of analysis available to tools like
Maude, where probabilistic systems can be specified at a high level as probabilistic rewrite
theories [2], which are theories in rewriting logic [10] that may contain, in addition to regular
rewrite rules, probabilistic rewrite rules modeling probabilistic transitions of such systems.
We present PVeStA, an extension and parallelization of the VeStA statistical model
checking tool [72]. PVeStA supports statistical model checking of probabilistic real-time
systems specified as either: (i) discrete or continuous Markov Chains; or (ii) probabilistic
rewrite theories in Maude. Furthermore, the properties that it can model check can be
expressed in either: (i) PCTL/CSL, or (ii) QuaTEx. Since statistical model checking is
based on Monte-Carlo simulations, which are naturally parallelizable, the performance gains
can be very high, as our experiments show.
This chapter also further develops a rewriting-based approach to the formal specification
and verification of probabilistic systems initiated in [102] and further applied to other systems
in [103, 104], and applies it to a novel DoS protection mechanism, namely the Adaptive
Selective Verification protocol [105]. In this approach, real-time and probabilistic protocols
and DoS attackers are naturally modeled using probabilistic rewrite theories, while properties
are expressed by quantitative, real-valued formulas in QuaTEx, whose formal verification is
based on statistical quantitative analysis [2], using Maude and PVeStA.
6.1 Parallel Statistical Model Checking and Quantitative Analysis
Algorithms
Sen et. al. [1] described an algorithm A based on simple hypothesis testing for statistical
model checking of formulas in both: (1) Probabilistic CTL (PCTL) [106], which extends
standard CTL by associating probability measures to computation paths of a probabilistic
system and qualifying the temporal logic formulas with probability bounds, and (2) Contin-
uous Stochastic Logic (CSL) [107, 108], which further extends PCTL by continuous timing
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and qualifying temporal logic operators by time bounds. Given a probabilistic model M,
a PCTL/CSL formula P./p(ϕ), with ϕ a state or path formula1, and error bounds α and
β, the algorithm A checks satisfiability of the formula by setting up a statistical hypothesis
testing experiment such that its Type I and Type II errors are bounded, respectively, by
α and β. The test is based on the sample mean of n random samples of ϕ computed over
n Monte-Carlo simulations of the model. The algorithm uses standard statistical methods
to precompute the total number n of samples needed to achieve the desired test strength
(see [1] for more details).
To be able to express not just probabilities of satisfaction of temporal logic formulas but
also quantitative properties such as, for example, the expected latency of a probabilistic
communication protocol, PCTL and CSL have been generalized to a logic of Quantitative
Temporal Expressions (QuaTEx) in [2], in which state formulas and path formulas are
generalized to user-definable, real-valued state expressions and path expressions. In [2],
Agha et. al. proposed a statistical quantitative analysis algorithm Q for estimating the
expectation of a temporal expression in QuaTEx. Given a probabilistic model M, an
expectation QuaTEx formula of the form E[Exp], with Exp a QuaTEx state or path
expression, and bounds α and δ, the algorithm Q approximates the value of E[Exp] within
a (1−α)100% confidence interval, with size at most δ, by generating a large enough number
n of random sample values x1, x2, . . . , xn of Exp computed from n independent Monte Carlo
simulations of M. The value returned by the algorithm as the estimator for E[Exp] is the
sample mean x¯ =
Σi∈[1,n]xi
n
. To guarantee the quality and size requirements of the confidence
interval (given respectively by α and δ) for x¯, the number n of sample values must be large
enough. In general, the more accurate the estimator, the larger the number of samples
required. To generate enough samples, the algorithm Q uses student’s t-distribution to
compute a (1 − α)100% confidence interval by iteratively generating them in batches of N
samples each (with N > 5). Once the size of the computed interval falls below the threshold
δ, Q halts and the sample mean x¯ is returned (more details can be found in [2]).
A key observation is that the both statistical analysis algorithmsA andQ expose a real op-
1We restrict our attention to non-nested probabilistic formulas here, although the algorithm of [1] can
handle nested formulas as well.
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Algorithm 1 A parallel algorithm Ap for checking (non-nested) probabilistic CSL formulas
Input: Model M, Probabilistic formula P./p(ϕ), α, β, Parameters ~p, Resources R
Output: True or false, with Type I and II errors bound by α and β, respectively (see
Theorem 1 in [1])
1: n← computeSampleSize(p, ./, α, ~p)
2: sum ← 0,
3: sims ← bN / |R|c, r sims ← N mod |R|
4: for i← 1 to |R| do
5: mi ← (i < r sims) ? sims + 1 : sims
6: for i← 1 to |R| do in parallel
7: sum i ← 0
8: for j ← 1 to mi do
9: xij ← sat(ϕ, p, ./, pi(M)
10: sum i ← sum i + xij
11: for i← 1 to |R| do
12: sum ← sum + sum i
13: b← performHT(sum, n, α, β, ~p)
14: return b
portunity for parallelization through their dependence on performing batches of independent
Monte Carlo simulations. Moreover, the cost of performing a single discrete-event simula-
tion from a model of a probabilistic or cyber-physical system is usually high compared with
other computations in the algorithms, due to the typically complex nature of these systems.
Consequently, by exploiting this opportunity, performance gains through parallelization can
be significant and the scalability of this kind of statistical model checking analysis can be
substantially improved.
We develop parallel, map-reduce versions Ap and Qp of both algorithms in which the
task of computing a set of n sample values for a state or path formula in PCTL/CSL or
QuaTEx is done in parallel by performing n Monte Carlo simulations in parallel. Both
parallel algorithms make no assumptions about the underlying parallel architecture. For
PCTL/CSL, Ap assumes non-nested probabilistic formulas.
An outline of Ap is shown in Algorithm 1. In addition to the model M, the probabilistic
formula P./p(ϕ) and the verification parameters, the algorithms take as input a list of avail-
able computing resources R on which the task of generating random samples is mapped.
This task is first distributed as evenly as possible by determining the number of simulations
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Algorithm 2 A parallel algorithmQp for estimating expected values of QuaTEx expressions
Input: Model M, QuaTEx expression Exp, α, δ, load factor k, Resources R
Output: An estimator for E[Exp], with a (1−α)100% confidence interval of size at most δ
1: sum ← 0, n← 0, d←∞
2: if N < |R| then
3: N ← k · |R|
4: else
5: N ← k · dN / |R|e · |R|
6: m← N / |R|
7: while d > δ do
8: n← n+N
9: for i← 1 to |R| do in parallel
10: sum i ← 0, sumSquare i ← 0
11: for j ← 1 to m do
12: xij ← eval(Exp, pi(M))
13: sum i ← sum i + xij
14: sumSquare i ← sumSquare i + x2ij
15: for i← 1 to |R| do
16: sum ← sum + sum i
17: sumSquare ← sumSquare + sumSquare i
18: d← computeCISize(sum, sumSquare, n, α)
19: return sum / n
mi to be performed by each available computing resource Ri in R. Since the total number
of samples n is precomputed, mi is either bn/|R|c or bn/|R|c+ 1. The body of the for loop
at line (6) is done in parallel, where each resource Ri checks satisfiability of the formula
ϕ on mi random executions of the model M obtained by discrete-event simulations of M,
generating mi random sample results. The function sat(ϕ, p, ./, pi(M) verifies the state or
path formula ϕ on the given computation path pi(M), and returns 1 if the formula is satis-
fied and 0 otherwise. Each resource Ri then returns the sum sum i of its computed random
samples. Once all partial sums are collected, the algorithm performs the simple hypothesis
testing experiment (denoted by the function performHT) as explained in [1], using the total
sum of all random samples generated by the resources R.
The parallel QuaTEx evaluation algorithm Qp is outlined in Algorithm 2. Like Ap,
the algorithm takes as input a list of available computing resources R. The number m of
simulations to be performed by each computing resource Ri is computed as a positive integer
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multiple of |R| and the load factor k, which is a parameter to Qp that can be used to increase
the number of simulations performed by each resource in a round. Given a verification
task, the load factor k can be tuned to optimize performance, especially for lightweight
simulations when the desired statistical confidence is high, as we will see in Section 6.2.
Once m is determined, each resource Ri computes m random samples using the function
eval(ϕ, pi(M)), which evaluates a QuaTEx state or path expression ϕ on a computation
path pi, obtained by a discrete-event simulation of M, according to the semantics of such
expressions given in [2]. Each resource Ri returns a partial sum, sum i, and a partial sum of
squares, sumSquare i, of sample values, which are then used in the sequential computation
of the size d of the new confidence interval (denoted by the function computeCISize). The
algorithm halts and returns the overall sample mean once d becomes less than or equal to
the confidence interval size bound δ.
6.2 Implementation in PVeStA
We have implemented a client-server prototype, PVeStA, of both parallel algorithms Ap
and Qp, in Java, based on the Java implementation of the original algorithms in VeStA [72].
The tool, which is available for download online at http://www.cs.illinois.edu/~alturki/
pvesta, consists of two command-line-based executable programs: (1) a client program
pvesta-client, which implements the sequential parts of the algorithms performing sim-
ple hypothesis testing for PCTL/CSL formulas and confidence interval computations for
QuaTEx expressions, and (2) a server program pvesta-server, which implements the role
of a resource Ri that computes random samples by performing discrete-event simulations of
a given model expressed as a Markov chain or as a probabilistic rewrite theory. Figure 6.1
presents a schematic diagram of the structure and interactions of the client and server parts
of the tool.
The client program first reads a list of servers R that are available for performing sim-
ulations. It then creates, using Java’s managed concurrency library, a thread pool of |R|
callable computation threads, which are Java threads that implement the Callable interface
by specifying a run method to be called when the thread is invoked. Each thread, which
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Figure 6.1: Components and interactions of PVeStA
will manage simulation requests and responses with a particular server in R, is supplied
with a pseudo-random seed to be used by its corresponding server to guarantee statistical
independence of the simulations. The thread pool is then submitted to an executor object,
which invokes all the threads in the pool, commencing communication with the servers in
R. Upon receiving the simulations request, each PVeStA server performs the requested
number of simulations using either Maude (for models expressed as probabilistic rewrite
theories) or the built-in Continuous-Time Markov Chain (CTMC) engine (for CTMC mod-
els) and produces a list of sample results. The client collects all samples in an array of |R|
Future Java class objects, from which the results are extracted and then used in performing
the appropriate sequential computations. For confidence interval computations, the client
may need to repeat this process until enough samples are collected.
Experimental Evaluation. We have conducted two sets of experiments with PVeStA
to evaluate the performance gains of parallelization using two different parallel architectures:
(1) a high-performance computing (HPC) architecture, in which simulation tasks are dis-
tributed over different nodes in a PC cluster, and (2) a multi-core architecture, in which
simulations are distributed over different processing cores within a single node. The HPC
benchmarks were executed on a PC cluster consisting of 256 nodes, each of which has two
(single-core) AMD Opteron 2.2GHz CPUs with 2GB of RAM. The second set of experiments
was performed on a server machine having two quad-core 2.66GHz Intel Xeon processors with
16GB of RAM.
We use two examples from [72]: (1) a simplified server polling system, Polling, and (2) a
simple tandem queuing system, Tandem, both expressed as continuous-time Markov chains.
In addition, we use two variants of a larger case study, described in some detail in Section 6.3
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Polling (CSL) Tandem (CSL) Tandem (Q) ASV 0 (CSL) ASV 0 (Q) ASV 1 (Q)
Simulations 16,906 16,906 46,380 1051 706 1,308
Servers HPC Cluster
1 6.78 9.54 17.36 494.9 770.8 1,584.3
2 2.61 4.06 8.56 248.4 385.4 798.5
4 1.24 2.01 4.26 124.2 197.1 410.5
8 0.70 1.02 2.19 62.1 103.4 221.9
12 0.59 0.77 1.53 41.4 65.3 144.3
16 0.44 0.63 1.27 31.1 52.3 116.6
20 0.42 0.56 1.14 25.1 39.4 89.9
30 0.37 0.46 0.93 16.9 26.7 63.1
60 0.38 0.43 0.82 8.7 13.7 34.2
Servers Multi-core Computer
1 3.83 5.53 11.26 367.7 559.7 1,167.9
2 1.70 2.60 5.43 184.5 281.1 589.5
3 1.15 1.62 3.36 122.9 189.4 396.5
4 0.86 1.24 2.53 92.3 138.7 298.3
5 0.74 1.03 2.09 74.2 113.1 243.0
6 0.66 0.86 1.84 61.8 94.5 204.5
7 0.62 0.78 1.66 53.1 85.1 181.2
Table 6.1: The (average) times in seconds taken by PVeStA to complete six verification
tasks using a PC cluster and a multi-core computer
below, that specifies a probabilistic model in rewriting logic of the Adaptive Selective Veri-
fication (ASV) protocol [105] for thwarting DoS attacks. The first variant, denoted ASV 0,
assumes a reliable communication channel, a fixed attack rate, and no message transmission
delays, while the second variant, ASV 1, is more realistic, as it assumes a lossy channel, a
variable attack rate, and random delays. Benchmarking is performed by measuring the total
time required (including any additional time required for file and network I/O, thread and
object management, and so on) to verify a probabilistic CSL formula in Polling, Tandem,
and ASV 0, or a QuaTEx expectation expression in Tandem (load factor, k = 100), ASV 0
(k = 1), and ASV 1 (k = 1). The results are summarized in Table 6.1.
As the table clearly shows, performance gains as a result of parallelization can be substan-
tial. For example, in the analysis of ASV 1, a verification task that would normally require
about 27 minutes, can be completed in about 34 seconds on an HPC cluster using 60 nodes,
and a 20-minute task can be done in just above 3 minutes on a multi-core machine using seven
cores in parallel. In practice, several factors influence the speedups achieved by PVeStA,
including the complexity of the model and the formula, and the statistical strength of the
result. Figure 6.2(a) plots the speedups achieved against the number of servers used for
HPC experiments in Table 6.1. We note that while performance scales almost linearly with
the number of servers used for ASV 0 and ASV 1, the speedups for both Polling and Tandem
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Figure 6.2: The speedup using multiple PVeStA servers
begin to decelerate beyond 20 servers. This is primarily because the models Polling and
Tandem are so simple that, as the number of servers increases, the time needed to gener-
ate random samples begins to be dominated by other computations in the tool. For the
Tandem-Q experiment, which requires a fairly high statistical confidence, and thus a higher
number of random samples, achievable speedups are greatly influenced by the chosen load
factor k. In general, for such simple models, a higher value of k (and thus a higher number
of simulations performed by a server in each round) translates into reduced processing and
communication overhead and increased efficiency. For example, speedup tripled when using
k = 100 compared with k = 1 for Tandem-Q with 60 servers. Of course, excessively high
values of k result in an unnecessarily excessive number of simulations and degrade perfor-
mance. Appropriate values of k can be determined by experimentation using the above
ideas as guidelines. Figure 6.2(b), which plots speedups on a multi-core architecture, shows
a similar pattern to Figure 6.2(a).
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6.3 Statistical Analysis of the Adaptive Selective Verification
Protocol
For the formal analysis of availability under DoS attacks, we often need to define protocol
and attacker models that are real-time and probabilistic in nature. Such models are usually
too complex to analyze manually or through symbolic manipulations. For such systems,
it is well known that statistical methods, such as statistical quantitative analysis, provide
effective and flexible means for automatically approximating properties about their behaviors
with reasonable levels of statistical confidence. But when these methods are paired with
executable formal models, a much stronger level of assurance can be achieved.
We apply the rewriting-based approach to the formal specification and verification of
DoS resilience initiated in [102] to the Adaptive Selective Verification protocol [105] by:
(1) modeling the behavior of both the protocol and the DoS attacker by means of prob-
abilistic rewrite rules [2], (2) specifying properties using quantitative, real-valued formulas
in QuaTEx [2], and (3) formally verifying these properties using statistical quantitative
analysis with PVeStA and Maude.
In general, this approach provides a useful middle ground for the analysis of availability
properties between manual mathematical analysis and simulation-based analysis, adding
significant analytic power to these approaches. Specifically, the results obtained confirm
by automatic statistical quantitative analysis techniques analytic results proved by hand in
[105]. They also confirm, with a much stronger level of assurance, various protocol properties
suggested by the simulation analyses reported as well in [105]. In this way, a considerably
higher level of assurance can be gained for both analytical properties proved by hand, and
for properties suggested by simulation analyses. Furthermore, this assurance can be gained
for scenarios and realistic deployment conditions too complex to be amenable to manual
mathematical analysis.
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6.3.1 The Shared Channel Model and the ASV Protocol
Unlike the Dolev-Yao model [109], in which an attacker has full control over the commu-
nication channel, the shared channel model is a more appropriate model for the analysis
of availability properties [110], since attackers can only probabilistically share a channel
with legitimate clients to the server. However, an attacker may also replay modified (or
faked) versions of previously seen legitimate packets at some maximum rate, specified as a
parameter in the model.
The Adaptive Selective Verification (ASV) protocol [105] is a cost-based, DoS-resistant
protocol in which bandwidth is the currency. ASV assumes the shared channel model as
its underlying attack model, in which the goal of each legitimate client is to get a service
from the server represented in the protocol by an acknowledgment message. The key idea
of DoS-resilience in the protocol is for clients to spend more bandwidth to compete with
attacker bandwidth usage, and for the server to selectively process incoming requests.
More precisely, we denote the server’s mean processing rate by S, and the server and client
timeout periods by Ts and Tc, respectively. The current client request rate is denoted by ρ,
with the assumption that ρ ∈ [ρmin, ρmax]. Similarly, The current attack rate is denoted by
α ∈ [αmin, αmax]. The client replication threshold is specified by the protocol as 2J , where
J = dlog(αmax/ρmin)/ log(2)e (called the retrial span). Under the ASV protocol, the server
and clients behave as follows:
Client. When a client first arrives, it initializes its retries count j ← 0, and then sends a
single copy of its request to the server. If the client receives and acknowledgment within
Tc time units, the client succeeds and quits. Otherwise, it increments j (j ← j + 1)
and then sends 2j copies of its request to the server. This process is repeated until
either an acknowledgment is received, or the retrial threshold is reached, i.e. j > J .
In the latter case, the client fails and quits.
Server. The server first initializes its window count k ← 1, and its request count j ←
bSTsc + 1. During the kth window, the server attempts to collect the first bSTsc
incoming requests. At this point, there are two cases:
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1. If it times out before the reservoir is filled, the server sends an acknowledgment for
each request in the reservoir, empties its reservoir, increments its window count
k, and repeats the process for the next window.
2. If the reservoir is filled before a timeout occurs, the server places the jth incoming
request in the reservoir with probability p← bSTsc/j and discards it with prob-
ability 1− p. If the request is to be placed in the reservoir, the server replaces a
request in the reservoir selected uniformly at random with the accepted request.
The server increments its request count and processes the next request in the
same way. This step is repeated until the server times out (signaling the end of
the current window). Once a timeout occurs, the server empties its reservoir after
acknowledging its requests, increments k, resets j to bSTsc + 1, and the whole
process is repeated for the next window.
Despite the simplicity of the protocol, analyzing it manually under simplifying assumptions
turns out to be a fairly demanding task [105]. In the following, we describe a model of the
protocol that enables automatic statistical verification of its properties and analyze the
results in simple scenarios, and also under circumstances that would be too complex for
manual analysis.
6.3.2 Formal Probabilistic Modeling of ASV in Rewriting Logic
Our model of the ASV protocol is based on a representation of actors with asynchronous
message passing in rewriting logic [2], which is built using the logic’s Maude object-based
programming framework [20]. Within this framework, the system state is represented by a
configuration, which is a soup of objects and messages, in which an object is a term of the
form 〈name : O | A〉, with O a unique object identifier, and A a set of attribute-value pairs
representing the state of the object, and a message is a term of the form O ← C, with O
the target object id and C the contents of the message.
There are three main classes of objects, namely client, attacker, and server objects. A
client object represents a legitimate client trying to get a service from the server. The object
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maintains, among other attributes, the current number of retries and the current replication
count, which are required to implement the adaptive protocol. The attacker object is a
simple object that maintains only a reference to the server object on which the attack is to
be carried out. The server object maintains at least two attributes: a buffer attribute buffer ,
which holds incoming requests between server timeouts, and a request packet count attribute
reqcnt , which is used in determining the probability of accepting an incoming request when
the buffer is full: 〈name : Os | buffer : L, reqcnt : R〉. A server object, with id Os, accepts
two kinds of messages: (i) a connection request message of the form Os ← req(O), with O
the object id of the client or attacker object which initiated the request, and (ii) an internal
timeout message Os ← timeout , which signals a new server time window. Self-addressed
messages are commonly used in actor-based systems to schedule internal events [2].
In addition to the three classes above, a fourth, auxiliary class of objects is the generator
class, of which a single object is used in the configuration to model new clients coming in
at a rate ρS, with S the server’s mean processing rate. The generator object maintains a
counter for generating fresh client identifiers and the name of the server to which generated
clients will attempt to connect: 〈name : G | cnt : I, server : Os〉. The generator object G
uses a self-addressed message of the form G ← spawn to schedule the creation of the next
client object every 1/ρS time units.
Beside the objects described above, a configuration contains a few other components
that support its dynamic behavior. First, in order for it to properly support statistical
model checking and quantitative analysis, the specification must avoid any unquantified
non-determinism. We adopt a specification style originally developed in [102] to support this
requirement. In this style, the configuration uses a scheduler that stores a list of scheduled
messages to be made active and ready for consumption by the appropriate object in the
configuration. The scheduler, which is a term of the form {T | S}, with T the current global
clock of the configuration and S a list of scheduled messages, enforces the property that only
one message becomes active at any given instant of time. A scheduled message is a term of
the form [t,m, d], where t is the time at which the message is scheduled for delivery, m is
the message itself, and d is a drop flag that is used when modeling lossy channels to indicate
whether the message is to be dropped or kept.
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The use of the scheduler object also provides a mechanism for managing the elapse of time
and its effect on the configuration. This is achieved with the help of an operator mytick ,
which is used to extract the next message from the scheduler and update the current global
time accordingly. The specification uses this operator repeatedly to advance time and process
successive messages from the scheduler until the given time limit, specified by a parameter
in the model, is reached. This flexible mechanism enables us to specify the granularity of a
round in terms of the amount of time we wish to run a Monte Carlo simulation.
The behavior of the model is specified (mostly) by rewrite rules, some of which are prob-
abilistic. As an example, the following is a simplified version of the probabilistic rule for
capturing the event of handling an incoming request by the server.
[ProcessReq] :
{T | S} Os ← req(O) 〈name : Os | buffer : L, reqcnt : P 〉
→ mytick({T | S})
if the request buffer L is full then
if B then 〈name : Os | buffer : replace(L, req(O), U), reqcnt : P + 1〉
else 〈name : Os | buffer : L, reqcnt : P + 1〉 fi
else 〈name : Os | buffer : add(L, req(O)), reqcnt : P 〉 fi
with probability B := Bernoulli(A(P )) ∧ U := Uniform(|L|)
When a server receives a connection request message req(O), it first checks whether its
request buffer stored in the buffer attribute is full. If the buffer is not yet full, the request is
simply added to the list. Otherwise, if the buffer has already reached its maximum capacity,
the server tosses a biased coin with success probability B, given by a function of its reqcnt
attribute P , and uses the outcome of this experiment to decide on whether to replace an
existing request selected uniformly at random with the incoming request or to drop the
incoming request altogether.
A detailed discussion of the specification of the model can be found in [58].
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6.3.3 Properties of ASV as QuaTEx Expressions
We have used the ASV model described above to perform statistical quantitative model
checking analysis of various QuaTEx formulas using PVeStA and Maude to produce
a point estimator of the quantity of interest for each of these formulas, given a desired
confidence interval for the experiment and its maximum tolerable size. For this purpose, we
specify the nature of the quantities to be statistically estimated. The quantities specified as
QuaTEx formula declarations are listed below.
Connection ratio. This is the ratio of clients successfully connected to the total number
of clients in a configuration:
connRatio(t) = if time() > t then countConnected()/countClients()
else © (connRatio(t))
with time() a state function that returns the global clock time in the current configu-
ration. The number of accepted clients countConnected() is computed by equationally
counting the number of clients whose status field is connected, while the total num-
ber of clients countClients() can be easily extracted from the client counter attribute
maintained in the client generator object.
Average TTS. This is the ratio of the total time-to-service added up over all accepted
clients to the number of accepted clients:
avgTTS (t) = if time() > t then sumTTS ()/countConnected()
else © (avgTTS (t))
The total TTS sumTTS () is computed by adding up the time intervals given by the ar-
rival time and service time attributes of every accepted client. The number of accepted
clients is computed as described above.
Bandwidth usage. This is the amount of bandwidth used by legitimate clients attempting
to establish a connection with the server. Bandwidth usage is measured in terms of
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the number of legitimate requests and is given by the legitimate client request counter
attribute of the server object.
bw(t) = if time() > t then bwUsage() else © (bw(t))
Connection Confidence. This is the probability that a given client will successfully es-
tablish a connection to the server:
connConfidence(i, t) = if time() > t then hasConnected(i)
else © (connConfidence(i, t))
This is computed using a simple function hasConnected(i) that, given a client id,
returns 1.0 if the client has actually connected to the server and 0.0 otherwise.
Throughout this section, we assume a 95% confidence interval with size at most 0.05. We
also fix S, the mean server processing rate, to 600 packets per time units, the server and
client timeouts, Ts and Tc, to 0.4 time units, unless otherwise specified.
6.3.4 Verification of ASV Properties
In this section, we use the ASV model to formally verify two important properties of the
protocol, which were given in [105]. The properties provide guarantees on the connection
confidence and legitimate bandwidth consumption of ASV.
To provide a benchmark for the performance of ASV with respect to these properties,
a simpler protocol, namely, the omniscient protocol, in which the server and clients are
always aware of the current ρ and α is also described in the cited paper. We modeled the
omniscient protocol to compare the bounds given by these theorems and provide formal
statistical evidence of their correctness. In the omniscient model, the server accepts client
requests with probability that depends only on the (now known) ρ and α, which implies
a simpler server object specification as it no longer needs to maintain a buffer reqlist nor
a client request replication count reqcnt . Furthermore, a client uses the value dα/ρe as its
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(a) The ASV protocol (b) The omniscient protocol
Figure 6.3: Connection confidence: Theorem bound vs. estimated values
replication count, and fails if no ACK is received after Tc units of time.
Connection confidence (Theorems 1 and 2 of [105]). The property gives a lower
bound on the probability with which a given client will be able to establish a connection to
the server, given a condition on the client request rate ρ. In particular, for the omniscient
protocol, Theorem 1 states that if ρmax is at most 1/(−2 log δ), with δ a given confidence
parameter, then any given client will be accepted with probability at least 1− δ. A similar
lower bound is guaranteed for ASV under a slightly stronger condition on ρmax, which is that
ρmax ≤ 1/(−5 log δ). These properties are verified by fixing a client i (say the first client2)
and then estimating the expectation of the connConfidence(i, t) formula. Figure 6.3 plots
the estimated probabilities of the first client getting connected versus the bound given by
the theorem at different confidence parameter values, giving rise to different upper bounds
on ρmax, and assuming three different levels of attack (low, medium, and high). For this
analysis, we assume a worst-case analysis with ρ = ρmax. As both Figures 6.3(a) and 6.3(b)
show, the estimated success probabilities under both protocols are always higher than the
respective theorem bounds over the whole range of values of ρ, which confirms the statements
of the theorems. We also note that, with respect to the connection confidence property, both
protocols are able to maintain high success probabilities at higher attack levels compared to
those at low attack levels.
2For this analysis, the choice of the client is immaterial since all clients behave identically and are
introduced to statistically similar attack conditions.
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Figure 6.4: Bandwidth Usage: Theorem bound vs. estimated values
Bandwidth usage (Theorem 4 of [105]). This property gives a bound on the band-
width consumed by legitimate clients in ASV. In particular, Theorem 4 states that, under
the assumption of bounded variability in ρ, the ratio of the legitimate bandwidth consumed
in ASV to that in the omniscient protocol is bounded above by log(αmax)/ log(
1
ρmax
). As
discussed in [105], the restriction on the variability of ρ is imposed only to simplify manual
analysis and the statement of the theorem. Besides giving an independent confirmation of
the theorem by model checking analysis, we confirm the conjecture that the upper bound
holds even when the restrictions on ρ are lifted. This is achieved by estimating the expecta-
tion of the formula bw(t), while fixing ρmin to a very low value (close to 0.0) and allowing ρmax
to vary from very small values all the way up to almost 1.0. Figure 6.4 plots the estimated
ratios at three different attack levels as well as the upper bound given by the theorem at
the lowest level of attack (α = 3.0). The bounds corresponding to medium and high attack
rates are not shown, as both are too high to appear within the figure’s scale. The important
observation here is that the ratios of the legitimate bandwidth consumed by ASV to that
of the omniscient protocol are always below the theorem’s bound. The figure also suggests
that these ratios change only slightly across different attack conditions.
123
6.3.5 ASV versus Non-adaptive Selective Verification Schemes
In [105], the results of various NS-2 simulations comparing ASV to two non-adaptive selective
verification variations under various attack conditions were reported. The non-adaptive
schemes are: (i) the Naive protocol, in which a client does not increase its replication
count with time, and (ii) the Aggressive protocol, in which a client sends the maximum
number of requests (2J) at once upon entering the configuration. The simulations reported
validated the different trade-offs associated to the adaptive versus the non-adaptive schemes
in terms of the ratio of successful connections, the average time-to-service, and the legitimate
bandwidth used. We show here that using the ASV model in Maude along with two variants
of it, corresponding to the non-adaptive protocols above, we obtain similar results through
statistical quantitative analysis with PVeStA, independently confirming, and giving greater
strength to, the simulation analyses.
Since the non-adaptive protocols differ from the ASV protocol only in client request be-
havior, the Naive and Aggressive models are very similar to that of ASV. In fact, their
models differ from the ASV model in essentially one rewrite rule, which is the one labeled
[CSend]. In the Naive protocol model specification, the [CSend] rule maintains the initial
replication count, which is equal to 1, causing the client to send exactly one REQ at every
client timeout until connected or failed. On the other hand, the [CSend] rule of the Ag-
gressive model distinguishes two cases. During the first attempt at making a request to the
server (indicated by the retires attribute being 0), the rule replicates the request 2J times
(the replication count is simply ignored). Otherwise, if the client has already sent its initial
set of requests (0 < retries ≤ J), the client remains silent.
Since we intended to independently confirm the results of the NS-2 simulations of [105], we
instantiate the model using essentially the same values for the parameters. That is, we set ρ
to 0.08, J to 7, and Limit (the simulation duration) to 30.0 time units. The expectation of
the connection ratios, average TTS values, and legitimate bandwidth usage are estimated at
different attacker rates (given in terms of the number of attackers). The results are shown
in Figure 6.5.
As the figure shows, the results obtained confirm the effectiveness and efficiency of ASV
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(a) Connection success ratio (b) Average TTS
(c) Bandwidth usage
Figure 6.5: Performance of ASV compared to non-adaptive schemes
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compared to non-adaptive selective verification schemes. In Figure 6.5(a), ASV is statis-
tically shown to be effective even under high rates of attack, where it outperforms both
non-adaptive protocols. ASV is able to achieve this high performance at the expense of
some latency inherent in its adaptive behavior (See Figure 6.5(b)), which is higher than
that of the Naive protocol during periods of medium to heavy attacks. For legitimate band-
width consumption, Figure 6.5(c) shows that at low to medium attack levels, ASV is able
to maintain low bandwidth consumption levels that are comparable to those of the Naive
protocol. Even at higher attack levels, ASV manages to outperform the aggressive protocol
by a respectable margin.
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CHAPTER 7
AVAILABILITY ANALYSIS OF ORC SERVICES
In general, compositions of services may create new possibilities for DoS attacks by exploiting
the newly created inter-dependencies between these services, which constitute an emerging
threat to service- and cloud-based software systems. For example, knowledge of an interme-
diary forwarding service within an orchestration may be exploited to dramatically amplify
an otherwise limited flooding attack on other services1. Another example is a CPU- and
memory-exhaustion attack on orchestration processes, described in [113] as an instantiation
flooding attack on BPEL processes, in which the orchestration process itself is flooded with
bogus requests for creating and managing new instances of parts of the orchestration. A
third example, which is discussed in detail in [114], illustrates a cross-site scripting attack
using the specification of a service composition to destroy the integrity of the target service
(and hence deny meaningful service to its clients). While some of these DoS vulnerabilities
may be specific to current web service standards, such as BPEL and WS-Security, most of
these vulnerabilities fundamentally represent variations on familiar DoS attack opportuni-
ties, including most notably distributed network-based flooding attacks, which are the kind
of attacks this chapter focuses on.
This chapter presents a formal method for the specification and analysis of availability
properties against DoS in distributed service compositions based on: (1) the rewriting logic
approach to formal specification and analysis of probabilistic systems using probabilistic
rewrite theories and statistical model checking discussed in Chapter 6, (2) the object-based,
rewriting logic semantics of Orc, ROrc, introduced in Chapter 4, and (3) the shared channel
model and the Adaptive Selective Verification (ASV) protocol briefly reviewed in Section 6.3
1See a concrete instance of this kind of DoS attacks in the context of the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
in [111] and a formal, rewriting logic approach to characterizing it in [112].
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of Chapter 6. In particular, we introduce a generalization of the ASV specification as generic
wrapper objects, similar in principle to the generic cookie-based DoS protection wrappers
in [115], that can be used in a modular way to endow the specification of a communica-
tion system with ASV DoS protection. Using a somewhat simplified form of the onion skin
model [116] specified in rewriting logic [117, 118], we introduce the ASV wrapper specifi-
cation as object-based, real-time probabilistic rewrite theories and discuss the assumptions
under which statistical model checking and quantitative analysis of the kind discussed in
Chapter 6 can be correctly applied. We then demonstrate how these wrappers can be used
to analyze availability properties of services in arbitrary service compositions using service
orchestrations in Orc.
7.1 Modular DoS Protection Using the ASV Protocol
The ASV protocol identifies three main roles of nodes in a communication system: (1) a
server, which attempts to service incoming requests, (2) a client, which represents a legiti-
mate user requesting services from the server at some predictable, reasonable rate, and (3)
an attacker, which poses as a legitimate user and tries to flood the server with fake requests
to deny service to clients. As explained in [105], and briefly reviewed in Section 6.3, in the
presence of an attack, a legitimate client attempts to adapt to the current level of attack,
which is estimated by the prolonged absence of a response from the server, by exponentially
replicating its requests (up to a threshold) as the sensed severity of attack increases. At the
other end, the server implements a reservoir-sampling algorithm to collect a random sample
of the incoming requests and process them at its mean processing rate.
Therefore, when the roles of servers and clients in a communication system are identifiable,
the ASV behavior can be naturally applied as a DoS defense layer over nodes in the system
against adversaries probabilistically sharing communication channels with legitimate clients
according to the shared channel model. This layer of protection can be achieved by defining
both server ASV wrappers, which implement the ASV server reservoir sampling algorithm
for incoming requests, and client ASV wrappers, which implement the ASV client adaptive
exponential replication strategy. The server ASV wrapper maintains a buffer with which
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Client 1 Client 2
Server A Server B
Figure 7.1: An example of an ASV-wrapped communication system
random sampling of incoming requests is performed. Once the wrapper times out, it forwards
all the messages in the buffer to the underlying server. Server responses are forwarded to
clients as soon as they become available. The Client ASV wrapper, on the other hand,
maintains a message queue for outgoing requests. When the underlying client sends out
a request, the request is placed in the wrapper queue in preparation for replication. A
request remains in the queue until either it is serviced or its retrial span is exhausted.
Server responses for pending requests in the queue are forwarded immediately to the client.
Figure 7.1 depicts an example communication pattern of ASV-wrapped servers and clients,
in which Client 1 requests services from Server A, while Client 2 uses services from both
Server A and Server B.
Below, we describe formally the components and behaviors of generic ASV wrappers and
how they can be used.
7.2 Assumptions on the Underlying Language
To be able to specify ASV wrappers that are both generic and amenable to statistical anal-
ysis of the kind discussed in Chapter 6, we make a few, reasonable assumptions about the
language in which the underlying communication system is specified as follows. We assume
that the language is specified as a (possibly probabilistic) rewrite theoryR = (Σ, E∪A,R, φ).
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The equational theory (Σ, E ∪ A) defines the following sorts and data structures:
1. A sort Configuration, which is constructed by an associative and commutative empty
juxtaposition operator with the constant none :→ Configuration as its identity element:
: Configuration × Configuration → Configuration [assoc comm id: none]
In addition, we assume two sorts: Object and Msg, which are subsorts of Configura-
tion, for objects and messages, respectively. Intuitively, a term of sort Configuration
represents the state of a system as a multiset of objects and messages in transit. In
addition, objects within a configuration are assumed uniquely identifiable using terms
of sort Oid of object identifiers. These data structures and their properties are already
assumed when using Maude’s object-based programming facilities [20].
2. Two subsorts, CMsg and SMsg, of the sort Msg, representing, respectively, client re-
quest and server response messages, which can be formed using the following (subsort-
overloaded) constructors:
← : Oid × CContent → CMsg ← : Oid × SContent → SMsg
where the sorts CContent and SContent (which are subsorts of the sort Content), model
client and server message payloads, respectively. What actually constitutes a term of
the sort Content or any of its subsorts is application-specific.
3. A sort MsgID for globally unique message identifiers, which will be used by the ASV
wrappers to match server response messages to the corresponding client request mes-
sages that prompted them. We assume that messages produced or consumed by the
system configuration are encapsulated with a message identifier and a sequence number
using the following constructors:
[ , , ] : Nat × MsgID × CMsg → EncapCContent
[ , , ] : Nat × MsgID × SMsg → EnacpSContent
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where the sorts EncapCContent and EnacpSContent are subsorts of both the sort Msg, as
messages in the underlying system state, and the sort Content, as payloads of (wrapped)
messages at the level of ASV wrappers. The sequence numbers used in encapsulated
messages define a linear order in which these messages can be processed by the wrappers
(see below).
In addition to the structural assumptions (1) – (3) above, we also have to make a behavioral
assumption about the semantics of the underlying language, so that systems specified in
this language do not exhibit any non-deterministic behavior that is not probabilistically
quantified. In particular, we assume that the semantics of the language is either deterministic
(optionally specified entirely by the equations E inR = (Σ, E∪A,R, φ)), or probabilistic such
that any potential non-determinism is resolved by a probabilistic choice. This implies that
(encapsulated) messages (terms of the sort EncapCContent or EnacpSContent) can only be
introduced in the system configuration or consumed by objects in the configuration according
to the deterministic or probabilistic semantics of the language. Consequently, we may assume
two linear orderings: one ordering on the outgoing messages produced by an object in the
configuration, and the other linear ordering on the messages to be consumed by an object in
the configuration. The orderings are assumed to be maintained by the configuration of each
object to be wrapped, and are exposed to the wrappers using the sequence number field of
an encapsulated message, which is represented as a natural number. Therefore, a sequence
of internal (possibly probabilistic) transitions of an object 〈O : CID | AS 〉 in the system
may have the form:
〈O : CID | AS 〉 →+R/E∪A 〈O : CID | AS ′〉 [N, IMi ,Mi]
→+R/E∪A 〈O : CID | AS ′′〉 [N, IMi ,Mi] · · · [N + k, IMi+k ,Mi+k]
where the order in which the messages are produced is captured by their assigned numbers
from the sequence [N, · · · , N + k]. In general, at any given point in time, the configuration
may contain a set of outgoing messages that are waiting to be forwarded to their target
objects ordered by a sub-sequence of the natural numbers [N lowout , · · · , Nhighout ], where N lowout
denotes the sequence number of the next message to be forwarded, and Nhighout denotes the
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Figure 7.2: Input and output queues of a wrapped object simulated by sequence numbers
sequence number of the next output message to be produced by the configuration.
Similarly, the configuration may contain a set of incoming messages that are waiting
to be consumed by the target object ordered by a sub-sequence of the natural numbers
[N lowin , · · · , Nhighin ], where N lowin denotes the sequence number of the next message to be con-
sumed by the object, and Nhighin denotes the sequence number of the next input message to
be forwarded to the object.
As Figure 7.2 illustrates, each pair of sequence numbers, (N lowin , N
high
in ) and (N
low
out , N
high
out ),
defines a moving window in an infinite queue of messages, where the low sequence number
denotes the current index of the front of the queue, and the high sequence number denotes
the current index of the back of the queue. The queue is empty when the low and high
numbers coincide.
7.3 The ASV Wrappers
Given a (probabilistic) rewrite theory R = (Σ, E ∪ A,R, φ) specifying a communication
system and satisfying the assumptions above in Section 7.2, the ASV wrappers of R are
specified in a probabilistic rewrite theory RW = (ΣW , EW ∪ AW , RW , φW ) that extends
R with definitions of ASV wrapper objects, declarations of ASV model parameters and
interface functions, and with ASV behaviors. This is described next.
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Server Wrapper
〈O : SASV | conf : C the underlying server object configuration
reqlist : M¯ the incoming request buffer
reqcnt : P the current value of the request count parameter
selv : B〉 the selective verification flag
Client Wrapper
〈O : CASV | conf : C the underlying client object configuration
buffer : M¯ the client request retrial buffer
repcnt : K the current client replication count
gen : O′ the corresponding client generator
rep : B〉 the client replication flag
Client Generator Wrapper
〈O : GASV | id : O′ the object identifier of the client to be generated
conf : C〉 the object configuration of the client
Attacker Wrapper
〈O : AASV | conf : C the underlying attacker object configuration
buffer : M¯〉 the attacker’s attack buffer
Table 7.1: The ASV wrapper classes
7.3.1 ASV Wrapper Configurations
The theory RW declares four classes of ASV wrapper objects: server wrappers, client wrap-
pers, client generator wrappers, and attacker wrappers, which, in some sense, generalize the
classes of objects declared in the ASV model described in Section 6.3. The four classes and
their fundamental class attributes are summarized in Table 7.1.
Server Wrapper. The server wrapper object maintains in an attribute named conf
a server object configuration (of the sort Configuration), which is assumed to contain the
underlying server object as well as any supporting objects required for the proper behavior
of the server as defined by the language in which the system is specified. The server wrapper
also includes: (1) a buffer attribute reqlist that holds incoming requests between server
timeouts, (2) a request count attribute reqcnt that is used in determining the probability
of accepting an incoming request when the buffer is full, and (3) a selective verification
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Boolean flag selv , which can be used to switch selective verification on and off. In addition
to client request messages, a server wrapper object, with id O , accepts two kinds of internal
scheduling messages: (i) a timeout message O ← timeout , which signals a new server time
window causing the processing of messages in the buffer, and (ii) an internal poll message
O ← poll , which signals a check for possible internal transitions within the underlying
configuration and results in encapsulating and lifting up any outgoing server responses to
the wrappers level.
Client Wrapper. A client wrapper object maintains a client object configuration, which
is assumed to contain the underlying client object and any supporting objects for its proper
semantics. Additionally, a client wrapper maintains a client replication buffer attribute
buffer , which stores a queue of pending client requests that have not yet been serviced. The
client buffer is constructed using an associative juxtaposition operator with empty syntax and
with nil as an identity element. An entry in the buffer is a pair of the form {I,CMsg}, where
I is the current retrial count for the buffered client message CMsg. Other client wrapper
attributes include the current (global) client replication count repcnt , which is required to
implement the adaptive protocol, and a Boolean replication flag, which can be used to turn
the adaptive replication behavior on or off. In addition to incoming server responses, a client
wrapper object, identified by O , accepts two kinds of internal scheduling messages, which
are syntactically identical to those described above for server wrappers but have different
semantics. These messages are: (i) an internal poll message O ← poll , which signals a
check for possible internal transitions within the underlying configuration causing any client
request messages in the configuration to be lifted up and stored in the wrapper’s request
queue, and (ii) a timeout message O ← timeout , which initiates the process of appropriately
replicating the next message in the queue, when the queue is non-empty.
Client Generator Wrapper. Like the generator objects of the ASV model described
in Section 6.3, the generator wrapper class is a utility wrapper that is declared essentially
for analysis purposes to model new clients coming in at a specified rate. It maintains the
next object identifier and the next configuration of the client object to be generated in
the attributes id and conf, respectively. The client configuration maintained is assumed
to contain the underlying client object and any of its supporting objects. The generator
134
wrapper accepts a message of the form O ← spawn to schedule the creation of the next
client object. Note that, unlike the ASV model in Section 6.3, in which only one generator
object is used, there can in general be more than one instance of the generator wrapper
class, as we will see in the Orc example in Section 7.4.
Attacker Wrapper. The attacker wrapper is another utility wrapper declared for anal-
ysis purposes. The wrapper is a simple class that maintains only two attributes: (1) the
attacker configuration in an attribute conf, which holds the underlying attacker object con-
figuration defining the attacker behavior, and (2) an attack request queue, having a structure
similar to a client request buffer (described above), in an attribute buffer. The queue, which
holds the attacker’s (fake) requests, serves as a launching pad for the attack. An attacker
wrapper ignores incoming server responses and accepts the same two kinds of internal mes-
sages accepted by the client wrapper with similar semantics.
7.3.2 Parameters and Interface Functions
To support the generic nature of the ASV wrappers, the theory RW declares a number of
operators representing (partial) functions that capture parameters of the ASV model and
define an interface with the underlying communication system. First, the ASV wrappers
assume a simple object identification scheme that maps object identifiers O in the underlying
configuration to object identifiers at the wrappers layer of the form f(O), where f is one
of the four constructor symbols: sv, cv, gv, av, for server, client, generator and attacker
object wrapper identifiers, respectively. Clearly, uniqueness of wrapper object identifiers is
guaranteed by the assumption of uniqueness of wrapped object identifiers in the underlying
configuration, which are constructor terms of the sort Oid. This object identification scheme
is essential to the proper semantics of the wrappers, as it impacts how messages are processed
across the two different layers.
Furthermore, the ASV wrappers define several ASV parameters and interface functions,
which are listed in Table 7.2, where the first set of declarations captures the ASV model
parameters, and the second set the interface functions. We note that, since we may have
multiple server, client or generator wrapper objects in a configuration, some of the ASV
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µ : Oid → [Float] mean processing rate of a server
ρmin, ρmax : Oid → [Float] min and max request rates of a client
αmin, αmax : → [Float] min and max attack rates
Timeout : Oid → [Float] timeout period of a given server or client
JBound : Float× Float → [Nat] client retrial span given ρ and α
Delay : → [Float] message transmission delay
Drop : → [Float] message drop probability
Limit : → [Float] time duration of a sample run
getLX : Configuration → [Nat] get the value of a sequence number
setLX : Configuration× Nat → [Configuration] set the value of a sequence number
eager : Configuration → [Bool] is a configuration eager?
nextOid : Oid → [Oid] next client object id to be generated
nextConf : Configuration → [Configuration] next client configuration to be generated
nextID : MsgID → [MsgID] next client message id to be used
nextCC : CContent → [CContent] next client message content to be used
Table 7.2: The ASV wrapper interface functions
model parameters are parametric to wrapper object identifiers, including µ(O), which defines
the mean processing rate of the server wrapped by O, ρmin(O) and ρmax(O), which define
the minimum and maximum client request rate for the client object wrapped by O, and
timeout(O), which defines the server timeout window, if O identifies a server wrapper object,
or the client timeout period, if O identifies a client wrapper object.
The interface functions decouple the specification of the wrappers from the specification of
the underlying system by hiding some of the system specification details. In particular, the
theory RW declares a set of four getter and four setter functions for the message sequence
numbers maintained by the configuration, which are of the forms getLX and set
L
X , with
X ∈ {in, out} for input and output messages to the underlying configuration, and L ∈
{low , high} for the low and high sequence number handlers (as described in Section 7.2). For
instance, given a system configuration C, the function call gethighin (C) returns the sequence
number Nhighin + 1 to be used for the next input message to the configuration, while the
call set lowout (C,K), with K a natural number, returns the configuration C with its sequence
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number N lowout of the next output message to be processed by the enclosing wrapper set to K.
In addition, the theory declares a function eager, which, given a configuration C, evaluates
to true if and only if the configuration has an enabled transition.
Interface functions also provide added flexibility in the specification and analysis of an
ASV-wrapped system by giving further control over its possible behaviors. In particular,
the functions nextOid and nextConf can be used to specify how new client objects are
introduced in the configuration by a generator wrapper, while the functions nextID and
nextCC can be used to define how the attacker generates fake requests to the server. The
example discussed in Section 7.4 illustrates how these parameters and interface functions
can be instantiated.
7.3.3 Wrapper Behaviors
Like the ASV model in rewriting logic described in Section 6.3, the configuration of ASV
wrappers maintains a few other objects required for defining the wrappers behaviors, in-
cluding, most notably, a global scheduler object of the form {T | S}, with T the current
global time, and S a list of scheduled, encapsulated messages, of the form [T,M,B], where
T is the time at which the message is scheduled for delivery, M the encapsulated message,
and B a message drop flag for modeling lossy channels. As before, the scheduler object
provides two important benefits: (1) it enables resolving any potential non-determinism by
enforcing a deterministic order on message delivery, and (2) it provides a flexible mechanism
for specifying time and its effects in a configuration and controlling the time length of a
simulation of the model using an auxiliary function, mytick, as described in Section 6.3.
The behaviors of the different wrappers are explained below, where we show slightly
simplified versions of the rewrite rules to improve readability and to highlight the important
aspects of wrapper behaviors.
Server Wrapper. When a server wrapper O receives an incoming client message O ←
[N, ID ,CMsg ], it first checks whether its request buffer stored in the reqlist attribute is full
or not, where the buffer size is given by bµ(O) · timout(O)c. If the buffer is not yet full, the
request is simply added to the list. Otherwise, if the buffer has already reached its maximum
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capacity, the server tosses a biased coin with success probability A(P ), parametrized by its
reqcnt attribute P , and uses the outcome of this experiment to decide whether to either
replace an existing request selected uniformly at random with the incoming request, or to
drop the incoming message altogether. The server wrapper also increments its client request
count reqcnt in preparation for the next incoming client request. This behavior is modeled
by the following probabilistic rewrite rule:
ProcessReq :
〈O : SASV | reqlist : L, reqcnt : P 〉 O ← [N, ID ,CMsg ] {T | S}
→ mytick({T | S})
if the request buffer L is full then
if B then 〈O : SASV | reqlist : replace(L, [N, ID ,CMsg ], U), reqcnt : P + 1〉
else 〈O : SASV | reqlist : L, reqcnt : P + 1〉 fi
else 〈O : SASV | reqlist : add(L, [N, ID ,CMsg ], reqcnt : P 〉 fi
with probability B := Bernoulli(A(P )) ∧ U := Uniform(|L|)
Once a server wrapper times out, indicated by the self-addressed timeout message, the
server resets its reqcnt counter to the value bµ(O) · timout(O)c+1.0, which is specified using
the function resetP , and forwards all the messages in its buffer (if any) down to the enclosed
configuration using the auxiliary function call emitMsgs(L,N), which emits an ordered set
of messages in L starting with the next sequence number N provided by the configuration
through the function gethighin .
STimeout :
〈O : SASV | conf : C, reqlist : L, reqcnt : P 〉 O ← timeout {T | S}
→ 〈O : SASV | conf : sethighin (C,N + |L|) emitMsgs(L,N), reqlist : nil , reqcnt : resetP(O)〉
O ← poll {T | S}
if N := gethighin (C)
The wrapper also updates the next input message sequence number in the configuration
appropriately using the function sethighin , and schedules an internal poll message O ← poll
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to allow for internal transitions in the underlying configuration, which is captured by the
following rule:
SInternal1 :
〈O : SASV | conf : C〉 O ← poll {T | S}
→ 〈O : SASV | conf : pullUp(C ′)〉
mytick({T | insert(insert(S,makeSL(C ′, T )), [timeout(O) + T, (O ← timeout), 0])})
if eager(C) ∧ C → C ′ ∧ eager(C ′) 6= true
The rule can be applied when the underlying configuration C is eager, as defined by the en-
closed system specification, implying that an internal transition is possible. In this case, the
configuration C is allowed to make one or more transitions all the way to a configuration C ′
that is not eager, where no internal transition is possible. Therefore, when the condition is
satisfiable, the server wrapper’s configuration C rewrites to the next non-eager configuration
in which all outgoing server response messages are removed and submitted to the scheduler
using: (1) the auxiliary functions pullUp, which removes available outgoing messages from
the configuration according to their sequence numbers and appropriately updates the con-
figuration’s output sequence number N lowout , and (2) the auxiliary function makeSL, which
constructs a list of scheduled, encapsulated outgoing messages from the configuration given
the current global time. The rule also schedules a timeout message to be made available after
timeout(O) time units. The other case, when the configuration is not eager, is modeled by
a rule labeled SInternal2 (not shown), which simply ignores the poll message and sched-
ules a timeout message. We note that, since the poll message is scheduled to be processed
immediately after the timeout message, the two transitions defined by these two messages
can in principle be combined into one rewrite transition step. However, we have chosen to
define the internal server wrapper behavior as two consecutive transition steps to a achieve
a simpler and more readable specification.
Client Wrapper. When it is time for the client wrapper to make an internal transition
in the underlying configuration C, which is signaled by the self-addressed timeout message,
and if C is indeed eager, the client wrapper advances C to the next non-eager state C ′, and
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updates its configuration and buffer attributes according to the following rewrite rule:
CInternal1 : 〈O : CASV | conf : C, buffer : E¯〉 O ← timeout {T | S}
→ 〈O : CASV | conf : pullUp(C ′), buffer : makeCB(C ′, T ) E¯〉 O ← poll {T | S}
if eager(C) ∧ C → C ′ ∧ eager(C ′) 6= true
The rule removes any outgoing client request messages from C ′ while updating the appropri-
ate sequence number handler (namely N lowout ), using the function pullUp, constructs a buffer
of these messages and appends them to the queue, using the function makeCB, given the
current global time. If the configuration is not eager, a corresponding rule CInternal2
applies, in which the timeout message is simply ignored. In either case, both rules, CInter-
nal1 and CInternal2, schedule a poll message to initiate the client message replication
step. If the client wrapper’s buffer is non-empty, the CSend1 rule may fire, which has the
following form:
CSend1 :
rateρ(Og, R) rateα(A) {T | S}
〈O : CASV | conf : C, buffer : E¯{J, [N, ID , Os ← CC ]}, repcnt : K, gen : Og〉 O ← poll
→ rateρ(Og, R) rateα(A)
if (J = 0) then
〈O : CASV | conf : C, buffer : {s(J), [N, ID , Os ← CC ]}E¯, repcnt : K, gen : Og〉
mytick({T | schedule a timeout msg and sv(Os)← [N, ID , Os ← CC ]})
else if (J ≤ JBound(R,A)) then
〈O : CASV | conf : C, buffer : {s(J), [N, ID , Os ← CC ]}E¯, repcnt : 2 ·K, gen : Og〉
mytick({T | schedule a timeout msg, replicate sv(Os)← [N, ID , Os ← CC ] K times })
else
〈O : CASV | conf : C, buffer : E¯, repcnt : K, gen : Og〉
mytick({T | schedule a timeout msg only }) fi fi
The rule considers the next message in the buffer (the head of the queue), having a retrial
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count J and targeted to server object Os. There are three cases. The first case is when J is
0, meaning that the message has not yet been forwarded to the server. In this case, a single
copy of the encapsulated message sv(Os)← [N, ID , O ← CC ] is submitted to the scheduler
(no replication), and the buffered message is moved to the back of the queue with its retrial
count J incremented by 1. The second case is when J is non-zero, but smaller than or equal
to the current retrial span limit given by JBound(R,A), a function of the current client rate
R and the current attack rate A. In this case, the client wrapper sends K replicated copies
of the encapsulated message to the server, with K the value of its repcnt attribute, and
updates the replication count for the next attempt. Here, again, the message is moved to
the back of the message queue with its J incremented. In the third case, when the message’s
retrial count exceeds the current retrial span limit JBound(R,A), the wrapper gives up on
the message and drops it from the queue. In all of the three cases, the wrapper schedules
another timeout message after timeout(O) time units. The specification also includes a
corresponding rule, namely CSend2, for the case when the buffer is empty, which simply
ignores the current poll message.
When a client wrapper receives a server response corresponding to a pending request in
its buffer, which is determined by matching the messages’ identifiers, the wrapper consumes
the message and forwards it to the underlying configuration while properly updating the
incoming message sequence number handlers, using the function pushDown, according to
the following rule:
CRec1 :
〈O : CASV | conf : C, buffer : E¯1{J, [N, ID ,CMsg ]}E¯2, repcnt : K〉
O ← [N ′, ID , SMsg ] {T | S}
→ 〈O : CASV | conf : pushDown(C, [N ′, ID, SMsg]), buffer : E¯1E¯2, repcnt : dK/2e〉
mytick({T | S})
This rule uses matching modulo associativity and identity to match the ID field of the
incoming message with the appropriate buffered message in the queue. The rule drops
the matched buffered message from the queue and updates the client replication count by
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dividing it by 2 in response to the successful completion of the request. If the client wrapper
receives a server response for a request that is no longer in the buffer, implying that the
response corresponds either to a request that has already been serviced (a duplicated response
message) or to a request that has already failed (a response that is too late), the client
wrapper simply ignores the message. This is captured by a corresponding rewrite rule
labeled CRec2.
Generator Wrapper. The behavior of the generator is modeled by a single rewrite rule
of the form:
SpawnClient :
〈Og : GASV | id : O, conf : C〉 Og ← spawn rateρ(Og, R) {T | S}
→ 〈Og : GASV | id : nextOid(O), conf : nextConf (C)〉 rateρ(Og, R)
〈cv(O) : CASV | conf : C, buffer : φ, repcnt : 1, gen : Og, · · · 〉
O ← poll {T | schedule in S the next spawn message })
When the Og ← spawn message is the next message to be processed, the generator wrapper
object Og creates a new client wrapper object cv(O) that is initialized with the configuration
C, an empty buffer, and a replication count of 1. The generator wrapper updates its client
object id and client configuration for the next client wrapper to be generated, using the
interface function nextOid and nextConf, and schedules the next spawn message.
Attacker Wrapper. The attacker wrapper assumes a similar behavior to client wrap-
pers, in that an attacker wrapper object first, upon receiving a timeout message, makes
an internal transition (if possible) to pull up client request messages from the underlying
configuration and store them in its message queue, according to the rules labeled AInter-
nal1 and AInternal2 (not shown), corresponding, respectively, to client wrapper rules
CInternal1 (shown above) and CInternal2. Then, using a subsequent poll message,
the attacker wrapper forwards a copy of the next message in its (non-empty) queue to the
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appropriate server wrapper according to a rule of the following form:
ASend1 :
〈O : AASV | buffer : E¯{J, [N, ID , Os ← CC ]}〉 O ← poll rateα(A) {T | S}
→ 〈O : AASV | buffer : {s(J), [N, nextID(ID), Os ← nextCC (CC )]}E¯〉 rateα(A)
mytick({T | schedule in S a timeout msg and sv(Os)← [N, ID , Os ← CC ] })
In this rule, the attacker wrapper encapsulates the request message appropriately and sub-
mits it to the scheduler. The wrapper also updates the message’s identifier (to generate
uniquely distinguishable copies of the same request), and optionally the message’s content,
using the interface functions nextID and nextCC. A next timeout message is also scheduled
using the current attack rate A. Another rewrite rule labeled ASend2, which ignores the
wrapper’s poll message, applies when the queue is empty. Finally, the attacker wrapper
ignores incoming server responses, regardless of where they come from, which is modeled by
a simple rewrite rule labeled ARec.
7.4 Case Study: Availability Analysis in a Service Composition
Pattern in Orc
To illustrate how the generic ASV wrappers can be used, we describe a case study in which
we analyze service availability in an Orc service composition. The aim of this case study is
twofold: (1) to provide a concrete instantiation of ASV wrappers and the type of analysis
that can be performed, and (2) to illustrate a formal method for analysis of availability
of services in Orc service compositions. Due to the generality and flexibility of both the
ASV wrappers, and the Orc language, much more complex case studies can be designed and
analyzed in many different ways. The case study presented here was designed for simplicity
to emphasize these two goals.
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7.4.1 The Underlying Language
Being a concurrent programming model, the semantics of an Orc orchestration expression
may naturally be non-deterministic, using either symmetric parallel composition or asym-
metric parallel composition (angelic and demonic types of non-determinism, respectively,
as explained in [35]). Consequently, the SOS semantics of Orc as originally defined in [35],
and the rewriting semantics introduced in Chapters 3 and 4 cannot be directly used as the
semantics of the language in which the underlying system of an ASV wrapper object is
specified, if we are to apply the statistical model checking methods described in Chapter 6,
which assume that all non-determinism has been removed and the model is purely proba-
bilistic. One possible solution is to develop and use a probabilistic semantics of Orc, in which
non-determinism is replaced by probabilistic choice (cf. [119]). However, this development is
outside the scope of this work, and is, furthermore, unnecessary, since the object-level con-
currency inherent in the object-based semantics of of Orc, given by ROrc, already provides a
semantically equivalent alternative to (symmetric) parallel composition in Orc, as discussed
in Section 4.1.4. The non-determinism resulting from object-level concurrency can then be
readily eliminated using the wrapper-level scheduler.
Therefore, we use here a sequential subset of Orc, denoted
 
Orc, which is Orc without the
parallel composition operators | and < < . The object-based semantics of
 
Orc is captured
by a theory R  
Orc
⊂ ROrc, a sub-theory of the ROrc that excludes operator declarations and
semantic equations pertaining to parallel compositions2.
To support the assumed messaging behavior of ASV wrappers, discussed in Section 7.2, the
theoryR  
Orc
includes sort and operator declarations for messages identifiers, sequence number
handlers, and encapsulated messages. A message identifier in R  
Orc
is a pair of the form
id(O,H), where O is the Orc object identifier of the caller object and H is the handle name of
the site call in O that caused the message. Sequence numbers in an Orc configuration inR  
Orc
are maintained by sequence number handlers of the form in(N lowin , N
high
in ) for input messages
and out(N lowout , N
high
out ) for output messages, so that each object maintains the appropriate
2Currently, only the untimed sequential subset of Orc is used. This limitation is compensated for by timing
out self-addressed messages at the wrappers layer. Extending wrappers to support real-time behaviors of
underlying objects is part of future work.
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Local Client Intermediary
Enterprise Back-end
Remote Client
Figure 7.3: The underlying Orc orchestration pattern of the case study
sequence numbers in its configuration when consuming an incoming message or producing
and outgoing message, as explained in Section 7.2 above.
7.4.2 The Orc Orchestration Pattern
The Orc orchestration example underlying the communication system to be analyzed is de-
picted in Figure 7.3, where round rectangles represent Orc expression objects and ellipses
represent Orc site objects. The example models a common pattern of communication in
service-based systems, in which a group of enterprise clients (Local Clients in Figure 7.3)
use services provided by a local server in the enterprise (Enterprise). The enterprise server
is also expected to simultaneously serve other users beyond the boundaries of the enterprise
(Intermediary), which compose these services with services provided by other back-end ser-
vice providers (Back-end) to complete a given task. Other clients (Remote Clients) who do
not depend on services from the enterprise, but use services from the back-end server, also
exist.
In the Orc program specification, a local client is modeled by an Orc expression object
that attempts to make a site call to the enterprise server, represented by a simple site object,
with object identifier ep, that simply echos back the actual parameter list of the site call.
The initial configuration of the ith local client object, given by an operator localConf (i), is
of the form:
〈local i : Expr | env : ∅, exp : ep(), hdl : ∅〉 in(0, 0) out(0, 0)
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Since there may be more than one local client Orc expression object present, the enterprise
Orc site object may receive multiple, distinct messages corresponding to site calls from local
clients. The intermediary Orc expression object, on the other hand, makes three sequential
site calls using the Orc expression ep() be() ep(), which calls the enterprise server first
and waits for a response, calls and waits for the back-end server (with object identifier be),
and then calls the enterprise server again. The initial state of the ith intermediary expression
object has the form:
〈interm i : Expr | env : E() , ep() be() ep(), exp : E(), hdl : ∅〉 in(0, 0) out(0, 0)
Finally, a remote client is modeled by an Orc expression object that makes a site call to the
back-end server, and its specification is similar to that of the local client expression object.
7.4.3 Availability Analysis
In the instantiation of ASV wrappers to
 
Orc, a server ASV wrapper encloses an Orc site
object configuration, whereas a client ASV wrapper encloses an Orc expression object. In
addition, a client generator ASV wrapper may optionally be used to generate new instances
of (wrapped) Orc expression objects of a certain type, such as local client objects, and an
attacker wrapper may be used to simulate an instance of an attack.
In this example, we use three generator wrappers, one for each of the three Orc expres-
sion objects: local clients, intermediaries, and remote clients, to model clients requesting
services at some specified request rates, and two server wrappers, one for each of the two
Orc site objects: ep and be. Assuming that the initial configurations for the Orc site and
expression objects described above are constructed using the respective defined functions
epConf , beConf , localConf i, intermConf i and otherConf i, the initial wrapper-level configu-
ration (with no attackers) is a term of the following form (the scheduler and other supporting
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µ(sv(ep)) = 200 Timeout(sv(ep)) = 0.4
µ(sv(be)) = 50 Timeout(sv(be)) = 0.4
ρ(gv(local)) = 0.02 Timeout(cv(local)) = 0.4
ρ(gv(interm)) = 0.04 Timeout(cv(interm)) = 0.4
ρ(gv(remote)) = 0.16 Timeout(cv(remote)) = 0.4
Table 7.3: An instantiation of the ASV parameters
objects are not shown):
〈sv(ep) : SASV | conf : epConf , reqcnt : resetP(sv(ep)), reqlist : nil , · · · 〉
〈sv(be) : SASV | conf : beConf , reqcnt : resetP(sv(be)), reqlist : nil , · · · 〉
〈gv(local) : GASV | conf : localConf 0, id : local0〉
〈gv(interm) : GASV | conf : intermConf 0, id : interm0〉
〈gv(remote) : GASV | conf : remoteConf 0, id : remote0〉
To complete the specification of the ASV-wrapped system, we instantiate the ASV model
parameters as listed in Table 7.3. For simplicity, we assume no message transmission delays
or drops (Delay = Drop = 0.0), and a simulation length of 10.0 time units.
In addition, we define the ASV wrapper interface functions given in Table 7.2 as follows.
The eager function coincides with the eager predicate for Orc configurations, defined in
Chapter 3, so that a configuration is eager if and only if an instantaneous Orc action is
enabled. The definitions of the getter and setter functions for sequence number handlers
in an Orc configuration are trivial. The functions nextOid and nextConf simply increment
the appropriate object identifier counters to create fresh new identifiers to be used by the
generator wrappers, while the functions nextID and nextCC, which are used by attackers,
generate unique message identifiers and message contents by using fresh handle names. For
example, the function nextOid has the defining equation nextOid(local i) = local i+1, and the
function nextID is defined as nextID(id(O, hi)) = id(O, hi+1).
To be able to compare the performance of ASV to other non-adaptive schemes in this
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setting, we develop variations of the ASV wrappers corresponding to the naive selective ver-
ification protocol and the aggressive selective verification protocols discussed in Section 6.3.5,
in addition to a third variation in which no selective verification is performed, referred to
below as the basic variant.
In our analysis, we consider two different attack scenarios with varying attack rates: at-
tacks on the enterprise server ep, and attacks on the back-end server be. As in the ASV
analysis reported in Section 6.3, we analyze the system in terms of three classes of proper-
ties: (1) connection ratio, which is the number of clients successfully served over the total
number of clients, (2) average time to service, which is the average amount of time, over
all successfully served clients, to get served, and (3) bandwidth usage, which is measured by
the total number of legitimate client requests reaching the server. These properties have
identical specifications as QuaTEx expressions as those presented in Section 6.3.3. Unlike
the previous analysis of ASV, where we had only one server and one client generator objects
(i.e. one type of multiple, identical client objects), these properties are analyzed here for
each of the two server wrappers, and the three client generator wrappers. Throughout the
experiments, we assume a 95% confidence interval of size at most 0.05. The analysis results
are shown in Figures 7.4–7.7.
Figure 7.4 plots the expected client connection ratio and the average time to service against
different attack rates for the three types of clients for the first attack scenario. The connection
ratio plots for local and intermediary clients (in Figures 7.4(a) and 7.4(b)) show similar
results as those obtained before, in which the ASV protocol performs fairly well against
extreme rates of attack. All four variants performed slightly less effectively for intermediary
clients than for local clients, which is to be expected, due to the more demanding underlying
behavior of intermediary clients. The connection ratio plot for remote clients in Figure 7.4(c)
shows the effects of the attack on the enterprise server are only barely noticeable, except for
the aggressive protocol, which consistently performs suboptimally due to the consistently
high replication count on the slower back-end server. The average time to service results
reaffirms latency side-effects of ASV as the severity of attack increases. We note that the
service latencies suffered by the intermediary clients are more pronounced because of the
fact that an intermediary client requests two sequential services from the enterprise server
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under attack. Figure 7.5 shows a similar, somewhat symmetric, set of results when the back-
end server is subjected to the attack. Due to the slower server being attacked, connection
ratios are in general lower than in the previous attack scenario. We also note that the
average service latency for intermediary clients is less affected by this attack due to their
underlying behavior. Finally, legitimate client bandwidth consumption plots in Figures 7.6
and 7.7, show that the ASV behavior performs exceptionally well for both servers, under
both attack scenarios. The figures also show that, in moderate to severe attack situations,
the bandwidth consumption in the aggressive behavior becomes extremely high compared
to the other variants, which is due to the computed (rather than fixed) retrial span using
the function JBound.
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(a) Local Clients
(b) Intermediary Clients
(c) Remote Clients
Figure 7.4: The expected connection ratio and average time to service for local,
intermediary, and remote clients when attacking the enterprise server
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(a) Local Clients
(b) Intermediary Clients
(c) Remote Clients
Figure 7.5: The expected connection ratio and average time to service for local,
intermediary, and remote clients when attacking the back-end server
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(a) Enterprise server (b) Back-end server
Figure 7.6: Bandwidth usage when attacking the enterprise server
(a) Enterprise server (b) Back-end server
Figure 7.7: Bandwidth usage when attacking the back-end server
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CHAPTER 8
RELATED WORK
In this chapter, we briefly review related work in the different areas to which this dissertation
contributes. The intent is not to document every related development in the literature, but
rather to highlight fundamentally related, exemplary results. We also provide references to
some surveys, where more background information and related cited publications can be
found.
8.1 Rewriting Logic Semantics
The fact that rewriting logic is a general semantic framework in which languages and sys-
tems can be naturally specified is now well established, as discussed in Meseguer’s and Rosu’s
survey of the rewriting logic semantics project [61] as well as in [62], and in the upcoming
survey [63]. The generality and flexibility of rewriting logic make it suitable for specify-
ing both deterministic computations (algebraically using equations) and non-deterministic
computations (using rewrite rules) within a uniform model, providing a convenient way to
control the level of abstraction desired in a specification.
Several recent research projects within the rewriting logic semantics project, which are
closely related to the work presented in the thesis, have been conducted (some are discussed
in the upcoming survey [63]). For example, a formal framework for the specification and anal-
ysis of timing properties in software design based on Real-Time Maude was presented at [120].
The framework uses a flexible intermediate language with timeouts to specify software com-
ponents in a design, and allows for both static analysis (using abstract interpretations) and
dynamic analysis (searching and model checking) of timed properties. Another recent ex-
ample is a Real-Time-Maude-based tool for specifying and analyzing synchronous, real-time
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embedded software systems in Ptolemy II [121, 122]. The tool implements a code generation
infrastructure, similar to MOrc’s, minimizing exposure to the underlying Maude model. A
third example, also for embedded software components, but with emphasis on safety-critical
systems, is given in [123], where an object-based, formal semantics of a behavioral subset of
AADL in Real-Time Maude is used as a formal analysis back-end for AADL specifications.
8.2 Formal Semantics of Orc
In addition to the operational SOS semantics of Orc in [35] and its timed SOS extension
in [81], several denotational formalizations of Orc’s semantics, which are more well-suited
for reasoning about algebraic properties in the language than for describing the operational
behavior of Orc programs, have been developed [84, 82, 124]. Encodings of Orc in some
other formal models of concurrency, including encodings in pi-calculus [125], Petri nets and
the join calculus [126], and networks of timed automata [127] were also given, indirectly
providing formal semantics to Orc and highlighting some of its semantic subtleties.
The SOS-based rewriting semantics of Orc, along with some of the operational approaches
cited above, has similarities with the various SOS semantics that have been given for different
timed process calculi, such as ATP [128] and TLP [129], and real-time extensions to various
process calculi, such as extensions of ACP [130, 14], CCS [131], and CSP [132].
8.3 Formal Analysis of Service Compositions
Over the last few years, a considerable amount of foundational research has been conducted
to address the problem of formally specifying and analyzing different forms of service com-
positions, including most importantly service orchestrations, which can be broadly classified
into four categories: (1) automata-theoretic, (2) Petri net-based, (3) process-algebraic, and
(4) BPEL-oriented approaches. We selectively highlight some of the most relevant results
below.
The automata-theoretic approach proposed in [127] leverages available model checking
tools for timed automata models, namely Uppaal [133], by modeling the semantics of an Orc
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expression as a network of timed automata. Unlike MOrc, the resulting Uppaal-based tool
enables formal verification of only a subset of Orc with limited recursion, where the number
of threads in an Orc expression is fixed. A fundamentally similar approach, but based on an
abstraction of BPEL activities instead of Orc, is used in [134], where an abstracted BPEL
process is transformed into a network of Web Service Timed Transition Systems (WSTTS),
which are essentially timed automata tailored in design for web service compositions. An
implementation of the underlying model enables model checking analysis of timed properties,
which are specified in discrete-time Duration Calculus. In comparison to the rewriting-based
approach of the thesis, automata-based methods are limited in expressiveness and are, as a
result, insufficient for modeling the full generality of service compositions.
Models of service compositions using Petri nets, and their extensions, have been developed.
Most of these approaches, such as [135, 136, 137], tend to first define a process calculus in
which service composition constructs are specified, and give such constructs formal semantics
as Petri nets. Correctness of composition specifications can then be verified using standard
reachability analysis methods for Petri net models. A recent, introductory book on modeling
business processes using Petri nets is also available [138].
Several other (non-Petri-net-based) process-algebraic approaches to service composition
specification were developed. The general theme of these methods is to first specify a pro-
cess calculus with specialized constructs for the targeted aspects of a service composition,
like persistent sessions, error handling (exceptions), or security properties, and then develop
their formal semantics in some form of a transition system, on which formal verification is
based. Examples of such efforts, many of which were partially supported by the Sensoria
project [139], include: (1) Service-Centered Calculus (SCC) [140], an Orc-inspired process
calculus of service compositions with persistent sessions; (2) Service Oriented Computing
Kernel (SOCK) [141], which defines a layered process calculus for modularly specifying ser-
vice behaviors, service sessions, and service compositions; (3) the Calculus for Orchestration
of Web Services (COWS) [142], a timed process calculus with termination constructs; (4)
Event Calculus for Web Services [143], a process calculus with events and event scopes for
error handling; and (5) Signal Calculus (SC) [37], a variant of the Ambient Calculus [38]
for event-notification-based service coordination. Most of these calculi emphasize expres-
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siveness and conciseness by providing constructs that capture different aspects of services,
and demonstrate them with examples. It is not clear, however, how mechanizable such for-
malisms are for performing automatic formal analysis. Bruni [36] provided a fairly recent
survey of such process calculus-based approaches, and described one of his own, called the
Calculus of Sessions and Pipelines (CaSPiS) [36], which is a calculus for describing service
sessions and their interactions.
Other approaches that are based directly on BPEL (and related industrial languages) have
also been proposed. Given the fact that BPEL and similar languages are descriptive and
verbose, and lack any sort of formal semantics, these approaches essentially try to provide
formalizations of (subsets of) these industrial languages in some formal model of computa-
tion, like BPEL encodings in Petri Nets [42], the pi-calculus [43], Event Calculus [144], and
Message Sequence Charts [145]. Alternatively, they may devise new BPEL-inspired core
languages for service orchestrations that capture some of BPEL’s salient features, such as
transactions and process termination, including, for example, Blite [44], and the BPEL-based
process calculi of [146] and [147], focusing on studying correlations between orchestration
processes within service choreographies. The manuscript [41] provides a comprehensive (but
perhaps fairly outdated) survey of BPEL formalizations. Nevertheless, as a result of BPEL’s
complexity and expansive feature-set, a comprehensive and practical BPEL-based formal
framework for the specification and verification of service orchestrations remains elusive.
8.4 Implementations of Service Composition Languages
There are numerous implementations of service compositions (including implementations in
general purpose programming languages, like Java and C#) providing tools and frameworks
for designing business processes. Unfortunately, most of these tools are not in any way based
on formal models against which formal analysis and verification can be carried out, but rely
solely on forms of static analysis and traditional non-exhaustive dynamic analysis methods
like testing. However, There are a few recent proposals for tools that are based on formal
(or at least semi-formal) models. Bruni et. al. [148] described an implementation approach
based on abstract state machines (ASMs), in which a formal model of service compositions
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is first compiled into the intermediate language of the underlying Service-Oriented Abstract
Machine (SOAM), for which a code generator exists. An implementation of Orc, among
other service composition formal models, was given using this approach [148]. Compared
to our rewriting-based implementation approach in Maude, the ASM approach seems less
generic as the underlying SOAM has to be tailored to the specific model to be implemented,
which may re-introduce possibilities for implementation errors. Moreover, SOAM’s model
of services defines specialized constructs for messaging and maintaining multiple program
states (corresponding to different services running in parallel) with specialized semantics,
which makes it less intuitive than the object-based model with asynchronous message pass-
ing employed in our transformation. Finally, it is not clear whether truly distributed imple-
mentations can be obtained from their SOAM specifications.
Other approaches to implementations of service compositions, which can be classified un-
der the model-driven software engineering methodology, have also been proposed. These
include: (1) VFT [149], which is a tool based on a visual language (with semi-formal seman-
tics) for specifying semantic web service compositions in OWL-S [33]; (2) DecSerFlow [150],
which is an extensible, graphical language with formal semantics, endowed with LTL model
checking; (3) The UML-based specification framework of [151], which is rooted at Hoare’s for-
malism of Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) [13] to formally check conformance
of service compositions with a given choreography specification; and (4) LTSA-WS [152],
which is a UML-based specification language, developed as an Eclipse plug-in, in which
service composition specifications are translated into labeled transition systems, where ver-
ification is performed by trace equivalence.
8.5 Statistical Analysis Methods of Probabilistic Models
Statistical model checking of formal models of probabilistic systems has seen a growing
interest in the formal methods community over the last few years, mainly due to its higher
scalability and wider applicability, when compared to numerical probabilistic methods. In
general, in statistical model checking, the problem of checking whether the probability that
a certain property holds is within some specified threshold (expressed as a probabilistic
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formula in a probabilistic temporal logic, such as PCTL [106] and CSL [107, 108]) is solved
using statistical means, such as statistical hypothesis testing, as described by Sen et. al. [1].
A similar approach based on hypothesis testing is presented in [101, 153], where, instead
of pre-computing the sample size and performing a simple hypothesis test as in [1], the
authors describe a testing strategy based on sequential acceptance sampling, where after each
observation, a testing step is performed to decide whether further observations are needed to
satisfy the required statistical strength of the result. Although the simple hypothesis testing
strategy of [1] is more amenable to parallelization, it is argued in [101] that sequential
sampling may reduce generated sample size. Other statistical model-checking algorithms
for checking properties of “black-box” systems, in which samples cannot be generated on
demand, have been proposed [154, 155].
In statistical quantitative analysis, a quantitative measure of some aspect the probabilistic
system is estimated, as demonstrated here and in [2] using QuaTEx and the statistical
quantitative analysis algorithm of [2]. A similar algorithm was also described in [104], in
which, instead of fixing a sample size N , samples are generated until a standard normality
test (e.g. the JB test [156]) succeeds. The standard normal distribution is then used in the
computation of the confidence interval.
8.6 Formal Specification and Analysis of Availability
The VeStA tool [72], along with Maude, has been used for statistical model checking
and quantitative analysis in several projects, including analysis of TCP SYN floods-based
DoS attacks within the shared channel model [102], analysis and redesign of a wireless
sensor networks protocol [103], and a few case studies in object-based stochastic hybrid
systems [66]. A similar rewriting-based approach using Maude was also described in [104],
which was applied to a resource optimization problem in embedded systems.
Other statistical model checking and quantitative analysis tools have been developed.
They include PRISM [157], a BDD-based model checker with a simple state-language for
system specification, and APMC [158], which is based on a randomized algorithm for ap-
proximating probabilities in Discrete Markov Chains and, like PVeStA [57], supports
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client-server architectures for parallel computations. Other tools include Rapture [159]
(which is also a BDD-based model checker) and Erlangen-Twente Markov Chain Checker
E ` MC2 [160]. Compared to the VeStA/PVeStA and Maude approach, most of these
tools sacrifice expressiveness and generality for algorithmic decidability.
There have been several works in the literature to formally analyze DoS attacks. These
include Meadow’s formal framework for evaluating protocols against DoS attacks [46], an
information flow-based framework using the Security Protocols Process Algebra (SPPA) for
the detection of DoS vulnerabilities [47], and an observation-equivalence approach based on
pi-calculus for DoS detection [48]. Other formal approaches and extensions and applications
of these approaches have also been developed [49, 50, 51].
8.7 Availability Analysis in Service Compositions
Service availability issues in service compositions in the presence of DoS attacks have only
been recently recognized. Jensen and colleagues studied distributed flooding attacks on
services in web service compositions in [161, 162], where they highlighted the challenges in
maintaining availability, defending against such attacks, and tracing sources of attack in this
context. These issues were also described in recent, general surveys of attacks, including
DoS attacks, on web services [113, 163] and cloud-based services [164].
Much of the work in the literature addressing availability of services in service-oriented
architectures deals with Quality-of-Service (QoS) properties of services, including reliability,
latency and bandwidth usage. In general, several different approaches to the analysis of QoS
properties of communication networks exist. The approach that is most closely related to our
work is based essentially on the use of a probabilistic process calculus for the specification of
services and service compositions, and a quantitative temporal logic for QoS properties. An
exemplary work using this approach appeared in [165], where the author proposed an exten-
sion of Milner’s CCS [166] with costs, which can be used to represent a QoS property such
time delays and drop probabilities. The semantics of the extended calculus, called Quality
CCS (QCCS), was given as a cost-extended labelled transition system (Quality Extended
Labeled Transition System - QELTS), in which a transition is labeled by a pair (a, c), with a
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an action and c the cost associated with the transition. To compare cost-enriched behaviors
of processes in QCCS, a notion of quantified bisimulation was also presented. The author
also gave a Quantified extension of CTL [167] (QCTL) endowed with costs, with semantics so
that satisfaction of QCTL formulas is preserved under quantified bisimulation. A similar ap-
proach, given in [168, 169], extends the timed calculus COWS [142] with probabilities, called
Stochastic COWS. Analysis is performed by translating processes in Stochastic COWS into
Continuous Time Markov Chains (CTMCs), on which probabilistic or statistical verification
can be applied using available tools, like PRISM.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
DIRECTIONS
This dissertation has presented formal methods and tools for the specification, analysis
and implementation of distributed services, based on rewriting logic, it implementation in
Maude, and the theory of Orc. A fundamental contention of this work is that in order to
be able to provide effective formal tools for the design and analysis of current- and next-
generation distributed Internet software systems, the underlying formalism should be both
very expressive, so that their features can be naturally represented, and efficiently executable,
which is required for efficient and mechanizable formal analysis, and for seamlessly deriving
system implementations from formal specifications.
Below, we provide a summary of the results obtained, while highlighting possible future
research directions.
9.1 Formal Specification and Analysis of Orc Service
Orchestrations
We have presented a formal semantics in rewriting logic of Orc that provably captures Orc’s
intended synchronous, real-time semantics, which is a unique contribution to previous ef-
forts to Orc’s formal semantics. Two specification styles of Orc’s rewriting semantics were
first discussed: (1) the SOS-based rewriting semantics, given by the theory RsosOrc, which
was obtained directly from ORC’s original SOS semantics through a semantics-preserving
transformation method, and (2) the reduction rewriting semantics, given by RredOrc, which
exploits the distinction between equations and rules in rewriting logic to arrive at a much
more efficiently executable specification. Both specifications were shown semantically equiv-
alent through a strong bisimulation theorem, which implies correctness of the (untimed)
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reduction rewriting semantics with respect to Orc’s original SOS semantics. Through their
specifications in Maude (and Real-Time Maude), both rewriting semantics can be immedi-
ately used for simulating Orc programs, and exhaustively analyzing their possible behaviors
using breadth-first search and model-checking formal analysis tools of Maude. Experimental
results, which were obtained by formally analyzing several Orc programs, have demonstrated
the execution efficiency advantage of the reduction rewriting semantics over the SOS-based
semantics.
The reduction rewriting semantics paved the ground for a more distributed, object-based
semantics, ROrc, which extended Orc’s semantics to multiple Orc expressions and provided
explicit treatment of the environment by modeling Orc sites and asynchronous message pass-
ing. A specification of ROrc in Real-Time Maude was then used as a back-end engine for the
MOrc tool, which is a web-based application enabling the formal specification and verifica-
tion of Orc expressions without exposing its user to the underlying Maude representation.
The tool was described in detail with several examples.
There are several possible future research directions that will further advance the results
obtained as part of this work. First, the object-based semantics given by ROrc already
improves on the other two semantics by introducing a level of true concurrency (object-level
concurrency) as opposed to simulated concurrency by interleaving semantics, inherited from
the original SOS semantics. However, it would be interesting to further develop an object-
based semantics of Orc that is not based on the original SOS semantics, but is instead based
on the truly concurrent, distributed semantics of rewriting logic. Recent developments in the
rewriting logic semantics project, and, in particular, the K framework [170, 62], may be used
as a vehicle towards achieving this semantics. An investigation of how this semantics relates
to the original SOS semantics of Orc would also be interesting. Another possible future
direction is to incorporate into Orc’s rewriting semantics the notion of Orc classes (Professor
J. Misra, personal communication, August 2010), which are data structures encapsulating
Orc expressions and defining interfaces to external objects. The addition of Orc classes
will have the desirable side effect of enabling the specification of behaviors of Orc sites as
expressions in Orc. This is particularly useful for MOrc, since custom site behaviors can
only be specified internally in Maude. A third possible future development is to improve
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on the expressiveness of constraints in MOrc, to allow more general constraint patterns,
and MOrc’s current post-processing functions, to provide a more user-accessible analysis
results.
9.2 Distributed Implementation of Orc Service Orchestrations
We described a general transformation methodology through which a real-time, object-based
rewriting specification can be turned with minimal effort into a distributed implementation
with physical timing, bridging the gap considerably between formal specifications and actual,
deployable implementation. The transformation methodology is fundamentally enabled by
Maude’s support for external communication with external objects through sockets. We
have demonstrated this method by applying it to the real-time, object-based semantics of
Orc, obtaining as a result, a distributed implementation, Dist-Orc. A case study was
described, in which the Orc specification of an auction application was deployed on a phys-
ically distributed network of nodes. Finally, we showed how programs in their implemented
form (according to this transformation) can still be subjected to formal analysis by building
appropriate abstractions of external objects.
Since the transformation method described above is generic, an interesting possible future
research direction is to develop a precise characterization of the class of real-time rewrite
theories for which this semantics-preserving transformation can be applied to arrive at a
provably correct implementation. This development will provide the necessary theoretical
foundation for automating the transformation process, perhaps as a meta-level function in
Maude.
Furthermore, while the distributed implementation of Orc, Dist-Orc, currently enables
prototyping and experimenting with an Orc program in a distributed environment, it does
not provide an easily accessible interface beyond that of the Maude interpreter, which may
not be as intuitive and natural as the user of an Orc program would expect when experi-
menting with or observing its behavior. In addition, the process of setting up the required
environment, including management of the ticker objects, can be burdensome since it in-
volves a fairly large number of steps that must be customized for each Orc program (this is
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currently partially automated using shell scripts). Therefore, an interesting future develop-
ment is to extend Dist-Orc with a more user-friendly, visual interface for its applications,
using, for example, the IOP+IMaude approach [20] or an external GUI server, such as the
GTK+ server [171]. This extension will automate most of the steps required to setup and
execute an Orc program, while providing a visual representation of its most relevant aspects.
9.3 Statistical Model Checking Analysis
This dissertation has proposed architecture-independent, map-reduce parallelizations of two
statistical analysis algorithms: (1) the statistical model checking algorithm of PCTL/CSL
formulas given in [1], and (2) the statistical quantitative analysis algorithm of QuaTEx
expressions given in [2]. The parallel algorithms were implemented in PVeStA, which is
based on the implementation of the original sequential algorithms in VeStA. Like VeStA,
PVeStA supports probabilistic models of systems given either as probabilistic rewrite theo-
ries in Maude, or as continuous-time Markov chains in a PRISM-like input syntax. We have
also demonstrated the performance gains as a result of parallelization through several statis-
tical analysis tasks of varying complexities, run on two different parallel architectures: a HPC
cluster, and a multi-core machine. One important goal of this contribution was to make this
increased scalability and efficiency available to expressive probabilistic models of systems,
such as probabilistic rewrite theories in Maude. To this effect, we have demonstrated and
further developed a rewriting-based approach to the analysis of availability properties of ser-
vices (specified as QuaTEx expressions) in the presence of DoS attacks in the ASV protocol
and its non-adaptive variants. Automatic statistical quantitative analysis results confirmed
previously manually proved theorems, in addition to properties shown by statistical analy-
sis of low-level network simulations. In this formal statistical model checking approach, a
considerably higher level of assurance can be gained for both analytical properties proved
by hand, and for properties suggested by simulation analyses.
An interesting future research direction related to this work is to extend the parallel
statistical PCTL/CSL model checking algorithm, and its corresponding implementation in
PVeStA, to nested probabilistic formulas of the form P./p(ϕ), where ϕ may itself be a
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probabilistic formula. While the original sequential algorithm in [1] already supports nested
probabilistic formulas, parallelization of the algorithm for nested formulas is not entirely
trivial, since nested probabilistic operators will eventually require generating further sample
executions along previously generated sample paths. A naive solution is to limit paralleliza-
tion to the outermost probabilistic operator. Another possible solution is to use techniques
from statistical model checking of black-box systems [154, 155].
9.4 Availability Analysis in Service Compositions
By building on the ASV model in rewriting logic, presented in Chapter 6, we proposed
a method for modular protection of availability properties of systems using generic ASV
wrappers, which are objects that encapsulate lower-layer configurations of objects, mediating
communication between sub-configurations of the wrapped system. We provided a detailed
description of the design of wrappers, their behaviors, and the assumptions under which
statistical model checking and quantitative analysis becomes applicable. As a demonstration
of the use of wrappers and an illustration of an expressive and flexible method for analysis
of availability in service compositions, we described an instantiation of the ASV wrappers
to Orc, given by its object-based semantics in ROrc, and conducted a set of experiments
analyzing a simple Orc orchestration pattern.
There is much more to be done in this direction. In particular, to further refine the design
of wrappers and demonstrate the generality and effectiveness of the approach, we will need
to: (1) further experiment with the Orc instantiation of ASV wrappers using more complex
orchestration examples, (2) develop other different instantiations of the wrappers beyond
Orc and experiment with them, and (3) extend the specification of wrappers to support
timing in underlying system specifications. Another possible research direction is to extend
the adaptive behavior of clients in the ASV protocol (specified in the ASV client wrappers)
to the area of cloud computing, in which dynamic resource allocation in the could is made
adaptive to potential DoS attacks, to try to maintain a level of service comparable to that
in the absence of such attacks. The generic wrappers method can be extended to support
such adaptive behaviors in server wrappers.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS OF SOME ALGEBRAIC PROPERTIES OF
ORC
Equivalence of arbitrary Orc expressions is shown here using a strong bisimulation based
on the operational semantics specified by the rules in Figure 2.2. At the risk of abusing
notation, the symbol = is used here to denote strong bisimulation.
• (f ; g) ; h = f ; (g ; h). The behavioral transitions of f are the only transitions possible
in each side of the identity. So suppose f publishes a value, i.e., f
!v
↪−→ f ′. Then, by
OtherV, f ; g
!v
↪−→ f ′, which, again by OtherV, implies (f ; g) ; h !v↪−→ f ′. Applying
OtherV to the right-hand side of the identity yields f ; (g ; h)
!v
↪−→ f ′, which concludes
this case.
Suppose now that f takes a non-publishing action n, i.e., f
n
↪−→ f ′. Then, by OtherN,
we have:
(f ; g) ; h
n
↪−→ (f ′ ; g) ; h and f ; (g ; h) n↪−→ f ′ ; (g ; h)
which concludes the proof, assuming that (f ′ ; g) ; h = f ′ ; (g ; h).
• f ; 0 = f . There are two cases corresponding to f taking a publishing or a non-
publishing action. If f publishes a value, then by OtherV, we have f
!v
↪−→ f ′ iff
f ; 0
!v
↪−→ f ′. Otherwise, if f takes a non-publishing action n, then by OtherN,
f
n
↪−→ f ′ iff f ; 0 n↪−→ f ′ ; 0 . Assuming f ′ ; 0 = f ′, the property is proved.
• f <x< 0 = [stop/x]f . We need to show that, for some label l and expression f ′:
f <x< 0
l
↪−→ f ′ <x< 0 iff [stop/x]f l↪−→ [stop/x]f ′
By Asym2, we have f <x< 0
l
↪−→ f ′ <x< 0 iff f l↪−→ f ′. Therefore, the goal reduces
to: f
l
↪−→ f ′ iff [stop/x]f l↪−→ [stop/x]f ′, which can be shown by structural induction
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on f (this property is called Substitution Independence in [83] and is proved there for the
timed SOS semantics). Therefore, the property holds assuming f ′ <x< 0 = [stop/x]f ′.
• !v ; f = !v . The only possible behavioral transition for both !v and !v ; f is the
Publish action. Therefore, !v
!v
↪−→ 0 and, by OtherV, !v ; f !v↪−→ 0 , and hence
the conclusion.
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APPENDIX B
PROPERTIES OF RSOSORC AND RREDORC
In this appendix, we refer to the theories RsosOrc and RredOrc respectively by Rs and Rr, and
use C →R C ′ to denote R ` C →1 C ′, for brevity and notational convenience.
B.1 Executability of RsosOrc
Before going through the proofs of executability of Rˆs, we outline the transformation method
applied to the underlying conditional membership equational logic theory (Σs, Es∪As) of Rs
into a semantically equivalent conditional order-sorted equational logic theory (Σˆs, Eˆs ∪As)
in Rˆs with no kinds or membership assertions, so that the current Maude tools for checking
confluence of equations and coherence of rules with respect to equations can be used. In this
transformation, a new top sort sK is introduced for each kind K in Σ. The sort sK in Σˆ
s
replaces the kind K in all kind-level operator and variable declarations in Σs. In particular,
a top sort s[Bool] is introduced and used to represent terms of the kind [Bool]. Then, each
membership clause of the form f(t1, · · · , t2) : s, with f an operator of a sort s′ ≥ s, is
transformed into the equation s?(f(t1, · · · , t2)) = true, where s? is a newly introduced
(partial) predicate, declared as s? : s′ → s[Bool]. This transformation, which is also applied
to Rr in Appendix B.2, can be straightforwardly shown to preserve the semantics of the
original membership equational logic-based rewrite theory.
Proof of Lemma 3 – ground confluence and descent properties of Rˆs. The proof is automatic
using Maude’s Church-Rosser Checker (CRC) tool [89] and the Maude module SOS-ORC cor-
responding to the rewrite theory Rˆs. In particular, by loading the Full Maude specifica-
tion of CRC and the Maude module SOS-ORC, and by issuing the CRC command (check
Church-Rosser .), we obtain the following output:
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...
Church-Rosser checking of SOS-ORC
Checking solution:
The following critical pairs cannot be joined:
cp for syn04d and cin12a1
zero = M:SiteName(VL:ValueList).
ccp for syn04c and cin12b
zero = (S:Subst ix:IVar)(S:Subst P:AParamList)
if not hasSV?(P:AParamList)= true .
ccp for syn04d and cin12a
zero = M:SiteName(S:Subst P:AParamList)
if not hasSV?(P:AParamList)= true .
The specification is sort-decreasing.
The current version of the tool has a known bug that, in some specific cases, may cause
the checker to miss some conjuncts in the conditions of conditional critical pairs, caus-
ing the reported (apparently not joinable) critical pairs above (personal communication
with Prof. Francisco J. Dura´n, November 2010). In particular, the first reported critical
pair between equations labeled syn04d and cin12a1 should actually be a conditional crit-
ical pair with the condition hasSV?(VL:ValueList) = true, which can be easily shown
unfeasible. The other two reported conditional critical pairs are missing the conjunct
hasSV?(P:AParamList) = true in their conditions, which clearly makes both pairs trivially
unfeasible. Finally, the tool correctly reports that the specification is sort-decreasing.
Proof of Lemma 4 – ground coherence of Rˆs. By definition of ground coherence (see [90]),
Rˆs is ground coherent iff for every ground Σˆs term t such that t →E,A u and t →R,A v, we
have
t
R,A //
E,A

v
E,A
∗ &&u
E,A ∗

w
A
w′
u′
R,A
// u′′
E,A
∗ 99
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where solid and dotted arrows denote, respectively, universal and existential quantification.
Likewise, for local ground coherence we have,
t
R,A //
E,A

v
E,A
∗ &&u
E,A !

w
A
w′
u′
R,A
// u′′
E,A
∗ 99
We first note that Theorem 3 in [90], which states that the notions of coherence and local
coherence coincide for the considered class of conditional rewrite theories with equational
conditions, also applies to rewrite theories with rules having rewrites in their conditions
(The proof of Theorem 3 in [90] is essentially the same because the property follows mainly
by confluence and termination of the equational rewriting relation →E,A). Therefore, the
problem of checking ground coherence of Rˆs reduces to checking local ground coherence.
Consequently, as in [90], we may reason about coherence of Rˆs by cases on u E,A← t→R,A v,
depending on whether they are overlap or non-overlap situations as follows:
Overlap Case. We note that Rˆs is a top-most theory so that rewrites by rules occur only
at the top of an Orc configuration (the top sort is Config) with no function symbols that
equationally rewrite above a configuration. Therefore, a (conditional) critical pair may only
be the result of an overlap between the left-hand side of an equation in Es and a non-variable
position in the left-hand side of a rewrite rule in Rs (Type I critical pairs in [90]). That is, the
overlap case reduces to checking for every rule l→ r if C in Rs, equation l′ = r′ if C ′ in Eˆs,
non-variable position p in l, and substitution θ such that θ(l′) = θ(l|p), that the conditional
critical pair θ(C ′)∧ θ(C) =⇒ θ(l[r′]p)→ θ(r) is either unfeasible or can be shown joinable.
It is easy to see from the equations and rules in Rˆs that the only possible overlap of this kind
is between the equation corresponding to identity (8) in Figure 2.3, namely that !v ; f = !v,
and the rewrite rule OtherV:
·〈fˆ ; g, lbl : l | r〉 → 〈f ′, lbl : !v′ | r′〉 if ·〈fˆ , lbl :  | r〉 → 〈f ′, lbl : !v′ | r′〉
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The overlap occurs at the top of the expression component of the configuration given by the
lhs of the rule OtherV, which results in the following conditional critical pair:
·〈!v, lbl :  | r〉 → 〈f ′, lbl : !v′ | r′〉 =⇒ ·〈!v, lbl : l | r′〉 → 〈f ′, lbl : !v′ | r′〉
The rewrite in the condition ·〈!v, lbl :  | r〉 → 〈f ′, lbl : !v′ | r′〉 can only be an application
of the Publish rule in Rs (see Figure 3.4) with the substitution {f ′ 7→ 0, v′ 7→ v, r′ 7→ r},
which makes the critical pair joinable by the Publish rule.
Non-overlap Case. Again, since Rˆs is top-most, we need only to consider non-overlap
situations of Eˆs under Rs. That is, we need to show local ground coherence of situations
of the form ·〈f1, r1〉 E,A← ·〈f, r〉 →R,A 〈f ′, r′〉, where rewriting with Eˆs occurs in variable
positions in f and/or r. This can be shown by induction on the size of (or the number of
applications of the Replacement inference rule of rewriting logic [10] in) a proof of the
one-step rewrite ·〈f, r〉 →R,A 〈f ′, r′〉.
The base cases correspond to applications of rules with no rewrites in their conditions,
i.e., when the rewrite step ·〈f, r〉 →R,A 〈f ′, r′〉 is an instance of one of the following rules:
SiteCall, SiteRetV, SiteRetStop, Publish, ExprCall or Tick. We will discuss the
cases for SiteCall and Tick only, as the other cases are similar. Suppose that the rewrite
is proved by SiteCall. Then, the configuration ·〈f, r〉 is of the form:
·〈M(~v), lbl : l | msg : ρ | hdl : η | r〉
Since M(~v) and any label instance of l are constructor terms, the configuration may rewrite
with equations in a substitution of the variables ρ, η, or r. In other words, the configuration
may rewrite with Eˆs to ·〈M(~v), lbl : l | msg : ρ′ | hdl : η′ | r′〉, with ρ′, η′, and r′ of the
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respective appropriate sorts. Therefore, we have:
·〈M(~v), l | ρ | η | r〉 R,A //
E,A

〈?h, M〈~v, h〉 | ρ[M,~v, h] | η, h | r〉
E,A
∗ ,,· · ·
E,A !

w
A
w′
·〈M(~v), l | ρ′ | η′ | r′〉
R,A
// 〈?h, M〈~v, h〉 | ρ′[M,~v, h] | η′, h | r′〉
E,A
∗ 33
since h = fresh(η) = fresh(η′), as the only equation that could apply to an instance of η is
the idempotency of handle sets.
For the case of the Tick rule, the configuration is of the form ·〈f, clk : t | r〉 such that
eager(〈f, clk : t | r〉) 6= true and m = mte(r) is non-zero. Using Eˆs, the configuration
may rewrite to one of the form ·〈f ′, clk : t′ | r′〉. Note that f in the original configuration
cannot be an active expression (because otherwise the configuration would be eager), which
implies that f has either the sort IExpr or ZExpr. Since these sorts are minimal, and by
the descent property of Eˆs, the sort of f ′ is the same as the sort of f . Moreover, since the
original configuration is not eager, the record r does not contain a message identified by a
handle h that is being used in f (i.e., neither an incoming message [w, h] nor an outgoing
message [M,~v, h]). Therefore, the configuration ·〈f ′, clk : t′ | r′〉 is also not eager. Finally,
since definitions of mte and δ are entirely based on message delays, which must always have
identical canonical forms in r and r′, it is easy to see that mte(r) = mte(r′) and δ(r) = δ(r′),
and hence the desired conclusion.
The inductive cases correspond to applications of the remaining rewrite rules in Rˆs, which
are the rules with rewrites in their conditions. In particular, suppose that the rewrite step is
proved by SymI. Then, the configuration has the form ·〈fˆ | g˜, lbl : l | r〉, which may rewrite
by Eˆs to the term ·〈fˆ1 | g˜1, lbl : l | r1〉 (note that fˆ1 and g˜1 are of the respective appropriate
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sorts). By the rewrite condition of SymI and the induction hypothesis, we have
·〈fˆ , lbl :  | r〉 R,A //
E,A

·〈f ′, lbl : i | r′〉
E,A
∗ ))· · ·
E,A !

w
A
w′
·〈fˆ1, lbl :  | r1〉 R,A // ·〈f ′1, lbl : i | r′1〉
E,A
∗ 55
Then, by SymI:
·〈fˆ1 | g˜1, lbl : l | r1〉 →R,A 〈f ′1 | g˜1, lbl : i | r′1〉
=A 〈f ′ | g˜1, lbl : i | r′〉
and, thus, the property holds. The other cases are similar. This completes the proof.
B.2 Executability of RredOrc
Proof of Lemma 6 – ground confluence and descent properties of Rˆr. As for Lemma 3, the
proof of this lemma is almost fully automatic using Maude’s Church-Rosser Checker (CRC)
and the Maude module RED-ORC corresponding to Rˆr. The current version of Maude’s
CRC tool, however, reports a few additional, superfluous conditional critical pairs to those
reported for Rˆs in the proof of Lemma 3 in Appendix B.1 as a result of a known problem
in the tool, as discussed before. The missing conditions, when correctly taken into account,
render the conditional critical pairs unfeasible. The tool correctly reports that the Maude
module RED-ORC is sort-decreasing.
Proof of Lemma 7 – ground coherence of Rˆr. Let Rˆr◦ = (Σˆr, Eˆr ∪ Ar, R◦, φr), where R◦ =
Rr − {IAction}. That is, Rˆr◦ is almost identical to Rˆr except without the IAction rule,
which is the only conditional rule in Rˆr with a rewrite condition. Therefore, ground co-
herence of Rˆr◦ can be shown by Maude’s ChC tool. As was argued in the proof of ground
coherence of Rˆs (proof of Lemma 4 in Appendix B.1), by Theorem 3 in [90], it is enough
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to show ground local coherence of Rˆr to show ground coherence. That is, we have to show
that, for every ground Orc configuration 〈f, r〉, the following diagram commutes:
〈f, r〉 R,A //
E,A

〈f ′, r′〉
E,A
∗ ''· · ·
E,A !

w
A
w′
〈f1, r1〉 R,A // 〈f ′1, r′1〉
E,A
∗ 88
We note that, by the ground descent property of Eˆr and the sorts ZExpr and IExpr being
minimal, if f is not an active expression, then neither is f1, and, thus, the diagram commutes
by ground local coherence of Rˆr◦. So suppose f is an active expression. Then, the one-step
rewrite must be an instance of the IAction rule. Therefore, we have to show:
〈f, r〉 R,A //
E,A

〈β(f ′), r〉
E,A
∗ ((· · ·
E,A !

w
A
w′
〈f1, r1〉 R,A // 〈β′(f ′1), r1〉
E,A
∗ 66
where β and β′ stand for auxiliary functions for internal actions, namely siteCall, exprCall,
publish and publishτ . Note that, since f is active, f1 must also be active, and hence the
use of the β′ in the diagram. Therefore, the problem now reduces to showing that the
diagram commutes by applying IAction on 〈f1, r1〉 using the same internal action rule in
the condition as the one used in the rewrite step for 〈f, r〉. It can be easily shown by cases
on the equations in Eˆr that sub-expressions in non-frozen positions in any expression g are
preserved. That is, if l → r if C is an equation in Eˆr such that θ(l) = g|q, for some non-
frozen position q, and g◦ is a sub-term of g|q then there exists a corresponding non-frozen
position q′ in g[θr]q with g◦ = g[θr]q|q′ . In particular, if f has a basic active expression b
as a subterm in a non-frozen position, then b is also a non-frozen subterm of f1. Therefore,
f1 →R,A β(f ′1), and, hence, the conclusion.
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B.3 Proof of the Equivalence Theorem (Theorem 4)
Proof. (=⇒) By induction on a proof of smallstep(·C) →Rs smallstep(·C ′), which is abbrevi-
ated below as (·C) →Rs (·C ′). There are six base cases, corresponding to the rules [Site-
Call], [Publish], [Def], [SiteRetV], [SiteRetStop], and [Tick] in Rs:
• [SiteCall]: If h is a fresh handle with respect to a handle set η, and
(·〈M(~v), lbl : l | msg : ρ | hdl : η | r〉)
→Rs (〈?h, lbl : M〈~v, h〉 | msg : ρ[M,~v, h] | hdl : η, h | r〉)
=Rs (·〈?h, lbl :  | msg : ρ[M,~v, h] | hdl : η, h | r〉)
then, by [IAction] (and [SiteCall]) in Rr, and using the substitution {f ′ 7→ γ, i 7→
siteCall(M,~v)}, we have
〈M(~v), lbl : l | msg : ρ | hdl : η | r〉
→Rr 〈act↑(γ, siteCall(M,~v)), lbl : l | msg : ρ | hdl : η | r〉
=Rr 〈act↓(γ, ?h), lbl :  | msg : ρ[M,~v, h]) | hdl : η, h | r〉
=Rr 〈?h, lbl :  | msg : ρ[M,~v, h] | hdl : η, h |r〉
The base cases for the remaining internal actions, [Publish] and [Def], are similar.
• [SiteRetV]: Suppose
(·〈?h, lbl : l | msg : ρ[v, h] | hdl : η, h | r〉)
→Rs (〈!v, lbl : h?v | msg : ρ | hdl : η | r〉)
=Rs (·〈!v, lbl :  | msg : ρ | hdl : η | r〉)
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Since ?h is an inactive expression and h ∈ handles(?h) = true is provable from Rr, we
use the rule SiteRet in Rr (with the substitution {f¯ 7→?h}) to get:
〈?h, lbl : l | msg : ρ[v, h] | hdl : η, h | r〉
→Rr 〈sret(?h, v, h), lbl :  | msg : ρ | hdl : η | r〉
=Rr 〈!v, lbl :  | msg : ρ | hdl : η | r〉
The base case for [SiteRetStop] is similar.
• [Tick]: Suppose
(·〈f¯ , clk : t | r〉)→Rs (〈f¯ , clk : t+ t′ | δ(r, t′)〉)
Then, Rs proves t′ = mte(C), which is non-zero, and eager(C) 6= true. By Lemma 9,
Rr, too, proves that that t′ is the maximum time elapse of C and that C is not an eager
configuration. Therefore, by the Tick rule in Rr, we have:
〈f¯ , clk : t | r〉 →Rs 〈f¯ , clk : t+ t′ | δ(r, t′)〉
For the inductive step, there are fourteen cases corresponding to the inductive rules listed
in Figure 3.5. We discuss below representative cases for symmetric parallel and sequential
compositions. The remaining cases for asymmetric parallel and otherwise compositions are
similar.
• [SymI]. Suppose (·〈fˆ | g, lbl : l | r〉) →Rs (〈f ′ | g, lbl : i | r′〉), which is equationally
equivalent to (·〈f ′ | g, lbl :  | r′〉), then we have
(·〈fˆ , lbl :  | r〉)→Rs (〈f ′, lbl : i | r′〉) =Rs (·〈f ′, lbl :  | r′〉)
By the inductive assumption, this implies 〈fˆ , lbl :  | r〉 →Rr 〈f ′, lbl :  | r′〉, by
an application of [IAction] in Rr such that there exists an active base expression
as a subexpression of fˆ . Therefore, fˆ →Rr act↑(f ′′, i), with f ′′ = fˆ [p ← b], for some
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position p in fˆ and b is either tmp or 0, depending on whether the internal action is
a (site or expression) call or a publishing of a value, respectively. By congruence, this
implies fˆ | g →Rr act↑(f ′′, i) | g, which is equal to act↑(f ′′ | g, i). If the action i is a
call, then by the rule [IAction]:
〈fˆ | g, lbl : l | r〉 →Rr 〈act↑(f ′′ | g, i), lbl : l | r〉
=Rr 〈act↓(f ′′ | g, e), lbl :  | r′〉
=Rr 〈f ′ | g, lbl :  | r′〉
where e is a handle expresion if i is a site call, or the instantiation of a body of an
appropriate expression declaration if i is an expression call. The remaining case when
the action i is a publishing action is similar.
• [SymE]. Let u be a site return label, and suppose
(·〈f¯ | g¯, lbl : l | r〉)→Rs (〈f ′ | g¯, lbl : u | r′〉) =Rs (·〈f ′ | g¯, lbl :  | r′〉)
Then (·〈f¯ , lbl :  | r〉) →Rs (〈f ′, lbl : u | r′〉) =Rs (·〈f ′, lbl :  | r′〉). By the inductive
assumption, this implies 〈f¯ , lbl :  | r〉 →Rr 〈f ′, lbl :  | r′〉, by an application
of [SiteReturn] in Rr such that there exists a handle base expression of the form
?h as a subexpression of f¯ at some position p, that a message [w, h] exists in the
set of handles in the handles field of r, and that f ′ is either f¯ [p ← 0] or f¯ [p ←!v],
depending on whether the return value is a stop value or not, respectively. Therefore,
by [SiteReturn], we have:
〈f¯ | g, lbl : l | r〉 →Rr 〈sret(f¯ | g, w, h), lbl : , | r′〉
=Rr 〈sret(f¯ , w, h) | sret(g, w, h), lbl : , | r′〉
=Rr 〈f ′ | g, lbl : , | r′〉
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• [Seq1V]. Suppose
(·〈fˆ >x> g, lbl : l | r〉)→Rs (〈(f ′ >x> g) | [v/x]g, lbl : τ | r′〉)
which is equationally equivalent to (·〈(f ′ >x> g) | [v/x]g, lbl :  | r′〉). Then, (·〈fˆ , lbl :
 | r〉) →Rs (〈f ′, lbl : !v | r′〉) =Rs (·〈f ′, lbl :  | r′〉). By the inductive assumption,
this implies 〈fˆ , lbl :  | r〉) →Rr (〈f ′, lbl :  | r′〉 by an application of [IAction] in Rr
such that there exists a publishing base expression of the form !v as a subexpression
of fˆ and that v is not bound in fˆ . Therefore, fˆ →Rr act↑(f ′, publish(v)), with f ′ =
fˆ [p ← 0], for some position p in fˆ . By congruence, this implies, fˆ >x> g →Rr
act↑(f ′, publish(v)) >x> g, which is equal to act↑(f ′ >x> g | [v/x]g, publishτ ), and,
thus, by the rule [IAction]:
〈fˆ >x> g, lbl : l | r〉 →Rr 〈act↑(f ′ >x> g | [v/x]g, publishτ ), lbl : l | r〉
=Rr 〈f ′ >x> g | [v/x]g, lbl :  | r′〉
• [Seq1NI]. Suppose
(·〈fˆ >x> g, lbl : l | r〉)→Rs (〈f ′ >x> g, lbl : n | r′〉)
=Rs (·〈f ′ >x> g, lbl :  | r′〉)
for some internal, non-publishing label n. Then, (·〈fˆ , lbl :  | r〉) →Rs (〈f ′, lbl :
n | r′〉) =Rs (·〈f ′, lbl :  | r′〉). By the induction hypothesis, this implies 〈fˆ , lbl :
 | r〉) →Rr (〈f ′, lbl :  | r′〉 by an application of [IAction] in Rr such that fˆ has
as a subexpression a base expression of one of the folowing forms: (i) a site call
expression M(~v), (ii) an expression call expression E(~p), or (iii) a publishing expression
!v with v bound in fˆ . For case (i), fˆ →Rr act↑(ftmp, siteCall(M,~v)), with ftmp =
fˆ [p ← tmp], for some position p in fˆ . By congruence, this implies, fˆ >x> g →Rr
act↑(ftmp, siteCall(M,~v)) >x> g, which is equal to act↑(ftmp >x> g, siteCall(M,~v)), and,
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thus, by the rule [IAction]:
〈fˆ >x> g, lbl : l | r〉 →Rr 〈act↑(ftmp >x> g, siteCall(M,~v)), lbl : l | r〉
=Rr 〈act↓(ftmp >x> g, ?h), lbl :  | r′〉
=Rr 〈f ′ >x> g, lbl :  | r′〉
Cases (ii) and (iii) can similarly be checked using IAction and the appropriate equa-
tions in Rr.
• [Seq1NE]. Let u be a site return label, and suppose
(·〈f¯ >x> g, lbl : l | r〉 →Rs 〈f ′ >x> g, lbl : u | r′〉)
=Rs (·〈f ′ >x> g, lbl :  | r′〉)
Then, (·〈f¯ , lbl :  | r〉 →Rs 〈f ′, lbl : u | r′〉). By the induction hypothesis, this implies
〈f¯ , lbl :  | r〉 →Rr 〈f ′, lbl :  | r′〉 by an application of [SiteReturn] in Rr such that
there exists a handle base expression of the form ?h as a subexpression of f¯ at some
position p, that a message [w, h] exists in the set of handles in the handles field of r,
and that f ′ is either f¯ [p ← 0] or f¯ [p ←!v], depending on whether the return value is
a stop value or not, respectively. Therefore, we have by [SiteReturn]:
〈f¯ >x> g, lbl : l | r〉 →Rr 〈sret(f¯ >x> g, w, h), lbl : , | r′〉
=Rr 〈sret(f¯ , w, h) >x> g, lbl : , | r′〉
=Rr 〈f ′ >x> g, lbl : , | r′〉
The inductive cases for [Asym2I] and [Asym2E] are, respectively, similar to [SymI] and
[SymE]. The cases for [Asym1V] and [OtherV] are similar to the value publishing case of
[Seq1V], while the cases for [Asym1NI] and [OtherNI] are similar to the internal non-
publishing case of [Seq1NI]. Finally, the cases for the external site return action, namely
[Asym1NEa], [Asym1NEb] and [OtherNE] are similar to [Seq1NE].
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(⇐=) If C →Rr C ′ is an instance of the [Tick] rule (i.e., C is not an eager configuration),
then the implication holds trivially by the corresponding [Tick] rule in Rs by Lemma 9.
So, suppose that the rewrite in the hypothesis is not an instance of the tick rule. Then,
we observe that it must be an instance of an instantaneous action, which can either be an
internal action (with the [IAction] rule) or a site return action (using the [SiteReturn]
rule). This implies that the expression component f of C is either active or inactive (i.e.,
non-zero). To complete the proof, we proceed by induction on f .
If f is a base active expression (i.e. M(~v), E(~p), or !v), then the implication holds easily
by the equations in Rr, the assumption that C is closed, and the corresponding base rules
([SiteCall], [Def], and [Publish]) for these expressions in Rs. Similarly, if f is a base
inactive expression, namely the handle expression ?h, then the implication follows using the
corresponding site return rules in Rs ([SiteRetV] and [SiteRetStop], for the cases of
returning an Orc value or a stop value, respectively).
Suppose that the expression f is of the form f | g. If the hypothesis is an instance of an
internal action i, then, modulo commutativity, it must be of the form
〈fˆ | g, lbl : l | r〉 →Rr 〈f ′ | g, lbl :  | r′〉
with fˆ having as a sub-expression a base active expression at some position p. Then, fˆ →Rr
act↑(f ′′, i), with f ′′ = fˆ [p← b], for some position p in fˆ and b is either tmp or 0, depending on
whether the internal action is a (site or expression) call or a publishing of a value, respectively.
By the equations defining act↑ for internal actions, this implies 〈fˆ , lbl :  | r〉 →Rr 〈f ′, lbl :
 | r′〉, which by the induction hypothesis implies (·〈fˆ , lbl :  | r〉) →Rs (〈f ′, lbl : i | r′〉),
and thus the conclusion holds by the rule SymI in Rs. If the action is an instance of a site
return u, then the hypothesis is of the form:
〈f¯ | g¯, lbl : l | r〉 →Rr 〈f ′ | g¯, lbl :  | r′〉
with f¯ having as a sub-expression a handle expression of the form ?h, and r having in its
messages field an incoming message of the form [w, h], and in its handles field a handle h. By
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the [SiteReturn] rule and the equations defining sret for site return actions, this implies
〈f¯ , lbl : l | r〉 →Rr 〈f ′, lbl :  | r′〉. The induction hypothesis, and the [SymE] rule in Rs
imply the desired conclusion.
Suppose f is of the form f >x> g. There are three cases. First, the hypothesis may be an
instance of a publishing action, and hence of the form
〈fˆ >x> g, lbl : l | r〉)→Rr (〈(f ′ >x> g) | [v/x]g, lbl :  | r′〉
with fˆ having as a sub-expression a base publishing expression !v such that v is not bound
in fˆ . By the [IAction] and [Publish] rules, and the equations defining act↑ for publishing
actions, this implies 〈fˆ , lbl :  | r〉)→Rr (〈f ′, lbl :  | r′〉. By induction, and rule [Seq1V] in
Rs, the conclusion holds.
The second case is when the action is a non-publishing internal action (i.e. a site call or
a τ action). In this case the hypothesis has the form:
〈fˆ >x> g, lbl : l | r〉 →Rr 〈f ′ >x> g, lbl :  | r′〉
where, by the [IAction] rule, fˆ has as a sub-expression either a site call, an expression call
or a publishing expression in a value-binding position. Again, [IAction] and the equations
defining act↑ for non-publishing internal actions, imply 〈fˆ , lbl :  | r〉) →Rr (〈f ′, lbl :  | r′〉.
Induction and rule [Seq1NI] in Rs complete the proof of this case
Finally, the action may be an external site return action, and the hypothesis has the form:
〈f¯ >x> g, lbl : l | r〉 →Rr 〈f ′ >x> g, lbl :  | r′〉
which, by the [SiteReturn] rule, the equations defining sret, the inductive hypothesis and
the Rs rule [Seq1NE], implies the desired conclusion.
The inductive cases for the asymmetric parallel composition and the otherwise composition
are similar and follow by induction and the corresponding rules in Rs.
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APPENDIX C
MAUDE SPECIFICATIONS OF THE REWRITING
SEMANTICS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF ORC
The complete specifications in Maude of the rewriting logic semantics of Orc discussed in
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 can be found in supplemental files named as follows:
• orc-syntax.maude, which specifies the syntax of Orc and the CINNI substitution
instance of Orc.
• orc-infrastructure.maude, which specifies the semantic infrastructure, described in
Section 3.1.
• orc-sos-semantics.maude, which specifies the SOS-based rewriting semantics of Orc,
described in Section 3.2.
• orc-red-semantics.maude, which specifies the reduction rewriting semantics of Orc,
described in Section 3.3.
• orc-object-semantics.maude, which specifies the object-based rewriting semantics
of Orc, described in Section 4.1.
• orc-sites.maude, which specifies a set of basic Orc sites for simulation and analysis.
The complete specifications of the rewriting-based, distributed implementation of Orc in
Maude, discussed in Chapter 5 can be found in a supplemental file named dist-orc.maude.
The specifications of the formal model of the implementation specified in Real-Time Maude
can be found in a supplemental file named dist-orc-model.maude.
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APPENDIX D
MAUDE SPECIFICATIONS OF THE ASV
PROTOCOL
The specifications in Maude of the rewriting logic model of the ASV protocol and its variants,
discussed in Section 6.3 can be found in supplemental files named as follows:
• apmaude.maude, which specifies the general structure of a communication system and
the Maude sampler module.
• common.maude, which specifies the common infrastructure and behavior across all vari-
ants of the protocol.
• omniscient.maude, which specifies behaviors specific to the omniscient protocol.
• asv.maude, which specifies behaviors specific to the ASV protocol.
• sv-aggressive.maude, which specifies behaviors specific to the aggressive, selective
verification protocol.
• sv-naive.maude, which specifies behaviors specific to the naive, selective verification
protocol.
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APPENDIX E
MAUDE SPECIFICATIONS OF THE ASV
WRAPPERS
The specifications in Maude of the generic ASV protocol wrappers and their variants, dis-
cussed in Chapter 7 can be found in supplemental files named as follows:
• apmaude.maude, which specifies the general structure of a communication system and
the Maude sampler module.
• wrappers-common.maude, which specifies the common infrastructure and behavior
across all variants of the wrappers.
• wrappers-asv.maude, which specifies behaviors specific to the ASV wrappers.
• wrappers-aggressive.maude, which specifies behaviors specific to the aggressive, se-
lective verification wrappers.
• wrappers-naive.maude, which specifies behaviors specific to the naive, selective veri-
fication wrappers.
• wrappers-nosv.maude, which specifies behaviors specific to the naive wrappers with
no selective verification.
• orc-syntax.maude, which specifies the syntax and structure of sequential Orc expres-
sions.
• orc-semantics.maude, which specifies the semantics of sequential Orc.
• orc-analysis.maude, which specifies the Orc orchestration pattern used in the anal-
ysis of Section 7.4.3.
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